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The Value of Public-Notice Filing under Uniform Commercial
Code Article 9: A Comparison with the German Legal System
of Securities in Personal Property
(Under the direction of JULIAN B. MCDONNELL)
In contrast to the public-notice filing system under
U.C.C. Article 9, the modern German law of securities in
personal property lacks publicity of security interests. The
German courts have developed a mesh of priority rules
exhaustively described in this analysis. Despite the costs and
risks arising under the formal filing system, the U.C.C.
accomplishes a preferable balance of interests involved in
secured transactions. It assures certainty to creditors about
the priority of security interests in particular assets,
whereas the German law comprehensively recognizes the debtor ^s
interest in the secrecy of the transaction and the need for
external capital. Regarding the scene of business financing,
the analysis confronts the notorious priority of the floating
lien over the supplier's security for the purchase money with
the preference of the supplier under German law. The U.C.C.
gives effect to aspects of economy and efficiency, whereas the
German law enforces standards of fairness.
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Introduction
The economic systems of both countries, the United States and
Germany, have to deal with significant undercapitalization of
businesses. Banks and other financers infusing
undercapitalized businesses with external capital seek to
protect themselves against debtors getting into default with
repayments; by acquisition of a security interest creditors
can provide that the particular collateral ensures
satisfaction of the secured debt.^ In both countries personal
property,^ including primarily chattels and receivables,
commonly serves as collateral for security interests.^ The
legal systems of the United States and Germany provide
regulations for security interests in personal property, which
deal differently with the frequent interest of the debtor to
conceal the security transaction and his incapability of self-
financing from the trade; although in both systems the
^MBank Grand Prairie v. State, 737 S.W.2d 424, 427
(Tex.Ct.App. 1987).
^Although the German term "Mobil iarsicherheiten" would be
translated literally as 'securities in movables' (as in:
Rolf Serick, Securities in Movables in German Law: An
Outline (1990)), for the purpose of this thesis the uniform
use of the expression 'personal property' will suffice.
^Serick, supra note 2, at 90, with respect to security
interests in receivables.
2inherent risks arising from ostensible ownership and secrecy
in security transactions are recognized and initially were
warded off identically.
In the common law system the risk of fraudulent conveyances
arising from ostensible ownership due to secret transfers of
property has been acknowledged in England as early as 1601. In
Twyne'^s Case the Star Chamber has held that a transfer of
ownership without a transfer of possession violated the
Statute of Fraudulent Conveyances of 1571.* Twyne^s Case
proclaimed: "Secrecy is a mark of fraud. "^ Consequentially, it
was held and practiced that any transfer of ownership required
publicity. Based upon the public function of possession
indicating ostensible ownership in the possessed chattel the
publicity of the transfer of ownership needed to be manifested
by the transfer of possession. •" Thus, the United States^ legal
system required the transfer of possession for any conveyance
including those for security purposes.'' In parallel fashion
the German private law initially acknowledged the risk of
"13 Eliz. c. 5
^76 Eng.Rep. 809, 814 (Star Chamber 1601). Defendant Twyne
received as a gift virtually all substantial assets -
primarily sheep - from his debtor, who remained in
possession thereof and was also heavily indebted to another
creditor.
^Ryall V. Rawles, 27 Eng. Rep. 1074, 1075 (Ch. 1749).
^1 Grant Gilmore, Security Interests In Personal Property
25-26 (1965); i.e.: N.Y. Lien Law § 230; Clow v. Woods,
5 S.&R. 275, 287, 9 Am. Dec. 346, 356-57 (Pa. 1819).
3fraudulent conveyances due to ostensible ownership, too, and
correspondently demanded that transfers of property rights
including secured transactions had to be accompanied by
transfer of possession.® But subsequently both legal systems
have abandoned the absolute requirement of a transfer of
possession and given effect to the debtor ^s need to use the
collateral to run its business.* Today both systems provide
security instruments for creditors allowing the debtor to
actually possess the collateral. But their approaches to
publicity of security transactions and the danger of
fraudulent conveyances arising from ostensible ownership due
to secrecy of transfers, which are not accompanied by a
transfer of possession, differ radically. ^°
The United States requires the publicity of security
transactions. As an alternative means of publicity enabling
the debtor to remain in possession of the collateral the
"Staudinger/Kober , Kommentar zum Buergerlichen Gesetzbuch
und dem Einfuehrungsgesetze, III. Band. Sachenrecht.
2. Teil. § 1205 cmt. 4, at 1395 (9th ed. 1926).
'Assumably, this need accelerated due to the
industrialization making a change of doctrine necessary,
see Julian B. McDonnell, A Reevaluation of Public Notice
under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, lA Bender ^s
Uniform Commercial Code Service Secured Transactions under
Uniform Commercial Code Chapter 6C (hereinafter: McDonnell,
6C).02[4] - 27; 1 Gilmore, supra note 2, at 25.
^^Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Introduction: Some Comparisons with
American Law, Securities in Movables, supra note 2, at 15,
characterizes the relationship between these approaches
impressively as "belong[ing] to different worlds"; he would
"place the German system at one end of the spectrum and the
US system at the other .
"
4filing of public notice of security transactions has a
tradition tracing back to the end of the past century. Varying
from state to state separated pre-code recording systems with
different locations to file had developed for different
categories of collateral and security instruments. Ultimately
there existed separate systems for trust receipts, assignments
of accounts receivables, factors^ liens and for chattel
mortgages and conditional sales. They commonly required filing
of the security agreement accompanied by the secured party ^s
affidavit confirming to have closed the secured transaction
for value and in good faith. ^^ The framers of the Uniform
Commercial Code^^ have merged these recording systems into the
one uniform system of filing a financing statement at public
office notifying of the secured transaction.^^ This system
deals unitarily with security interests in personal property
and thereby has abolished the previous distinction between
forms of security instruments.
But still it bears inefficiencies and incurs significant
costs, which make reflecting about the value of public-notice
filing appropriate. Besides the relatively moderate filing and
searching fees,^* which are necessary to finance the recording
"1 Gilmore, supra note 7, at 466.
^^Hereinafter : U . C . C . .
"U.C.C. §§ 9-302 (1) and 9-401-08 (1990); 1 Gilmore, supra
note 7, at 465 ("one big filing system").
^*See infra Part 1 X.B.4..
5system itself, plus expenses for preparing the filing, the
costs for litigation on priority issues concerning compliance
with the filing procedure impair the efficiency of secured
financing seriously. ^^ Creditors bear the risk of severe losses
arising from subordination to subsequent creditors with a
perfected security interest and lien creditors as especially
the trustee in bankruptcy^* because of noncompliance with the
system^ s public filing requirements. In the individual case
these losses seem to be harsh in consideration of their
source, the mere failure to comply with procedural details
i.e. by filing not at all required places or by misspellings
of the debtor *s name in the financing statement.
In contrast, at least in the area of business financing the
German practice of securities in personal property ultimately
has given up the concept of publicity under the German Civil
^^As White has proved, solely the costs of reported cases
on, whether the secured creditor due to perfection of his
security interest by filing public notice had obtained
priority over the trustee-in-bankruptcy^s hypothetical lien
under Bankruptcy Code (hereinafter: B.C.) § 544 (a) (1978),
amount to at least $ 1 million but perhaps even "more than
$ 30 million" per year for the period including 1980 until
1990 (James J. White, Revising Article 9 to Reduce Wasteful
Litigation, 26 Loy .L.A.L.Rev. 823, 838 note 22 (1993),
having listed 343 reported cases in note 21 at 831-38).
This litigation arises because a trustee in bankruptcy (or
debtor in possession) can avoid a security interest, if the
creditor's filing does not comply with the requirements of
Article 9 of the U.C.C.
^^Due to the so-called "strong-arm statute" of B.C.
§ 544 (a); see infra VII..
6Code.^'' The BGB lacks a public-notice-filing system entirely.
At the end of the last century the hostility towards
ostensible ownership and secret security transactions
dominated the legislature and judiciary and influenced the
drafting of the BGB, which was enacted in 1896. The statutory
pledge requiring publicity by transfer of possession or
notice, respectively, was established to serve as the
exclusive security instrument in personal property.^® Although
already in the early years of the BGB courts were reluctant to
invalidate extra-statutory devices that were contractual in
nature,^' the development of non-possessory and secret security
instruments flourished in the period of the 1960s to the mid
1970s, when the German post-war economy was booming and in a
permanent need for capital and flexible, non-possessory
security devices. The legislature has failed to respond to
this need and has neither codified laws on securities in
personal property requiring publicity by other means than
possession i.e. public-notice-filing, nor discouraged the
judiciary on its route to acknowledge the extra-statutory
security instruments. With academic support the judicial
^'C Buergerliches Gesetzbuch], Aug. 18, 1986 (RGBl., p. 195),
Oct. 7, 1993 (BGBl. I, p. 1668), hereinafter: BGB.
^*See infra Part 2 . I . .
"See i.e. Judgment of April 28, 1903, Reichsgericht,
II. Zivilsenat, 54 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in
Zivilsachen 396, 397-99 (1903) (hereinafter: 54 RGZ 396),
acknowledging a transfer of security ownership but
requiring some not defined public act executing the
transfer; see infra Part 2. II.B.2.b..
7practice has shaped the current system of securities in
personal property characterized by the lack of publicity.
This thesis examines and compares the filing system under
U.C.C. Article 9 and the operation of German securities in
personal property lacking publicity overwhelmingly and a
notice filing reguirement at all. It will attempt to show the
extent to which the systems accomplish their purposes and
comply with the interests involved in business financing, ^° and
thereby will disclose that the filing requirement under U.C.C.
Article 9 establishes substantial certainty among creditors
regarding encumbrances of potential collateral, but incurs
significant costs and particular risks of severe losses, which
could be saved under an informal system like the German. This
analysis also will reveal, that public-notice filing may
enhance economic efficiency and achieves a compromise of the
involved interests which generally is favorable to the
imbalance occurring under the German law lacking any
fundamental policy in this regard. With respect to the contest
between the principal secured financer and the supplier of a
business the thesis will set forth the system^ s contrary
treatment of priority in the debtor ^s insolvency as
acknowledged by the District Court in Hongkong and Shanghai
^°The analysis also considers issues of consumer financing
where it appears appropriate for illustrative purposes or
due to practical relevance.
8Banking Corp,, Ltd. v. HFH USA Corporation.^^ The general
priority of the principal lender according to the practice in
the United States will be confronted with its subordination to
the supplier's reservation of title under the German system.
The analysis will attempt to explain that the systems differ
so radically on this fundamental point of policy because the
United States' system tends to stress efficiency apects,
whereas the German practice gives effect to fairness
standards.
'805 F.Supp. 133, 140 (W.D. N.Y. 1992).
Part 1: Public-notice-filing in the system of secured
transactions under U.C.C. Article 9
I. The system of secured transactions under U.C.C. Article 9
U.C.C. Article 9 provides the legal framework for secured
financing and conceptually gives effect to the economy ^s need
to secure debts on a basis of personal property assets. It
recognizes a generic security interest. The security interest
establishes a property right for the secured party in the
collateral, and thus has effectiveness against the debtor and
any other creditor having no property right in the collateral.
The unsecured general creditor has no property right in the
collateral. Pursuant to U.C.C. § 9-203 (1990) the creation of
a security interest, or the "attachment", essentially requires
(1) that the secured party must either have obtained
possession of the collateral upon mutual consent or have
closed a security agreement in writing, ^^ (2), that the secured
party give "value" basically in form of credit or a "binding
'U.C.C. § 9-203 (l)(a) (1990).
9
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commitment" thereto"*^ and (3) that the debtor have any "rights
in the collateral."^* Any type of personal property, including
any receivable or intangible, may serve as the collateral of
an Article 9 security interest. ^^ According to U.C.C. § 9-102
(1) (a) (1990) security interests may also be taken in
fixtures.
U.C.C. Article 9 security interests are not limited to
security interests in present individual personal property
assets. The system enables and encourages encumbrances of
basically the debtor ^s entire present and future personal
property. ^^ Especially in the setting of business financing it
has become common practice of financers to insist in security
interests in the debtor ^s present and future acquired personal
property. These so-called "floating liens" provide the lienor
with a continuing security interest in the debtor ^s personal
property and thereby make personal property assets available
for security purposes which are subject to a rapid turnover
like i.e. inventory and accounts. Article 9 recognizes the
"U.C.C. §§ 9-203 (l)(b) and 1-201 (44) (1990).
^'^U.C.C. § 9-203 (1)(C) (1990).
^'Regarding general intangibles public-notice filing is the
sole means of perfection except for isolated accounts and
certain limited assignments under U.C.C. § 9-302 (1) (c),
(e) and (g) (1990); Uniform Commercial Code Official Text -
1990 with Comments (1994) (hereinafter: U.C.C. Official
Comment) § 9-302 cmt. 5, at 783.
^^Lynn M. LoPucki , The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80
Va.L.Rev. 1887, 1932 (1994).
11
floating lien in U.C.C. § 9-204 (1) (1990) expressly allowing
covenants in security agreements which extent the security
interest to collateral acquired by the debtor in future, so-
called "after-acquired property clauses."^" Moreover, the rules
of priority among contesting security interests in the same
collateral and the operation of the public-notice filing
system under U.C.C. Article 9 achieve almost perfect assurance
for the floating lienor to obtain the right to prior
satisfaction from the after-acquired property in the debtor ^s
insolvency.^*
The rules of priority fundamentally give effect to a concept
based on the timing of security interests. According to U.C.C.
§ 9-312 (5) (a) (1990) the security interest which is
perfected or filed first, gains priority over conflicting
security interests. Perfection occurs when the security
interest has attached and all requirements for perfection have
been fulfilled, U.C.C. § 9-303 (1) (1990). In practice the
creditor taking possession or filing a financing statement at
public office first, obtains priority.^' In the setting of
^'U.C.C. Official Comment, supra note 25, § 204 cmt. 1,
at 771.
^^LoPucki, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 1917. Regarding the preference of
the floating lienor over the supplier of a business in
detail see infra VIII..
*'For details see infra VI.. Other means to perfect a
security interest encompass i.e. the notification on a
certificate of title, temporary and automatic perfection
(See: U.C.C. § 9-302 (1990)).
12
business financing this is notoriously the principal financer
providing the business with the initial credit, taking a
floating lien for security and filing public notice first.
The system of secured financing giving priority over general
and unperfected unsecured creditors overrides the "principle"
of equal treatment of creditors in bankruptcy by per-quota
satisfaction from the estate regardless of bilateral
agreements of certain creditors with the debtor. '° The secured
creditor with priority in the collateral is not limited to
per-quota satisfaction and the collateral is deprived from the
bankruptcy estate available to satisfy the general creditors.
Thus the amount of return payments to general creditors in the
debtor *s bankruptcy is reduced. The "value" of unsecured - and
secured, but unperfected - debts decreases.'^ This intervention
by U.C.C. Article 9 has been challenged on grounds of
unfairness. ^^ But since contractual creditors can be "aware of
^°Thomas H. Jackson/ Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing
and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 Yale L.J. 1143, 1147
(1979).
^^Jackson/Kronman , 88 Yale L.J. at 1147; Alan Schwartz,
Taking the Analysis of Security Seriously, 80 Va.L.Rev.
2073, 2076 (1994).
"LoPucki, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 1954-62. LoPucki suggests the
"implied contract theory" resting on the reasonable
expectations of the voluntary unsecured creditor about
prior credit transactions and private disclosure of their
terms which previously has been rejected by the court in
Ninth District Production Credit Association v. Ed Duggan,
Inc., 821 P. 2d 788, 793 (Colo. 1991). The court has held
that a claim of a supplier for unjust enrichment against a
floating lienor would be inconsistent with the concept of
priority established under U.C.C. Article 9, even though the
13
... the risk[s]" arising under the U.C.C. Article 9 priority
rules, these creditors - other than "involuntary" i.e. tort
claimants and suppliers of businesses^^ - are free to negotiate
a perfected security interest or refrain from the credit
transaction. Moreover, it has been observed that based on a
"zero-sum hypothesis" the general creditor grants credit on an
unsecured basis in return for a higher interest rate
reflecting the risk of a reduction of the debt^s value due to
subsequent debts reducing the quota of the initial credit or
even gaining priority according to U.C.C. Article 9.^" Read it
the other way, the security reduces the interest rate.^^
Accordingly the current debate about the doctrines behind the
so-called "puzzle of secured debt"^* focuses on economic
supplier reasonably did not foresee the prior security
interest.
"See infra X.C.3.
.
^^Jackson/Kronman , 88 Yale L.J. at 1147-48; Robert E. Scott,
The Politics of Article 9, 80 Va.L.Rev. 1783, 1802 (1994);
Schwartz, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2079-80; White, 26 Loy .L.A.L.Rev.
at 839, acknowledging these choices of lien creditors in a
regime of their subordination under a revised U.C.C.
Article 9; Homer Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the
Economic Efficiency of Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact,
133 U.Pa.L.Rev. 929, 940, 946, 948, 950 (1985), rejecting
the "zero-sum hypothesis"; LoPucki , 80 Va.L.Rev. at 1955-
58, objecting to the presumption of an informed market.
^^Schwartz , 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2079-80, states that the
unsecured lender is induces to "raise [the] ... interest
rate .
"
^^Schwartz, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2079; Hideki Kanda/Saul Levmore,
Explaining Creditor Priorities, 80 Va.L.Rev. 2103, 2104
(1994) .
14
efficiency considerations .^"^ For economic reasons the present
system has been challenged in several respects.^® But
especially regarding the initial financer of a business
commonly insisting on a floating lien^^ and thus obtaining
first priority in basically all of the debtor ^s personal
property, the secured financer ^s priority over other creditors
has been justified as an incentive for the principal creditor
to "monitor"*^ and "counsel"*^ the debtor, which ultimately
also benefits the other creditors. The principal lender
entering into the business relationship with the debtor on a
^^Jackson/Kronman, 88 Yale L.J. at 1148; Scott, 80 Va.L.Rev.
at 1802.
^^See only: Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18
J. L. Studies 209, 211, 249-54 (1989), and Alan Schwartz,
Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of
Current Theories, 10 J. L. Studies 1, 10, 33-34 (1981),
basically favoring a debtor-based security system awarding
strict priority to a limited number of first-in-time
financers over all subsequent creditors without the need
for public notice; White, 26 Loy .L.A.L.Rev. at 830-41,
suggesting priority of unperfected security interests over
lien creditors and the repeal of U.C.C. § 9-301 (l)(b)
(1990); LoPucki, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 1959, 1964-65, demanding
to limit the binding effect of security agreements to
unsecured third-party creditors to reasonably expectable
security interests and thereby to require an implied assent
to the subordination.
^'Which is a comprehensive security interest in the
business* present and after-acquired assets and also
secures future advances, see infra VIII..
""Jackson/Kronman , 88 Yale L.J. at 1156-57, 1161; Scott, 80
Va.L.Rev. at 1796-97; similarly: George G. Triantis,
Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect Information, 21
J. L. Studies 225, 241-55 (1992), finding that secured
transactions reduce information deficits in the financing
economy; refused by: Schwartz, 10 J. L. Studies at 10, 15, 33,
"^Scott, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 19796-97; refused by: Schwartz, 10
J. L. Studies at 10, 15, 33.
15
secured basis "signals" to the trade that he has verified the
debtor ^s creditworthiness and is going to police his
commercial activity." Consequentially the subsequent creditors
are enabled to make a better informed credit decision. Giving
priority to the "signaling" principal financer also is deemed
to resolve the problem of " freeriding" by unsecured creditors
in the financing market."^ Furthermore, the subordination
encourages the later secured creditor to consider the credit
decision well and thereby minimize inefficient "overlending"
to debtors facing insolvency.**
Another approach for the justification of secured transactions
rests on the impact of subsequent debts on the initial credit.
Subsequent debts reduce the recoverable quota of earlier
credit in the debtor ^s bankruptcy*^ and induce the debtor to
engage in increasingly risky projects endangering return
payment on the senior credit, because risky operations with a
small chance of high returns become efficient when the
*^The medium for the secured creditor's "signal" is provided
by the system of filing public notice under U.C.C. Article
9; Scott, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 1796, 1801; see infra III..
*^Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and
Corporate Settings, 92 Yale L.J. 49, 71 (1982).
**Kanda/Levmore , 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2142.
*^Schwartz, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2076; even though on the other
hand the subsequent debt may enable a profitable project
increasing the debtor's revenue and ultimately the chance
of return payment in the ordinary course of business, the
"reduction-in-bankruptcy-share effect" supersedes in
practice (at 2077-78).
16
expenses for credit accelerate.** The assurance of prior
satisfaction of the senior credit in the debtor ^s bankruptcy
provides useful protection against both the loss of value of
the initial debt and the "risk alteration" and therefore
encourages financers to be the first and principal creditor of
a business other than under a pure per-quota system.*'' Thus the
impact of potential subsequent credit has been held to justify
the acknowledgment of security interests and first-in-time
priority under U.C.C. Article 9.*^
**The problem of "risk-alteration" is illustrated by:
Kanda/Levmore , 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2108-11.
^'Kanda/Levmore , 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2113.
*®Kanda/Levmore , 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2113. Other more general
efficiency arguments rest i.e. on the acknowledgment of an
overall and "general" increase of efficiency in credit
transactions (Paul M. Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of
Secured Transactions, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 1067, 1122-24
(1989)); on an accelerating effect of security on the speed
of credit decisions (Kripke, 113 U. Pa. L.Rev at 948); on the
extension of credit for the troubled debtor due to the
availability of transferring security interests in personal
property (James J. White, Efficiency Justifications for
Personal Property Security, 37 Vand. L.Rev. 473, 508
(1984)), which may increase the chances for return payment
to unsecured creditors in ordinary course of the debtor ^s
business; on the assessment that a secured transaction
establishes a "bargain" of "special treatment for important
financial interests in exchange for the obligation to
provide public notice of prior claims" (Scott, 80 Va.L.Rev.
at 1831); on the opinion that secured transactions
economically do not differ from other commercial
transactions like sales, which are encouraged by the state
(Steven L. Harris/Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based
Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtors^ Choices
Seriously. 80 Va.L.Rev. 2021, 2037-41 (1994); rejected by:
Schwartz, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2081-87).
17
II. The media of publicity for security interests
U.C.C. §§ 9-302 (1) and 9-401 (1990) provide that in order to
perfect a security interest a financing statement generally
can be filed as an alternative means of publicity to transfer
of possession according to U.C.C. § 9-305 (1990).*^ Security
interests in account receivables and general intangibles must
be perfected by filing since both are not manifested in
writing which could be subject to delivery.^" The U.C.C.
acknowledges further methods of publicity with respect to
security interests in motor-vehicles and collateral possessed
by a bailee. Regarding the first, publicity is established by
notification of the security interest on the certificate of
title unless the motor-vehicle is held as inventory. ^^ On
regard to the second, a possessory security interest, a pledge
in nature, may be established in collateral in the possession
of a third-person bailee by notification of he security
interest to the bailee." This notification replaces the
"U.C.C. § 9-302 (1990) contains a catalogue of further, but
"less important" (White, 26 Loy .L.A.L.Rev. at 826)
exemptions of perfection by public-notice-filing such as
temporarily perfected security interests in proceeds
arising from the disposal of the collateral and money or
instruments not constituting part of chattel paper, which
cannot be perfected by filing at all, but must be handed
over, U.C.C. §§ 9-302 (l)(b) and 9-304 (l),(4)-(6) (1990).
^°U.C.C. Official Comment, supra note 25, § 9-305 cmt. 1, at
789.
"U.C.C. § 9-302 (3) (1990) and the supplementary note,
U.C.C. Official Comment, supra note 25, § 9-302 at 782.
"U.C.C. § 9-305 second sentence (1990).
18
collateral's delivery." Accordingly, U.C.C. § 9-305 states
that transfer of possession is deemed to have occurred upon
the bailee's receipt of the notification. Because the
notification manifests the debtor's "relinquishment ... of
control over the disposition of the collateral," it is
required that the debtor notify the bailee.^*
III. Interpretations of the treatment of public-notice-
filing and the objectives of the recording system under
U.C.C. Article 9
In the academic debate the public-notice-filing system has
increasingly been appraised under economic and efficiency
criteria correspondent to the approach to explain the entire
system of security interests under U.C.C. Article 9.
Accordingly, it has been held that the public-notice-filing
system serves as the medium for the secured creditor to
communicate information about the existence of prior credit to
the debtor and the principal lender's intent to "monitor" and
"counsel" the debtor; it thereby reduces expenses for
investigations and policing efforts on the part of subsequent
"In re Peter Kontaratos, 10 B.R. 956, 968 (D.Me. 1981).
^*In re Peter Kontaratos, 10 B.R. at 970; In re David A.
Crabtree, 48 B.R. 528, 533 note 12 (E.D. Tenn. 1985); in
contrast, Gilmore has held notification by either the
secured party or the debtor sufficient, 1 Gilmore, supra
note 7, at 440.
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creditors using the recording system." This aspect of
efficiency has been acknowledged especially with respect to an
asset-based system of security interests since the creditor
seeking information without notice would have to employ
expensive inquiries regarding specific assets. ^^ On the other
hand the public-notice-filing system in connection with the
first-in-time priority rule under U.C.C. Article 9 enables the
principal creditor of a business to "stake his claim" in
exchange for the foresaid monitoring and counselling
services,^' which seems to discourage principal lenders from
monitoring the debtor ^s cash-flow and engagement in risky
business activities.^® Moreover, it has been stated that the
public-notice-filing system is "only justifiable", if it
incurs lower interest rates than a system of private
disclosure would. ^' Under a private disclosure system the
presumably lower degree of accuracy in the signaled
information*" would increase the risk of a shortfall and thus
^^Scott, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 1801, 1831; Kanda/Levmore , 80
Va.L.Rev. at 2128; Jackson/Kronman , 88 Yale L.J. at 1158-
61; Schwartz, 18 J. L. Studies at 218-24.
^^Whereas in a debtor-based system only a review of the
debtor ^s accounting books would suffice, Kanda/Levmore, 80
Va.L.Rev. at 2128.
^"Kanda/Levmore, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2104-05; Robert E. Scott, A
Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 Colum.L.Rev.
901, 932-33 (1986).
^^Schwartz, 10 J. L. Studies at 10.
^'Schwartz, 18 J. L. Studies at 218-24, and Schwartz, 80
Va.L.Rev. at 2085; Scott, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 1831-32 note 144.
*°Scott, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 1831.
20
induce the creditor to calculate a higher premium for the risk
on the interest rate.*^ But on the other hand it has been
considered that the debtor would have an incentive to full and
accurate disclosure to minimize the interest rate.*^ Basically
law and economics regard the public-notice-filing system as a
vehicle of information about prior credit, which to be
reasonable has to be overall more efficient than a competing
system of private disclosure."
The public-notice-filing system due to its characterization as
a medium to communicate information about prior credit and the
debtor ^s creditworthiness has been held to be "principally for
the benefit of those creditors who are subject to the
limitations of the first-in-time principle"^" since they are
enabled to make a sophisticated credit decision. In contrast,
others see it as the necessary means to operate the first-in-
time priority rule under U.C.C. Article 9, which thereby has
become a "pure race" filing system merely "designed" to prefer
^^Regarding the mechanism of the risk premium in the
interest rate see supra 1
.
.
"Scott, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 18 3 2 note 144; Schwartz, 80
Va.L.Rev. at 2084-85, therefore denying an "improv[ement
of] ... loan pricing" by the current public-notice filing
system under U.C.C. Article 9.
"Scott, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 1831; Kanda/Levmore , 80 Va.L.Rev.
at 2128-29; Schwartz, 18 J. L. Studies at 218-24.
64Scott, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 1801.
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secured creditors, who are enabled to "sort out" their
property interest against contesting creditors."
All of these approaches basically focus on the observation of
the social effects of the filing system^ s current operation.
They do not expressly consider that it has been initiated to
establish a compromise between the various interests of the
secured creditor, the general creditors and also the debtor
and his customers. They are concerned by secured transactions,
as the history and development of secured transactions, as set
forth above, indicates.^* Accordingly the public-notice-filing
system under U.C.C. Article 9 follows basically three
policies: It is determined to establish certainty for the
secured party regarding the acquisition of the security
interest having priority in a potential conflict of security
interests. *" In continuation of the pre-code filing systems it
also pursues to protect transferees against misrepresentation
and fraudulent conveyances by the debtor after the security
transaction due to ostensible ownership. Additionally, it is
^^Douglas G. Baird, Notice Filing and the Problem of
Ostensible Ownership, 12 J. L. Studies, 53, 55, 66 (1983);
LoPucki, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 1917, 1964.
**See: 1 Gilmore, supra note 7, at 464-65; McDonnell, supra
note 9, at 6C.03[l][a] - 35, [2] - 38-39, 6C.07 - 128-42;
LoPucki, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 1965, demanding such a view
realized by the current revision of U.C.C. Article 9.
^'1 Gilmore, supra note 7, at 465; Baird, 12 J. L. Studies at
55, 60, 64-65; James J. White, Work and Play in Revising
Article 9, 80 Va.L.Rev. 2089, 2096 (1994). Trust Company
Bank V. The Gloucester Corporation, 643 N.E.2d 16, 19
(Mass. 1994).
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designed to facilitate public-notice-filing under former
filing systems. ^^ Within these policies the system has been
laid out to impair contravening interests, especially those of
the debtor, only as much as necessary to achieve its foresaid
directives."
Certainty regarding the perfection of the security interest
and protection of the potential transferee shall be achieved
by public notice of the collateral's encumbrances in the
filing records. The reasonable searcher of records shall be
"alerted" of the senior security interest in the collateral .'°
The protection of third parties is limited to this cautionary
function; the recording system only requires the filing of a
financing statement and is not intended to provide full
disclosure of the secured transaction. Correspondently it
assigns the burden of additional investigation^^ and ultimately
the risk of the debtor's misrepresentation upon request for
further information to the potential transferee. ^^
^^1 Gilmore, supra note 7, at 463-65.
"See; McDonnell, supra note 9, at 6C.03[l][a] - 35,
defining and evaluating the debtor's and sometimes the
creditor's "privacy" interests affected by the disclosure
through the recording system.
""Biggins v. Southwest Bank, 490 F.2d 1304, 1308 (9th Cir.
1974); Magna First National Bank and Trust Company v. Bank
of Illinois in Mt. Vernon, 553 N.E.2d 64, 66 (Ill.App.Ct.
1990) .
"^U.C.C. Official Comment, supra note 25, § 9-402 cmt. 2 at
824; Biggins, 490 F.2d at 1308.
'''Baird, 12 J. L. Studies at 61.
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In the drafting of U.C.C. Article 9 this limited imposition of
due diligence upon the third party was selected rather than a
proposal to eliminate the public-notice-filing requirement.
The competing approach would have shifted the burden of due
diligence to the already secured party obliging it to monitor
and assure that the debtor disclosed the security transaction
to potential transferees of the collateral; the subsequent
transferee deceived by misleading statements should have been
granted relief by the availability of recovery of losses
sustained in good faith from the secured party violating its
"policing duty."'^
The triggering idea for the present filing system under U.C.C.
Article 9 has been the replacement and "unification" of
various formerly separated filing systems for trust receipts,
chattel mortgages, chattel sales etc..'* Thereby a centralized
filing system on the state level was suggested instead of
local filing.'^ Beside the unification of filing systems the
entire procedure of filing itself was intended to be
'^Baird, 12 J. L. Studies at 59-90.
''^l Gilmore, supra note 7, at 465; see supra Introduction.
"^But U.C.C. Article 9 is not intended to decide the
controversy and abandon local files as manifested by the
alternative proposals in U.C.C. § 9-401 (1) (1990); U.C.C.
Official Comment, supra note 25, § 9-401 cmt. 1, at 819.
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facilitated by a limitation of the information needed to be
filed. '^
IV. The filing procedure
The procedure of proper filing is regulated in U.C.C. §§ 9-
401-03 (1990). It requires that the secured party files a
financing statement containing the information listed in
U.C.C. § 9-402 (1) (1990) at the office determined according
to the particularly adopted alternative in U.C.C. § 9-401 (1)
(1990). Instead of a separate financing statement similar to
the sample in U.C.C. § 9-402 (3) (1990) the secured party may
file a copy of the security agreement provided that it
contains the minimum information required for a financing
statement and is signed by the debtor, U.C.C. § 9-402 (1)
sentence 5 (1990).
The financing statement must show the debtor ^s name, his
address and signature, the secured party ^s name and address,
and it must identify the collateral, U.C.C. § 9-402 (1)
'^U.C.C. Official Comment, supra note 25, § 9-402 cmts. 3, 9
at 825-26; 1 Gilmore, supra note 7, at 465; Baird, 12
J. L. Studies at 59; see also U.C.C. § 9-402 (8) (1990)
stating that "minor errors [in the financing statement]
which are not seriously misleading" are considered
irrelevant to perfection of the security interest.
Schwartz, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2084-84, expresses concerns about
the impact of excessive facilitation neglecting the
system* s "signaling" function and leading to "asymmetric"
information and ultimately "social inef ficien[cy]" in the
credit market.
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(1990). Since the debtor^s name is the criterion for the
filing system* s index, "seriously misleading" changes in the
debtor *s name require an amendment statement, U.C.C. § 9-407
(7) sentence 2 (1990). In addition to the debtor *s individual
name the secured party may file the financing statement under
the debtor *s trade name.""' The debtor *s address also serves his
identification. '^ His signature manifests his assent to the
filing of public notice."" The showing of the secured party *s
name and address shall enable the searcher to "reach" the
secured party for further inquiry. ®° The collateral is
adequately identified in the financing statement, when its
description is reasonable, U.C.C. § 9-110 (1990). Considering
the purpose of the filing system, such a description requires
that the prudent searcher be alerted to undertake additional
inquiry to find out the precise collateral.®^ Thus, less
strictly than the description of the collateral in the
security agreement, the financing statement merely must
''^Argumentum ex U.C.C. § 9-403 (5) (1990); U.C.C. Official
Comment, supra note 25, § 9-402 cmt. 7, at 826.
''^Argumentum ex U.C.C. § 9-403 (4) (1990); In re Excel
Stores, Inc., F.2d 961, 963 (2d Cir. 1965).
'^McDonnell, supra note 9, at 6C.05[6]-90.
*°In re Bengtson, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 283 (D.Conn. 1965).
"Biggins v. Southwest Bank, 490 F.2d 1304, 1308 (9th Cir.
1973) .
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indicate the category of collateral," i.e. accounts
receivables/^ equipment** or inventory.*^
The financing statement must be filed at the proper office
depending on the alternative of U.C.C. § 9-401 (1) (1990)
adopted by the particular state. Under this provision the
location of filing orientates at the place of the collateral
and the place of the debtor. Due to lack of consent among the
drafters of U.C.C. Article 9, whether a statewide or a local
system was preferable, they have provided three alternative
proposals in the code, which fundamentally rest on filing at
the office of the Secretary of State and differ regarding the
extent of local filings. Ultimately the third proposal
requires beside single central and local filings also double
filings, consisting of a central plus a local filing in the
county of the debtor ^s place of business or his residence, if
he either has solely one place of business statewide, or if
his place of business is located out of the state of his
residency, respectively."
"U.C.C. Official Comment, supra note 25, § 9-402 cmt. 1, at
924.
®'In re Varney Wood Products, Inc., 458 F.2d 435, 438
(4th Cir. 1972)
.
^^United States v. Crittenden, 600 F.2d 478, 481
(5th Cir. 1979)
^^Argumentum ex In re Katz, 563 F,2d 766, 769
(5th Cir. 1977)
^^Regarding failure to file at the proper location see
infra V.
27
The filing is effective as soon as the filing officer has
accepted the financing statement or the secured party has
presented the statement and the filing fees to the officer,
whatever is earlier, U.C.C. § 9-403 (1) (1990). The
consecutive indexing of the financing statement by the filing
officer is beyond the secured party ^s influence and
responsibility and therefore not necessary to "constitute"
filing.*"
V. The irrelevance of trivial errors in the financing
statement and major sources of inadequacy in filing
In consideration of the filing system^ s limited purpose to
merely caution searchers checking the records®* a financing
statement fundamentally meeting the requirements as set forth
above will not be invalidated for containing "minor errors
which are not seriously misleading," U.C.C. § 9-402 (8)
(1990). To determine whether any incorrectness is trivial in
this sense, it has to be examined, whether the particular
defect under the circumstances of the individual case bars the
"reasonably prudent" searcher from recognizing and allocating
•'U.C.C. Official Comment, supra note 25, § 9-407 cmt. 1, at
834; In re Royal Electrotype Corporation, 485 F.2d 394, 396-
97 (3rd Cir. 1973); In re Smith, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 730
(W.D. Okl. 1971)
**See supra III. .
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the security interest and the affected collateral.*' If the
defect turns out to be insurmountable by reasonable efforts,
the error has to be considered grave and prevents the security
interest from perfection. ''° If on the contrary the financing
statement as filed meets the foresaid standard despite the
incorrectness, the error is deemed irrelevant.'^
Considering the described standard, an element of the
financing statement being extremely sensitive towards errors
is the debtor *s name. Since the financing statement is indexed
pursuant to this feature, particularly in a computerized
system, any misspelling typically causes the statement being
untraceably recorded in the filing system. But, to illustrate
the complexity of issues concerning the adequacy of filings
containing errors, if the statement is filed under the
debtor *s regular used trade name instead of his legal name,'^
the mistake exceptionally may not be seriously misleading due
to the particular circumstances in the individual case. The
irrelevance of an error may also be inferred, if the debtor ^s
exact name is indicated somewhere else on the financing
®'In re Glasco, Inc., 642 F.2d 793, 796 (5th Cir. 1981);
National Cash Register Company v. Mishkin^s 125th St., Inc.,
317 N.Y.S.2d 436, 439 (N.Y.Civ.Ct. 1970).
'°K.N.C. Wholesale, Inc. v. AWMCO, Inc., 128 Cal.Rptr. 345,
348-49 (Cal.Ct.App. 1976).
'^In re Glasco, Inc. 642 F.2d at 796; National Cash Register
Company v. Mishkin^s 125th St., Inc., 317 N.Y.S.2d at 439.
"In re Glasco, Inc., 642 F.2d at 796.
29
statement'^ i.e. in the debtor *s legible signature,** so that
the filing officer would have been induced to either ask for
the correct name or double-index the financing statement. On
the other hand, apparently "slight" errors like the mere
adding of a "Co." in a corporate name have been regarded as
significant in the sense of U.C.C. § 9-402(8) (1990) since
according to the official administration of the records a
search would disclose only statements "found under the exact
name listed" and any probability of incidental findings has to
be considered speculative.'^
Besides errors in the debtor ^s name a further major source of
inadeguacy of filings focuses on filings at the wrong or not
at all reguired places. Considering that an austere standard
is applied regarding the correctness of the filing^s location
to protect the searcher who hardly can be supposed to find a
statement at the improper office,'* the misplacement of a
filing commonly rests on factual'^ or legal'® problems
'^Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc. v. Tabenken (In re Brawn),
7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 565, 578 (D.Me. 1970).
'*In re Vaughan, 4 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 61, 65-66 (W.D.Mich.
1967).
'*In re Raymond F. Sargent, 8 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 583, 592
(D.Me. 1970).
'^McDonnell, supra note 9, at 6C.06[2][b] - 123-24.
''I.e. an important factual issue relates to the
determination of the debtor ^s residency, when he is moving.
In the context of dual filing see: Uniroyal, Inc. v.
Universal Tire & Auto Supply Co., 557 F.2d 22 (1st Cir.
1977) .
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regarding the application of the particular proposal. Apart
therefrom difficulties might occur in interstate commerce
regarding the determination of the applicable state law
governing the security interest due to the separate filing
systems in each state and the inconsistency of the adopted
proposals of U.C.C. § 9-401 (1) (1990) among the states." A
failure to file at the right place can only be cured pursuant
to U.C.C. § 9-401 (2) (1990) regarding any collateral as to
which the filing has been proper, if it was made in good
faith, and regarding the entire collateral against anyone
having knowledge of the misplaced financing statement.
Both of the foresaid major sources of noncompliance with the
filing procedure contribute significantly to the extensive
volume of litigation on the issue of whether an asserted
security interest has been perfected or not. Moreover, since
these exemplary mistakes in the filing procedure typically
render the filing inadequate to perfect the security interest,
they set forth significant risks for the filing secured party
*®I.e. of primary legal concern is the disparity among
courts regarding the definition of a corporation's place of
business; in some jurisdictions the courts rest on the
declaration in the certificate of incorporation (National
Cash Register Co. v. K.W.C. , Inc., 432 F.Supp. 82, 87
(E.D.Ky. 1977)), while in others they stress the prime area
of business operation (In re Carmichael Enterprises, Inc.,
334 F.Supp. 94, 102-03 (N.D. Ga . 1971), affirmed per
curiam, 460 F.2d 1405 (5th Cir. 1972)).
''U.C.C. §§ 9-401 (4) and 9-103. Difficulties may arise
particularly from moving goods serving as collateral,
Douglas G. Baird/Thomas H. Jackson, Security Interests in
Personal Property 239 (2nd ed. 1987).
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to sustain severe losses in the debtor *s bankruptcy due to the
treatment as a general creditor limited to per-quota
satisfaction from the estate. ^°°
VI. The consequences of perfection
Once the required steps have been taken as set forth above,
proper filing is constituted and the attached security
interest is perfected, U.C.C. § 9-303 (1990).^°' Perfection
gives the secured party a priority right regarding
satisfaction of the secured debt from the collateral in a
conflict between competing security interests and accordingly
binds third parties holding a security interest in the same
collateral. Upon the debtor ^s default with payment, ^°^ the
secured party having first priority is entitled to exercise
the rights under U.C.C. §§ 9-501 et seq. (1990),^°^ especially
^""Regarding trustees scrutinizing filings for any failure to
comply with the filing procedure and the effect of an
unperfected security interest in the debtor ^s bankruptcy
see infra VII. and X.B.2..
^°^U.C.C. Official Comment, supra note 25, § 9-301 cmt. 1, at
779; Casterline v. General Motors Acceptance Corporation,
171 A. 2d 813, 816 (Pa . Super .Ct. 1961); In re Moore,
7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 578 (Bankr.D.Me. 1969), distinguishing
perfection from the "validity" and the "effectiveness" of
a security interest.
^°^U.C.C. § 9-501 (1990).
^°^These rights emerge from the secured transaction.
Therefore they are also available to unperfected secured
parties vis-a-vis the debtor (See: U.C.C. Official Comment,
supra note 25, § 9-501 cmt. 1, at 836).
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to repossess the collateral without a judgment^"* and either
retain it for the debt^°^ or sell it and account the proceeds
on the debt^s balance. ^°^ If the secured creditor intends to
buy the collateral, the liquidation must be executed by public
sale.^°'
The determination of first priority and the solvation of a
conflict between contesting security interests in the same
collateral is governed by priority rules. Generally they
determine that the earlier security interest prevails over the
later, ^°® that a later perfected security interest gains
priority over an earlier unperfected^°' and that among
contesting perfected security interests the one, which is
filed or perfected first whatever is earlier, is prior over
the later. ^^° Although these principles are subject to several
exemptions, ^^^ the fundamental consequence of a filing of
105
^°*U.C.C. § 9-503 (1990).
U.C.C. § 9-505 (2) (1990).
V.C.C. § 9-504 (1990).
U.C.C. § 9-504 (3) (1990).
U.C.C. § 9-315 (5)(b) (1990).lOS
^°^Argumentum ex U.C.C. §§ 9-301 (l)(a) and 9-312 (5) (a),
which "impl[y]" that a perfected security interest is prior
to an unperfected (Henry J. Bailey Ill/Richard B. Hagedorn,
Secured Transactions in a Nutshell 231 (3rd ed. 1988)).
"°U.C.C. § 9-312 (5)(a) (1990).
^^^Regarding the priority of a lien creditor, particularly
the trustee in the debtor ^s bankruptcy see infra VII. and
regarding the purchase money security interest see infra
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public notice first in time is the priority over competing
creditors in the collateral and the assurance of substantial
recovery of the secured credit not limited to the per-quota
satisfaction of a general or an unperfected or subsequently
perfected secured creditor in the debtor ^s bankruptcy . ^^^
Since perfection commonly is constituted by public-notice
filing, in a conflict of security interests the order of
priority can be verified accurately from the public files.
There is no need to rely on the debtor *s or any other
statements and records as it would be, if i.e. the date of the
security interest's creation were the decisive criterion.
Thus, the filing system under U.C.C. Article 9 provides the
first-to-perfect priority rule with operative clarity and
certainty in potential conflicts between perfected security
interests. ^^^
VII. The need of perfection to assure priority in the
debtor's bankruptcy
In the debtor's bankruptcy a security interest enjoys priority
when it has been perfected before the petition for
VIII. .
"''See infra VII. .
113Baird, 12 J. L. Studies at 64-65.
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bankruptcy. ^^* While the general creditors usually are limited
to share the proceeds of the estate after its closing, the
creditor holding a perfected security interest may obtain
relief of the automatic stay on certain grounds^" during the
pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding. The automatic stay
generally bars any attempts of creditors to collect the debt
including the effort to perfect a security interest. ^^^ The
trustee in bankruptcy may "abandon" the collateral at the
secured party ^s request^^' or if it is "burdensome ... or of
inconsequential value ... to the estate. "^^* Consecutively the
perfected secured creditor can liquidate it pursuant to U.C.C.
§§ 9-501 et seq. (1990)."' In practice the abandonment seems
to be worth of consideration primarily, when the secured debt
exceeds the value of the collateral.
If the trustee decides to keep the collateral to use or sell
it in the ordinary course of business pursuant to B.C. § 363,
he is obliged to provide for "adequate protection" of the
^^*With respect to some security interests the secured party
has a limited grace period to perfect after the petition
for bankruptcy; B.C. §§ 362 (b)(3), 546 (b)
,
providing an
exemption of the automatic stay under B.C. § 362 (a).
^^^I.e. the lack of adequate protection; B.C. § 361.
"*B.C. § 362 (a).
"^B.C. § 554 (b).
"«B.C. § 554 (a).
"'See supra VI .
.
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security interest. ^^° A lack of adequate protection gives rise
for the perfected secured creditor to request relief of the
automatic stay.^^^ Ultimately, if the trustee liquidates the
collateral, the perfected secured creditor has a right to
vindicate the proceeds deducting the trustee *s costs^^^ in the
amount of the secured debt^s open balance plus interest and
reasonable expenses.^" If the proceeds are insufficient to
satisfy the secured creditor, he becomes a general creditor
regarding the remaining balance. ^^*
But due to the so-called "strong-arm" clause in B.C. § 544 (a)
the privileges of priority sketched above are only available
to a secured creditor whose security interest is perfected in
time. This regulation provides the trustee in bankruptcy with
the powers of a creditor holding an executional lien - on
behalf of the general creditors he is representing^^^ - and
correspondently he is authorized to "avoid" any transfer of
interest in the collateral as a lien creditor could. ^^* Since
a lien creditor prevails in a conflict with any security
"°B.C. § 361.
"^B.C. § 362 (d)(1).
"=B.C. § 506 (C).
"=*B.C. § 506 (b).
""B.C. § 506 (a).
"^B.C. § 702.
^''^This regulation is acknowledged in U.C.C. § 9-301 (1) and
(3).
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interest unperfected at the time of the lien^s creation,
U.C.C. § 9-301 (l)(b) (1990), the trustee may set aside any
security interest, which is unperfected, ^^'^ especially
improperly filed, and thereby basically demote the unperfected
secured creditor to a general creditor for the purpose of the
bankruptcy proceedings.^^*
Due to his power under the "strong-arm" clause and his task to
"collect . . . the property of the estate"^^' the trustee is
induced to scrutinize whether security interests with asserted
priority have been perfected properly and particularly have
been filed accurately. Therefore the compliance with the
filing procedure has become an issue of extensive litigation
especially in connection with bankruptcy proceedings. ^^°
VIII. The comprehensive preference of the principal financer
to the supplier of a business regarding their security
interests and remedies
The code provides the supplier with several remedies in the
event of the debtor *s default with payment arising from the
^^'Or not perfected in time.
^^^Baird/Jackson, supra note 99, at 478.
"*B.C. § 704 (1).
^^°Regarding the empirical results of Whitens studies on
"wasteful" litigation on these issues see supra
Introduction and infra X.B.4..
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sale under U.C.C. Article 2. In addition, U.C.C. Article 9
generally enables the supplier of a business with inventory or
equipment to acquire a security interest for the purchase
price in the sold goods, the purchase money security
interest. ^^^ Under common law^^^ sellers could secure the
purchase money effectively by retaining title in the sold
goods. The concept of conditional sales allowed the delivery
and the buyer taking possession of the goods subject to the
seller^s retained title which was to pass over to the buyer
upon full payment of the purchase money. ^^^ Since the seller
retained its rights and had not acquired them derivatively
from the debtor, the conditional sale was not held to
constitute a fraudulent conveyance by the debtor. ^^^ Upon the
debtor ^s default with payment of the purchase money, the
seller was entitled to repossess the goods. ^^^ Courts gave the
"^U.C.C. § 9-107 (a) (1990). A purchase money security
interest may also acquire any person giving credit to
enable the debtor to purchase the goods, U.C.C. § 107 (b)
(1990) .
^^^Which governed title retention until legislation
integrated conditional sales into the system of security
interests in personal property primarily by Conditional
Sales Acts.
^^^1 Gilmore, supra note 7, at 71; Baird/Jackson, supra note
99, at 40.
^^*Baird/Jackson, supra note 99, at 41.
^^^Alternatively the seller could seek a judgment for payment
of the purchase price. But the seller was barred from
repossessing the goods and receiving a judgment for the
open balance of the purchase price (R. Braucher & R.
Riegert, Introduction to Commercial Transactions 397-98
(1977)).
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seller ^s retained rights priority over a contesting floating
lien and thereby made the conditional sale an attractive
security device for suppliers of businesses. The courts
refused to give effect to the after-acquired property clauses
in the lien agreements on grounds of fairness stating that the
enforcement of these provisions would frequently cause "gross
injustice. "^^* But remarkably, it was held a mere
"technicality" irrelevant under aspects of equity that the
after-acquired property clause could not attach the lien to
the property retained by the seller and not vested to the
debtor, yet.^^'
Under the U.C.C. the purchase money creditor may obtain
priority over the business^ principal financer, who already
holds a perfected security interest in the debtor ^s present
and future property for his loans to the business, the
floating lien. As far as the purchase money security interest
gains priority over previously perfected security interests,
the first-to-perfect priority rule is displaced. This
exception in favor of the later perfected security interest
has been justified at least on three grounds; First, the
purchase of supply and consequentially the security for the
purchase money are required by the debtor to run his business
"^United States v. New Orleans Railroad, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.)
362, 364-65 (1871).
"'Pennock v. Coe, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 117, 121 (1860).
Regarding the argument of nemo dat, quod non habet , see
infra Part 2 IV. A..
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and ultimately make return payments to the earlier
creditors ;^^* second, the other creditors benefit from the
later purchase money creditor monitoring the debtor;^'' third,
with respect to goods not designed for resale, thus other than
inventory, the later purchase has been held not to lead to a
problem of "risk-alteration" affecting the earlier credit. ^*°
But in practice the general availability of priority has
turned out to be effective only until the delivery of the
collateral to the debtor, thereafter the availability has
remained to be at most a theoretical under the code. Before
the debtor has obtained possession of the goods, the supplier
is protected sufficiently by the remedies under Article 2 of
the U.C.C. in the event of the debtor *s default with payment.
Accordingly, the supplier has rights to withhold delivery^*^
and to stop delivery, when the goods have already left the
supplier's sphere for shipment. ^*^ These remedies are "similar"
to a security interest for the purchase money without the
requirement of a written security agreement or the filing of
"^Scott, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 183 3.
"'Levmore, 92 Yale L.J. at 56-57
140-Kanda/Levmore , 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2139. Regarding "risk
alteration" see also supra I..
^"U.C.C. §§ 2-609 (1), 2-702 (1) and 2-703 (a) (1990).
^*^U.C.C. § 2-705 (1990). Besides default with payment these
remedies apply also to the buyer's repudiation of the
contract and wrongful rejection of the goods.
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a financing statement. ^"^ The floating lien does not prevail
over these rights of the supplier since it has not attached to
the goods free of the latter. The opinions hold that the
floating lienor does not qualify as a good faith purchaser
under U.C.C. § 2-403 (1) (1990) because the debtor has not
obtained possession, yet/** which could establish the basis
for the debtor ^s ostensible ownership and the lienor *s good
faith.
After delivery has occurred, the supplier encounters both
statutory and practical difficulties in achieving priority
over a floating lien. If the collateral of the purchase money
security interest is other than inventory, in the context of
business financing primarily equipment, the supplier has to
perfect and file a financing statement within ten days after
delivery to assure priority. ^*^ In contrast priority of the
purchase money security interest in inventory requires that
perfection occur at the time of delivery and that the holders
of conflicting security interests in the collateral.
^*^U.C.C. Official Comment, supra note 25, § 9-113 cmt. 1, at
764.
^"^Ceres Incorporated v. ACLI Metal & Ore Company, 451
F.Supp. 921, 924-25 (N.D.Ill. 1978); Ramco Steel Inc. v.
Kesler, 620 F.2d 767, 774 (10th Cir. 1980); Abilene
National Bank v. Fina Supply, Inc., 800 F.2d 469, 473 (5th
Cir. 1986); Crocker National Bank v. Ideco Division of
Dresser Industries, Inc., 839 F.2d 1104, 1109 (5th Cir.
1988), cert, denied 495 U.S. 919 (1990).
^*^U.C.C. § 9-312 (4) (1990). While a purchase money security
interest in consumer goods is perfected automatically
without filing according to U.C.C. § 9-302 (l)(d) (1990).
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especially the floating lienor, have received written notice
of the purchase money security interest from the supplier
within five years before the debtor obtains possession of the
inventory, U.C.C. § 9-312 (3) (1990). These restrictions on
the availability of priority to purchase money security
interests in inventory have been designed to protect other
creditors, usually floating lienors, with a conflicting
security interest and making "periodic advances against
incoming ... inventory;" upon notification the lienor can
prepare himself for fraudulent requests by the debtor for
advances, when the latter already has given a purchase money
security interest designed to defeat the floating lien.^**
Another statutory disadvantage for the supplier of inventory^*'
in the contest with the floating lienor follows from U.C.C. §
9-312 (3) (1990). Regarding the proceeds of the collateral's
resale the purchase money security interest's priority may
only cover "identifiable cash . . . received on or before
delivery" to the debtor's customer. "Cash proceeds" are
defined in U.C.C. § 9-306 (1) (1990) and especially do not
extend to accounts. The exclusion of accounts from the
priority of the purchase money security interest disadvantages
the supplier because the rapid turnover of the inventory in
^*^U.C.C. Official Comment, supra note 25, § 9-312 cmt. 3, at
801-02.
^^'This restriction does not apply to the seller of equipment
since it is not designed for resale (U.C.C. Official
Comment, supra note 25, § 9-312 cmt. 3, at 802).
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the debtor ^s business routinely is accomplished on an account
basis. Correlatively, the exclusion prefers the floating
lienor significantly, who routinely extends the lien to
present and future accounts.
In practice a serious obstacle to the supplier's acquisition
of a prior purchase money security interest also results from
the usage of negative pledge clauses in the financing
business, which basically are recognized in U.C.C. § 9-311
(1990) acknowledging that the alienation of the debtor's
rights in the collateral may be prohibited contractually."^** By
these covenants the principal financers prohibit their debtors
to transfer any right in the collateral including any purchase
money security interest, which would deprive the secured lien
of its priority status.^*' Although the negative pledge clause
does not abrogate the debtor's power to transfer his interests
in the collateral, ^^° it rather operates as a promise on the
part of the debtor not to cooperate in the creation of any
interest jeopardizing the priority of the financer's lien.
Breach of the negative pledge clause will constitute a default
^"Chadron Energy Corporation v. First National Bank of
Omaha, 379 N.W.2d 742, 748 (Nebr. 1986).
^"'Sometimes the purchase money security interests are
excluded from the negative pledge clause, as in the
provision of concern in Kelly v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 11 F.Supp. 497, 502 note 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1935),
reversed 85 F.2d 61 (2d Cir, 1936).
^^°Chadron Energy Corp, v. First Nat. Bank of Omaha, 379
N.W.2d at 748.
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under the debtor *s security agreement with the principal
lienor.^" Upon such default the lien creditor is entitled to
call the loan, seek payment of the accelerated balance^" and
ultimately obtains the right to take possession of the -
typically substantial - collateral actually covered by the
lien. In light of these potential consequences of an offense
against the negative pledge clause, the clause operates as a
useful tool for the floating lienor to prevent prior purchase
money security interests against their borrowers. Considering
all of these obstacles to a purchase money priority, purchase
money financers prefer an intercreditor agreement under which
the floating lienor agrees to subordinate its interest. The
express subordination is the only way the supplier can be
assured of priority. But it requires the consent of the
floating lienor.
Furthermore, in a conflict with the floating lienor the
supplier also loses protection under U.C.C. Article 2 after
delivery of the goods. When the debtor has obtained
possession, the supplier generally has a right to reclaim the
^^^Redding v. Rowe, 678 P. 2d 337, 338 (Wash.Ct . App. 1984);
United Independent Insurance Agencies, Inc. v. Bank of
Honolulu, 718 P. 2d 1097, 1102 (Haw. Ct. App. 1986). In case
of the creditor's shortfall it also gives rise for
compensation of damages for breach of the promise, which is
obviously is less important in the debtor's insolvency
(see: Ray D. Henson, Secured Transactions under the Uniform
Commercial Code 193 (2nd ed. 1979)).
^"Independent Insurance Agencies, Inc. v. Bank of Honolulu,
718 P. 2d at 1102; LoPucki , 80 Va.L.Rev. at 1926.
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goods upon the debtor ^s default with payment of the purchase
price. ^^^ But the remedy of reclamation is subject to the
rights of a good faith purchaser under U.C.C. § 2-403 (1)
(1990).^^" Based upon this authority the floating lienor
constantly has been recognized as a good faith purchaser for
value^" taking the security interest in the goods free of the
supplier's right to reclamation. ^^^ Although the applicability
of the good-faith-purchaser clause with respect to the right
of reclamation^^^ seems to rest on the debtor's possession
indicating ostensible ownership, the lienor's knowledge of the
supplier's remedy does not impede his qualification as a good
faith purchaser. ^^® The supplier basically can only defend his
"^U.C.C. §§ 2-507 (2), 2-511 (3) and, expressly for the
buyer's insolvency, 2-702 (2) (1990); U.C.C. Official
Comment, supra note 25, § 2-507 cmt. 3, at 128. The right
for reclamation is subject to various modifications and
restrictions by the trustee in the debtor's bankruptcy,
ultimately even the refusal of repossession, B.C. § 546
(c), (d).
^^*U.C.C. § 2-702 (3) (1990).
^"Value is assumed to be given according to U.C.C. § 1-201
(44) (b) (1990) already by the initial grant of credit or an
extension thereof. Any separate additional credit
specifically related to the supply with the goods is not
required. (Lavonia Manufacturing Company v. Emery
Corporation, 52 B.R. 944, 946, 41 U.C.C. Rep.Serv. 1172
(E.D.Pa. 1985).
^^^Lavonia Manufacturing Company v. Emery Corporation, 52
B.R. at 946; Trust Company Bank v. The Gloucester
Corporation, 64 3 N.E.2d at 18; Stowers v. Mahon (In re
Samuels & Co.), 526 F.2d 1238, 1243-44 (5th Cir. 1976) (en
banc), cert, denied 429 U.S. 843 (1976).
^^"'In contrast to the rights to withhold or stop delivery.
^^^Stowers V. Mahon, 526 F.2d at 1243-44; Teton International
V. First National Bank of Mission, 718 S.W.2d 838, 841
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remedy by showing circumstances of bad faith on the part of
the financer, which are subject to an extremely high standard
rarely met in practice. ^^'
The supplier is unable to circumvent the preference of the
floating lienor by a reservation of title in goods delivered.
U.C.C. § 2-401 (1) (1990) States that the retention of title
merely reserves a security interest without a security
agreement, which is subject to the foresaid restrictions. This
feature of United States* law provides one of its principal
contrasts to the German system which enforces title retention
similarly to the pre-code common law.^*°
This overall subordination of the supplier's security for the
purchase price, especially for inventory under the floating
lien ultimately results from the binding effect of the
security agreement between the debtor and the lienor on the
supplier. Although such binding effect of security interests
on third-party creditors has been subject to academic
(Texas Ct. App. 1986).
^^*Mere efforts by the principal financer to extend the
collateral of his security interest do not suffice unless
they are accompanied by i.e. collusive conduct or
fraudulent misrepresentation concerning the debtor's
financial situation. See: E.A. Miller, Inc. v. South Shore
Bank, 539 N.E.2d 519, 523 (Mass. 1989).
"°See infra Part 2 II. A., IV.B.,C..
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criticism, ^*^ the courts have enforced the policy of U.C.C.
Article 9 to prefer the principal lender over the supplier and
to encourage accounting and inventory financing as manifested
by the foresaid principles. Consequentially, the courts have
rejected suppliers^ restitutional claims for unjust enrichment
of the principal financer.^*^
IX. Cross-collateralization as a means of the principal
financer to expand the security interest
U.C.C. § 9-204 (3) (1990) gives effect to clauses in the
security agreement, which provide that the security interest
in the particular collateral in addition to the debtor ^s
present credit shall also expand to certain future debts or
liability of the debtor to the secured party. These covenants
generally effect that the initial security interest under its
status of priority continues to secure future advances as long
as the financing statement is filed, despite of any competing
security interests intermediately perfected. ^*^ But there exist
^*^Julian B. McDonnell, The Floating Lienor as Good Faith
Purchaser, 50 S.Cal.L.Rev. 429 (1977). LoPucki , 80
Va.L.Rev. at 1959, 1964-65, suggests for the revision of
U.C.C. Article 9 to bind the third-party creditor only to
security agreements between the debtor and other creditors
,
which were reasonably foreseeable, so that it can be deemed
to have assented to his subordination.
"^Ninth District Credit Association v. Ed Duggan Inc., 821
P. 2d at 793; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v.
Quality Inns, Inc., 735 F.Supp. 1311, 1318-20 (D.Md. 1990).
"=*U.C.C. § 9-312 (5) and (7) (1990); First National Bank of
Grayson v. Citizens Deposit Bank and Trust, 735 S.W.2d 328,
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some exceptional limitations on the continuation of priority,
i.e. regarding the security interest in advances made after an
interfering judgment lien had attached.^**
The cross-collateralization clause commonly is part of a
floating lien and employed by financers expecting to extend
their loans or to provide new credit to the debtor before the
initial credit will be paid off entirely and therefore aim to
ensure priority of the security for these advances. Generally
cross-collateralization clauses have been upheld by courts in
the setting of business financing. ^^^ The covenants in the
security agreement merely must cover the advances, which the
security interest is designed to secure, but neither must
331 (Ky.App. 1987); National Bank of Northern New York v.
Shaad, 400 N.Y.S.2d 965, 966-67 (1977).
"*U.C.C. § 9-301 (4) (1990) stating that the expanded
security interest only prevails regarding advances made not
later than 45 days after the judgment lien^s attachment or
without knowledge thereof or pursuant to a commitment
entered into without knowledge of the lien; U.C.C. Official
Comment, supra note 25, § 9-301 cmts. 7-8, at 780.
Regarding the protection of an intervening buyer of
collateral see U.C.C. § 9-307 (3) (1990).
^*^I.e.: In re Public Leasing Corporation, 488 F.2d 1369,
1378 (10th Cir. 1973); In re Riss, Tanning Corporation, 468
F.2d 1211, 1213 (2d Cir. 1972); Ex parte Chandler, 477
So. 2d 360, 362-63 (Ala. 1985). Whereas in the area of
consumer financing covenants in the context with cross-
collateralization, which consolidate the debts, determine
per-rata crediting of payments on all open debts and
thereby ultimately avoid any possibility of release of the
initial collateral except for full payment of the
accelerated debt, have been subject to judicial scrutiny
under the aspect of unconscionability ; i.e.: Williams v.
Walker-Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 447, 450 (D.C.App.
1965) .
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indicate the amount of the future advances^" nor need to be
disclosed in the financing statement .^^^ Thus, other creditors
of the debtor basically have no access to information about
the amount of the open debt and the exact expansion of the
security interest; in this respect they depend on private
inquiry and disclosure.^*®
X. The filing system^ s overwhelming compliance with the
involved interests
In consideration of the comparison with the German legal
system on securities in personal property it has to be
determined, in how far the public-notice-filing system under
U.C.C. Article 9 accomplishes its purposes and complies with
the interests affected by secured transactions. These are the
interests of the parties involved in the transaction, the
debtor and the secured party, and the interests of third
persons, the prospective secured creditors, the general
creditors and the buyers of the collateral.
^"As it was required under several common law jurisdictions,
U.C.C. Official Comment, supra note 25, § 9-204 cmt. 5, at
772.
^^^U.C.C. Official Comment, supra note 25, § 9-204 cmt. 5, at
772; First National Bank of Grayson v. Citizens Deposit
Bank and Trust, 735 S.W.2d at 331.
"^^^Henson, supra note 151, at 184.
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A. The limited accomplishment of the debtor^s interest in
secrecy of the security transaction
Pursuant to the filing system* s purpose to avoid secret
transfers of non-possessory security interests^*' the system
interferes with the debtor *s interest to conceal the entire
security transaction itself. But this infringement of the
debtor *s secrecy interest is outweighed by the advantages
emerging from the ability to use the collateral which due to
the filing system replacing the transfer of possession is the
sole and mandatory means of public notice of the secured
transaction. ^'^ Furthermore the filing system enables the
debtor *s principal financer to "stake his claim" by filing
notice of his lien first and thereby to limit the risk of a
shortfall in the debtor *s insolvency. ^^^ This risk-reducing
effect of the filing system is reflected in the interest rate
of the credit due to a deduction of the risk premium contained
in the interest rate. Thus, ultimately the debtor obtains his
principal credit for a lower interest rate.^'^
Whereas within the scope of the filing system* s rationale the
debtor *s legitimate interest to keep the conditions of the
^"See supra Introduction and III..
^""See supra Introduction and II. and III..
^'^Kanda/Levmore , 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2104-05, 2113.
^^^Regarding the mechanism of the interest rate influenced by
security see: Schwartz, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2076-78, 2084-85.
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transaction, like the amount of original credit or subsequent
advances and the interest rate, secret from trade is
comprehensively complied with under U.C.C. Article 9. The
financing statement does not disclose any business secrets and
details of the existing security interest except for the
identification of the parties and the collateral .^''^
B. The advantages for and the burdens on the secured party
Once the availability of a non-possessory security interest
and the limitation of a legitimate secrecy interest are
accepted, the assessment of advantages and disadvantages of
the filing system for the parties of the security transaction
focuses on the person of the secured party.
1. The certainty to acquire a security interest with
priority in a potential conflict with other security
interests
The filing system^ s principal advantage for the secured party
results from its correlation with the first-to-perfect
priority rule. The possibility to verify the filing date and
due to the priority rule the superior rank of the security
interest by simply referring to the filing records creates
^^^McDonnell, supra note 9, at 6C.07[1] - 128-30, provides a
detailed list of potential information covered by the
debtor ^s secrecy interest and not disclosed in the
statement.
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certainty regarding the priority in a potential conflict of
security interests.^'"' Accordingly the secured party having
filed notice of its security interest first is assured to gain
priority against any conflicting security interests and to be
entitled to seek satisfaction of the secured debt from the
liquidation of the collateral in the debtor ^s insolvency .^'^
This certainty applies particularly to the principal financer
of a business, who can "stake his claim" through the filing
system and neither has to fear any "risk alteration"^"'^ nor any
devaluation of his claim by later debts of the business^''' and
in practice even no priority of subsequent purchase money
security interests in the business* after-acquired equipment
or inventory or accounts proceeds therefrom. ^^® This advantage
makes the secured party ultimately being the primary
beneficiary of the filing system^^' and outweighs any of the
following disadvantages to him.
^"•Trust Company Bank v. The Gloucester Corporation, 64 3
N.E.2d at 19; 1 Gilmore, supra note 1, at 465; Baird, 12
J. L. Studies at 55, 60, 64-65; White, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2096.
^^^Baird, 12 J. L. Studies at 55, 64-65.
^^*Kanda/Levmore , 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2104-05; Baird, 12
J. L. Studies at 55, 65.
^^'Schwartz, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2076-78.
^'® Especially by avoiding cooperation of the debtor
regarding the perfection of a purchase money security
interest of the supplier due to the usage of a negative
pledge clause; see supra VIII.
^^^Baird, 12 J. L. Studies at 55.
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2. The risks of non-perfection and severe losses due to
failure to comply with the formal requirements under U.C.C.
Article 9
The formalities of the filing system under U.C.C. Article 9
routinely do not impose severe obstacles to perfection of the
security interest and despite that certain "minor" errors in
the filing of public notice are considered irrelevant. But
there remains the inherent risk of the formal requirements,
that they are seriously disobeyed particularly due to
misspellings in the debtor *s name and misplacement of the
filing, so that the security interest has not been perfected.
The volume of litigation indicates the factual risk of
erroneous filing endangering perfection of the security
interest, even if the chance of a serious failure to comply
with the foresaid filing procedure is drastically limited by
the current version of U.C.C. Article 9.
A major factor for the relevance of proper filing arises from
the "strong-arm" clause^*° and the priority of lien holders
over earlier unperfected security interests^®^ authorizing the
trustee in the debtor ^s bankruptcy to set aside earlier
security interests, when they are inadequately filed. The
"°B.C. § 544 (a).
"'U.C.C. § 9-301 (l)(b) (1990).
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reported cases^" initiated by the trustee in bankruptcy, in
which the security interest turned out to be unperfected, give
an estimation about the risk of non-compliance with the filing
procedure in practice. ^®^
Nevertheless, acknowledging that a risk is determined by the
ratio of the probability of a loss and the expected sum of a
loss in case of its occurrence^®", it can be stated, that in
the individual case the small possibility of erroneous filing
may increase to a significant risk on the part of the secured
party. A credit requiring a perfected security interest
frequently amounts to a considerable volume and in the event
of inadequate filing the unperfected secured creditor merely
receives per-quota satisfaction like a general creditor in the
debtor ^s bankruptcy instead of the proceeds from the
liquidation plus per-quota payment of the remaining balance. ^*^
Overall, under the present filing system the secured party
"^For the period including 1980-90 revealed in: White, 26
Loy.L.A.L.Rev. at 831-35 note 21.
"^As proposed by White, 26 Loy.L.A.L.Rev. at 830-41, a
repeal of U.C.C. § 9-301 (l)(b) (1990) and the lien^s,
including the trustee ^s hypothetical lien^s, priority over
earlier unperfected security interests would reduce the
risk of inadequate filing significantly. But the repeal
would also effect a serious reduction of public disclosure
in the practice of secured financing which would harm the
overall valuable balance of interests and particularly the
certainty about the priority status of creditors * security
interests.
"*The probability-cost ratio.
"^See supra VII.
.
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bears the - relatively small - risk of disobeying filing
requirements, which may cause the security interest's
ineffectiveness and consequentially severe losses.
3. The deterioration of the interest in secrecy
Sometimes secured parties share the debtor's interest to
conceal the security transaction or certain terms of it from
trade, in particular from competitors^®^ or different
clients.^®'' This interest is deteriorated by the filing system
as far as it concerns the mere fact of the secured
transaction; with respect to certain terms of the transaction,
including the total credit outstanding, the interest rate and
the purpose of the financing, the secrecy interest is
protected correspondently to the debtor's interest.^*®
4. The facilitation interest and the costs for the secured
party under the regime of the public-notice filing system
From a perspective merely considering the costs and
inconveniences connected with public-notice filing the secured
party has a strong interest in the facilitation of the filing
"^In re Cushman Bakery, 526 F.2d 23, 28, 33 (1st Cir. 1975)
cert, denied 425 U.S. 937 (1976).
"'McDonnell, supra note 9, at 6C.03[l][a] - 35.
""See supra 1 .
.
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requirement.'^®' Although the filing fees themselves are
relatively moderate, ^*° the costs increase to some
significance, when the secured party wants to ensure itself
about the first priority of its security interest. In that
case due to delays in the indexing process of probable prior
filings the secured party has to request a search of its
financing statement indicating no earlier contesting
statement. ^'^ This double-check causes additional costs for the
filing creditor. In addition, there incur expenses either in-
house or due to engagement of external counsel for the
preparation of the filing. ^'^ Preparation particularly
encompasses the determination of the proper place of filing.
Primarily in the context of interstate commerce this task
frequently is complicated and thus costly to resolve due to
the existence of separate filing systems in each state and the
inconsistency of state legislation under the current filing
system. In contrast to a centralized federal filing system
^**McDonnell, supra note 9, at 6C.03[1] - 38; Harris/Mooney
,
80 Va.L.Rev. at 2021.
^'"Report of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 9 Filing
System Task Force to the Permanent Editorial Board ^s Article
9 Study Committee (May 1, 1991), (hereinafter: Task Force-
Report), in appendices to: Permanent Editorial Board (PEB)
Study Group Uniform Commercial Code Article 9, Report
(December 1, 1992), (hereinafter: PEB-Report), p. 23.
I.e. in Louisiana they amount to $ 15,— per standard form
of a financing statement and to $ 30,— per non-standard
form plus additional charges for attachments and further
debtors listed. Task Force-Report, Appendix I at p. 49.
"^Task Force-Report, p. 20.
^'^hite, 26 Loy.L.A.L.Rev. at 830-31.
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which would render a filing effective nationwide, the current
decentralization causes problems regarding both the
determination of the proper state to file initially and the
need for any refiling, i.e. when the collateral is moving. ^'^
As mentioned above, within the applicable filing system it may
vary from state to state, whether filing at the local county
office, the state office or even dual filing is reguired in
the individual case.^'*
But as far as these costs and inconveniences are inherent in
public-notice filing any interest to avoid them is superseded
by the purpose and the advantages of the system to the secured
party assuring the acguisition of a prior status for the
security interest. ^'^ Therefore any less expensive way to
determine priority, especially by relying on the date of the
security interest's attachment, would establish at least both
the dependence on the parties' records for finding out about
priority and the temptation of contesting creditors to
^'^These problems are illustrated by Baird/Jackson, supra
note 99, at 239-46.
^'"See supra IV., V.. But this impairment of the filing
creditor's facilitation interest must not be overrated in
the evaluation of the filing system for the purpose of this
comparative analysis. The PEB will address this issue in
the revision of U.C.C. Article 9; see: PEB-Report, p. 90,
Task Force-Report, p. 24. Nevertheless, it remains to be
seen in how far harmonizing including federalizing
tendencies will succeed in the revision process.
^'^See supra 1 .
,
2 . .
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manipulate their agreements and advance the relevant dates. ^'^
Only cumulative and concealed costs^*^ arising from
inefficiencies in the technical operation of the filing
system, i.e. from delays in the indexing process^'® and from
insufficient computerization/'' are not balanced by the
superior need for certainty of priority. In this context it is
sufficient to note that the PEB plans to simplify the filing
procedure and to improve the efficiency of the entire filing
system within the revision of U.C.C. Article 9.^°°
But inherent in the requirement of public-notice filing to
obtain priority over conflicting security interests,
especially in the debtor ^s bankruptcy, the secured party may
sustain significant costs due to litigation merely concerning
the issue of perfection and proper filing, which could be
saved under a system of securities in personal property
lacking a notice-filing requirement. As mentioned previously,
White has examined the costs of litigation on issues of
"^McDonnell, supra note 9, at 6C.03[l]-38.
^'^Which are "enormous" according to the Task Force-Report,
p. 23.
^'^PEB-Report, p. 88; Task Force-Report, pp. 20-21.
"'PEB-Report, p. 88.
^°°See: PEB-Report, pp. 88, 90; Steven O. Weise, Report:
Initial Meetings of Article 9 Drafting Committee (1994),
p. 3, and UCC Article 9 Revisions-Report: Third Meeting of
Drafting Committee (October 20, 1994), p. 3 ; Fred H.
Miller, Plus The Revision of UCC Article 9 Conference on
Consumer Finance Law, 47 ConsumerFin.L.Q.Rep. 257 (Summer,
1993) .
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perfection challenged by the trustee in the debtor ^s
bankruptcy intending to set aside unperfected security
interests under the "strong-arm" clause. Considering certain
variables he has appraised the overall costs of litigation on
these issues between "not less than millions per year" and
perhaps in the area of $ 30 million per year during the period
including 1980-90.^°^ A substantial part of these costs
incurred to the creditors claiming to have a perfected
security interest due to adequate filing of public notice. ^°^
Therefore, it can be concluded that the filing system gives
rise to the secured party ^s interest to facilitate filing and
particularly to minimize the risks of improper filing and the
costs arising from both litigation and filing itself including
preparation of the latter. But this interest basically is
outweighed by the advantage of certainty regarding the
^°^26 Loy.L.A.L.Rev. at 838 and note 22.
^°^Beside the secured creditor's interest to minimize the
risk of failure to obtain priority and consequentially to
sustain severe losses, its interest to avoid litigation
costs supports IVhite's proposal of a policy subordinating
the lien creditor and particularly the trustee in
bankruptcy to the earlier unperfected secured party (26
Loy.L.A.L.Rev. at 830-41). Additionally, this proposal
would save filing fees and expenses for preparing the
financing statement at least with respect to the volume of
filings designed to defeat the trustee in bankruptcy, which
would become superfluous under this policy. But as
mentioned above (supra 2. note 183) this proposal would
reduce disclosure and jeopardize the balance of interests
and the valuable certainty established under the public
filing system.
59
priority of the security interest. ^°^ Moreover, any further
facilitation of filing must be proceeded cautionarily for
efficiency reasons because excessive granting of security
could jeopardize the filing system^ s "signaling" function
regarding the debtor ^s creditworthiness and ultimately would
increase the risk premium reflected in interest rates. ^°*
C. The accomplishment of the third persons^ interests
The filing system under U.C.C. Article 9 complies with its
basic purpose to protect third persons against fraudulent
conveyances in the course of ostensible ownership due to the
availability of non-possessory security interests. ^°^ It
fundamentally accomplishes or at least balances the interests
of third persons affected by the security transaction.
1. Compliance with and obstacles to the prospective secured
creditor's interests in general
The creditor, who intends to give credit to the debtor on a
secured basis after a previously perfected security
transaction by another creditor, basically needs certainty
about the existence of the prior encumbrance of the potential
'See supra 1 . .
•Schwartz, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2084-85.
^°^Regarding this purpose see supra Introduction and
I. .
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collateral. With respect to this interest the prospective
secured party is concerned about a dependable disclosure of
prior security transactions and the accuracy of the filing
records and search reports. Regarding the searching process it
is interested in a simple, prompt and inexpensive way to
obtain comprehensive^"^ information from the files. ^°^ In a
second step after having obtained knowledge about the
perfection of a prior security interest from the records, the
prospective secured creditor may depend on further information
about the security transaction such as the initial amount of
the secured debt, the expansion of the security interest to
advances and their amount, the interest rate and eventually
the volume of repayments to determine the actual balance of
the security interest in the collateral. Thereupon the
creditor would be able to appraise the collateral's value for
a subsequent security interest or for the purpose of
bargaining a termination or subordination statement from the
prior secured party.
^°*McDonnell, supra note 9, at 6C.07[3][b] - 133-34, 37;
Scott, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 1831; implicitly: Kanda/Levmore , 80
Va.L.Rev. at 2128-29.
^°^Regarding these interests and the filing system's
compliance with them it is irrelevant, whether the
prospective secured creditor checks the files before or,
as Baird , 12 J.L. Studies at 65-66, assumes, after the
decision about the credit has been made. In this thesis
it is supposed that the search occurs before the decision.
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a. The overwhelming compliance with the prospective secured
creditor's interest in certainty about the priority of
conflicting security interests
The filing system under U.C.C. Article 9 vastly complies with
the foresaid interest of the probable secured creditor in
obtaining certainty about the rank of the considered security
interest in a potential conflict. Searching the files the
prospective creditor may easily verify, whether the potential
collateral is subject to any prior security interest. Thereby
the probable secured party is protected against
misrepresentations by the debtor regarding the encumbrance of
the prospective collateral. These functions can be achieved
best by a public system of notice filing since it assures a
higher degree of accuracy than any private disclosure system
could. ^°* Thus, the records of the U.C.C. Article 9 filing
system appropriately give sufficient information to furnish
the searcher with certainty about the encumbrances of a
prospective collateral with prior security interests.
'Baird, 12 J. L. Studies at 61-62.
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b. The limited disclosure of the secured transaction in the
filing records: A balance between the prospective secured
creditor's disclosure interest and the debtor's secrecy
interest
In protection of the debtor's secrecy interest the financing
statement lacks any information about the terms of the secured
transaction, including any expansion to advances, and
repayments on the secured debt need not be filed. ^°' Therefore
the searcher cannot obtain all the information he needs for
his credit decision merely and directly from the records. To
this extent the interest in the complete disclosure of the
security transaction^^" is not accomplished by the filing
system. But the search of the files will "alert" the
prospective secured creditor to inquire for further
information. ^^^ It will also provide the searcher with the
prior secured party's name and address enabling further
investigation and thereby facilitates inquiry significantly.
Consequentially, it saves costs in comparison to a system
based on private investigation. ^^^
^°*See supra A. .
^^°McDonnell, supra note 9, at 6C.07[3][b] - 133-34, 37;
Scott, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 1831; implicitly: Kanda/Levmore , 80
Va.L.Rev. at 2128-29.
^^^See supra III. and V..
^^^Kanda/Levmore , 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2128.
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If the prior creditor refuses to provide the prospective
creditor with sufficient information, according to U.C.C. § 9-
208 (2) (1990) the former may be compelled to approve or
correct a "statement of account" prepared and submitted by the
debtor. This statement indicates the "aggregate amount of
unpaid indebtedness as of a specified date", U.C.C. § 9-208
(1) (1990). Generally it gives adequate notice to the
prospective secured party about the present value of a
potential collateral for its purposes of acquiring a security
interest. The prospective secured creditor cannot demand a
"statement of account" from the senior creditor directly. On
the occasion of negotiating the subsequent credit it must
stipulate that the debtor will submit such a request. ^^^ The
prospective creditor's bargaining power usually forces the
debtor to follow such a demand. If the debtor refuses, the
prospective creditor is sufficiently warned to refrain from
the security transaction.^^* Therefore it can be held that the
restrictions of the disclosed information in the financing
statement partially are compensated by the prospective secured
creditor's ability to indirectly force a "statement of
account" from the prior secured creditor.
^^^U.C.C. Official Comment, supra note 25, § 9-208 cmt. 2, at
777. The senior creditor thereby is protected against
insincere or abusive requests from trade, McDonnell,
supra note 9, at 6C.07[3][a] - 133.
^^"See In re Cushman Bakery, 526 F.2d 23, 29 n.5. (1st Cir.
1975), cert, denied 425 U.S. 937 (1976).
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But even after obtaining a "statement of account" especially
with respect to prior floating liens of principal financers,
there remains some risk regarding subsequent advances which
are secured by the prior lien due to cross-collateralization,
but have not been considered in the statement . "^^^ In this
respect the disclosure interest may not be accomplished by the
public-notice-filing system under U.C.C. Article 9. But in
case of a recognized prior extended security interest covering
advances, the probable secured creditor is sufficiently
alerted to draw back from the credit transaction, if it cannot
obtain a termination or subordination statement from the prior
creditor, particularly from the principal financer, regarding
any subsequent extensions of the secured credit. ^^^ Therefore
any remaining risk of subsequent advances secured by the prior
security interest ultimately rests on the searcher ^s
unreasonableness and thus is acceptable.
Correlating to the limitation of disclosure in the financing
statement to the names and addresses of the parties to the
secured transaction and the identification of the type of
collateral, the searcher in his own interest is expected to
undertake further inquiries regarding details of the security
transaction. ^^^ From this perspective the limitation of
'See supra A. .
'McDonnell, supra note 9, at 6C.07[3][b] - 139
'See supra III. .
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disclosure detriments the facilitation interest digesting the
completeness of information about the secured transaction
directly from the records.
But as set forth above the restriction of disclosure and the
correlating duty to inquire are designed to limit the
deterioration of the debtor ^s and the prior creditor's secrecy
interest. ^^^ The publicity of the secured transaction and
therefore the public-notice-filing system under U.C.C. Article
9 in the first instance serve the prevention of fraudulent
conveyances. ^^^ Any infringement of the contracting parties'
legitimate interest in the secrecy of their relationship
reaching further than necessary to accomplish this
precautionary rationale is disproportionate and has to be
avoided. Correspondently , as far as publicity of the secured
transaction and disclosure in the financing statement would
not anymore serve to "alert" the searcher of the security
interest's existence, but would solely simplify the search,
the disclosure would be disproportionate. In the light of the
U.C.C. 's rationale the searcher's facilitation interest in a
financing statement disclosing details of the secured
transaction therefore is outweighed by the secrecy interest.
The limitation of disclosure and the correspondent duty to
inquire thus balance the disclosure interest of the searcher
^^*See supra A., B.3..
^"See supra Introduction and III..
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on the one hand and the secrecy interest of the debtor and the
prior secured creditor on the other without leaving
significant space for further facilitation of the search by
extended disclosure in the financing statement.
Comprehensive disclosure in the records has been advocated for
considerations of economy and efficiency due to savings in
expenses for searches and investigations .^^° But the
intervention with the legitimate privacy interest of the
parties to the prior security interest cannot be justified by
reasons of efficiency to third-party searchers or society;
moreover, conceded an economic analysis would be appropriate,
the detriments of public access to trade secrets contained in
secured transactions can hardly be estimated and may produce
severe economic losses. Overall the duty of further inquiry
imposes acceptable restraints on the searcher ^s interest in
complete notice of the security interest; the prospective
secured party ^s interest in comprehensive disclosure is not -
at least not seriously - infringed by the filing system under
U.C.C. Article 9.
"°As argued with respect to a debtor-based filing system:
Kanda/Levmore , 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2128.
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c. The partial insufficiency of the filing system to comply
with the prospective secured party ^s interest in accuracy
and facilitation of searches
Beside the immanent necessity for the prospective secured
creditor to pay the "minimal" costs of search reports, ^^^ which
are considered to be less than under a system of private
investigation,"^ numerous inherent deficiencies of the filing
system under U.C.C. Article 9 impose burdens and risks on him.
These deficiencies adversely affect his interest in obtaining
accurate and prompt information and not being misled by search
reports
.
( i ) . The burden of improper indexing and wrongful search
reports
One major factor impairing the prospective secured creditor's
interest in accurate information about prior security
interests arises from U.C.C. § 9-303 (1) (1990) determining
that a security interest is perfected, when the secured party
has fulfilled all requirements on his part. Consequentially,
after filing any mistake,"^ delay"" or omission by the filing
"^Task Force-Report, p. 23.
"^Kanda/Levmore , 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2128; see also supra b.
.
"^See i.e. In re Royal Electrotype Corp., 485 F.2d 394, 396
(3rd Cir. 1973); Walker v. Tennessee State Bank (In re
Williams), 112 B.R. 913 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn. 1990).
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officer to index the financing statement properly does not
hinder perfection. ^^^ Thus, once the senior security interest
has been filed appropriately, it obtains priority in a
potential conflict regardless of any failures occurred in the
filing office. Consequentially the searcher bears the risk of
improper indexing and misleading search reports not indicating
the prior security interest, which are caused by deficiencies
in the filing off ice. ^^^
In several jurisdictions this policy of U.C.C. Article 9
preferring the first filing creditor's over the searcher's
certainty interest seems to be balanced by the right to
compensation for the damages sustained by the filing officer's
negligence. ^^^ Others have adopted statutes limiting or even
exempting the officer from liability. ^^^ But even if under
certain circumstances the officer can be held liable
personally, he appears to be a rather unattractive defendant
considering the substantial amount of credit regularly
^^"PEB-Report, p. 88; Task Force-Report, Appendix II at
p. 59, indicates that indexing delays vary from state to
state and range from 1-3 days in the majority of states up
to 30 days.
^^^U.C.C. Official Comment, supra note 25, § 9-407 cmt. 1, at
834.
"^In re Pasco Sales Company, 383 N.Y.S.2d 42, 45
(N.Y.App.Div. 1976).
^^^See i.e.: Borg-Warner Acceptances Corporation v. Secretary
of State, 731 P. 2d 301 (Kan. 1987).
^^^See i.e.: Kentucky: Commercial Code § 9-407 (3); Nebraska:
Commercial Code § 9-411 (1).
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involved in secured transactions for which notice is filed.
Thus, in practice the mislead creditor not obtaining priority
for his security interest has to bear the losses sustained due
to failure in the filing office.
(ii). The burden to determine trivial errors in the
financing statement and minor changes in the debtor ^s name
Furthermore, the prospective creditor searching the files
bears the burden of detecting trivial errors in the financing
statement. This is especially difficult in those cases, when
the error relates to the debtor *s name and therefore passes
through to the record ^s index. ^^' It is expected from the
searcher to make "reasonable" efforts to determine "minor
errors which are not seriously misleading" since a financing
statement defective to that extent does not impede perfection
of the security interest. ^^° Although the criterion of
'reasonableness' is rather indefinite at its borderline and
therefore bears some uncertainty regarding its range, it
restricts the searcher ^s burden and risks arising from the
'minor-error '-exception. Thus, these burden and risks
ultimately must be considered acceptable. Correspondently , the
searcher has to cope with changes in the debtor ^s name which
are not "seriously misleading" and therefore do not require
^'See supra V. .
'°U.C.C. § 9-402 (8) (1990); see supra V,
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the filing of an amendment statement from the senior secured
creditor. ^^^ The searcher may have to strengthen his efforts to
locate the file under prior names. ^^^
(iii). The need to determine the proper place of filing
Especially in interstate commerce the prospective secured
creditor needs to determine the proper place of filing to
start the search. In this respect the searcher faces the same
problems as the secured creditor, who must determine the
proper place to file his financing statement .^^^ The separate
filing systems in each state require to determine the
appropriate recording system for potential filings. Within the
proper staters recording system the offices competent to hold
the file may vary from state to state depending on the
particularly adopted alternative of U.C.C. § 9-401 (1) (1990)
including any amended versions."* The lack of uniformity in
state legislation in this aspect complicates the search and
impedes the searcher ^s interest to have simple access to the
records. ^^^
"^U.C.C. § 9-402 (7) (1990).
"''In re Gac, 11 U.C.C.Rep. Serv. 412 (W.D.Mich. 1972).
^^^See supra V.B.4..
'See supra II . .234<
"^But similarly to the deterioration of the filing
creditor's facilitation interest this impairment of the
searcher's interest must not be overweighed due to the
pendency of the revision process of U.C.C. Article 9
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(iv). The burden to identify the assignee of a security
interest
The searcher also bears the burden to find out the assignee of
a security interest to obtain further information or even a
termination or subordination statement from the prior secured
party because assignments of security interests are not
subject to a filing requirement; pursuant to U.C.C. § 9-405
(1990) a disclosure of the assignment in the records merely is
discretionary.^^* It has been indicated rightly that the
searcher may be misled by the former holder of the security
interest, the assignor, stating the discharge of the security
interest and failing to give notice of the assignment; the
searcher relying on this information risks to acquire a
subordinated security interest since the earlier security
interest of the assignee continues to be perfected under its
priority status. ^^'
presumably addressing the harmonization of filing locations
among states. See supra B.4. note 194.
^^*U.C.C. Official Comment, supra note 25, § 9-405 cmt. at
832.
"^McDonnell, supra note 9, at 6C.07[3][d] - 142.
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2. The general subordination of the supplier's security for
the purchase price to the floating lien of the principal
financer of a business
The principal financer of a business routinely is the first
creditor to file a financing statement of his security
interest, which typically is both extended to the debtor's
after-acquired property including the practically important
accounts proceeds and expanded to secure also future advances.
Thereby the public-notice filing system serves to assure the
notorious priority of the principal financer 's floating lien
over security interests of subsequent creditors of the
business particularly the suppliers' purchase money security
interests as far as they extend to accounts proceeds from the
resale of goods. ^^® The principal financer additionally is
preferred to the supplier in various other ways by U.C.C.
Article 9 and ultimately also prevails with respect to the
supplier's statutory right to reclamation upon the debtor's
default with payment of the purchase price.^^^ The overall
subordination of the supplier to the principal financer in
practice, as acknowledged in U.C.C. Article 9 and enforced by
the courts, rests on general economic considerations of
^^^See supra VIII.. An exception may apply to suppliers
having obtained a judgment lien and taken appropriate steps
in the execution procedure.
"'See supra VIII.
.
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efficiency. ^*° According to this policy particularly inventory
financing is regarded as a less valuable method of business
financing. ^"^ The subordination of the supplier's security
interest or remedy for default minimizes the devaluation of
the financer's earlier loan caused by the later debt for the
purchase price. ^"^ It also reduces the impact of any "risk
alteration" on the first credit. The problem of "risk
alteration" arises from the efficiency of an engagement in
risky but - if successful - highly profitable business
activity, when the break-even has increased due to the
accelerated credit or external capital, respectively, in the
course of the purchase of supply. "^"^ The assurance of an
overall priority thus reduces the risk premium contained in
interest rates for the business' principal loan.^"* It also
encourages first-in-time lending to businesses, ^*^ which
ultimately increases economic activity including sales and
revenue of suppliers in general. Furthermore, the
2*°Trust Company Bank v. The Gloucester Corporation, 64 3
N.E.2d at 19,
^"^Which is manifested by the restriction of the priority of
purchase money security interests in inventory to cash
proceeds received on or before delivery of the goods,
U.C.C. § 9-312 (3) (1990). Riesenfeld, supra note 10, at
20; Kanda/Levmore, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2139.
^"^See: Schwartz, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2076-78.
^"See: Kanda/Levmore, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2113, 2115, 2139-41.
^"^See: Schwartz, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2084-85.
^"^See: Kanda/Levmore, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2113, stating that
priority of later creditors ultimately would prevent
initial lending.
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subordination of the supplier can be claimed to increase the
supplier's need to monitor the debtor and avoid inefficient
"overlending" to debtors facing insolvency for the benefit of
an efficient distribution of financial resources. ^*^
Giving effect to these private and social economic
considerations, U.C.C. Article 9's policy to prefer the
principal financer ignores the inherent unfairness of the
supplier's subordination. Due to the priority of the floating
lien the supplier basically is compelled to either do business
with the debtor on an unsecured basis or refrain from trading.
The supplier of a business virtually has no device to secure
payment of the purchase price. While the principal financer
always is assured of substantial satisfaction, the supplier
typically is limited to per-quota payment in the debtor's
bankruptcy.'^"''
This result cannot be justified on the ground that the
supplier may find out the prior financers from the records and
contact them to negotiate a subordination agreement, a
guarantee for payment of the purchase price or at least to
seek an evaluation about the debtor's financial situation and
creditworthiness with respect to the prospective sale
transaction. By these means the supplier can improve the
''"^Kanda/Levmore , 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2142.
^"^Further aspects of unfairness are considered infra Final
comparison and conclusions.
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assurance of payment at least by recovery from the financer.
But for many supply transactions any of these means are
inefficient taking into account the amount of the purchase
price and the probability of a shortfall. Furthermore, these
assurances are only available to suppliers with substantial
bargaining power requiring both to be a supplier of goods
necessary for the operation of the debtor ^s business and to
have limited competition in the market. Less important
suppliers, presumably the vast majority, cannot obtain such
assurances from the principal financer. Since these suppliers
can hardly be expected to refrain from trade at all, they have
no alternative than to bear the burden of a shortfall without
effective security. Thus, it can be concluded that the
supplier especially of inventory is deteriorated substantially
in his interest to do business on a secured basis due to his
overall subordination to the principal financer ^s floating
lien for reasons of economic growth and efficiency in general
and for the benefit of the principal financer in particular.^*®
^"Especially with respect to the practically important
subordination of the inventory supplier regarding the
accounts proceeds of a resale, the inherent unfairness of
the current regime cannot be overcome by proposals to limit
the binding effect of security agreements only to third
party creditors, who reasonably could foresee the prior
security interest (LoPucki, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 1959, 1964-65;
see supra I.) It can be inferred that principal creditors
will continue to extend their liens routinely to accounts
proceeds and if necessary will disclose this interest i.e.
in a financing statement, so that the prudent supplier will
be able to expect the prior security interest and thus will
be bound to the lien agreement without any change of the
current situation.
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3. Limited compliance with the disclosure interest of
voluntary general creditors and aspects of efficiency
The system of public-notice filing apparently is of no value
for "involuntary" creditors such as tort claimants^*^ since
their claims do not emerge from a credit decision, which could
rest on the information provided by such system. Moreover, the
filing system detriments the involuntary creditors since it is
essential for secured creditors to obtain priority over the
general creditors in the debtor ^s bankruptcy. It thereby
establishes the legal tool for secured creditors to deprive
the estate from assets at the expense of involuntary
creditors. ^^° Under the foresaid definition the supplier of a
business also must be considered an "involuntary" creditor. In
practice the supplier is compelled to sell goods on an
unsecured basis due to the preference of the floating lien
notoriously held by the business^ principal financer. The
^"'LoPucki, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 1897.
^^"Regarding these involuntary claimants it is rightly
suggested to give them priority over secured creditors
under a revised U.C.C. Article 9 since the current regime -
in combination with the corporate limitation of liability
enables a comprehensive limitation from involuntary, namely
tort liability, whereas a subordination of the principal
financer *s security interest would encourage the financer
to induce the debtor to refrain from tortious activity
(LoPucki, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 1913-14, 1963) and avoid
"excessive precautions" by "potential victims" (Schwartz,
80 Va.L.Rev. at 2085-86). Critical also: James J. White,
Efficiency Justifications for Personal Property Security,
37 Vand.L.Rev. 473, 502-08 (1984); David W. Leebron,
Limited Liability, Tort Victims and Creditors, 91
Colum.L.Rev. 1565, 1650 (1991).
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supplier can neither "stake his claim" through the filing
system nor can meaningfully use the information provided in
the records for the credit decision.
Consecutively, it must be asked, whether the public-notice
filing system under U.C.C. Article 9 communicates sufficient
information for the voluntary creditor to make a sophisticated
decision about the award of credit on an unsecured basis.
Baird holds that general creditors granting credit without
obtaining a security interest hardly check the public files
and base their credit decisions on search reports; that they
give credit on the general appraisal of the debtor ^s assets
and the assumption that the debtor will pay his debt;
therefore the filing system would be of no interest for
general creditors .^^^ This assessment appears correct as far as
consumer and marginal credit transactions are concerned, when
the costs of searching the files exceed any economic relation
to the risk of potential losses arising from the debtor ^s
insolvency.
But in the arena of business financing even general creditors
usually rely at least indirectly on the filing records, when
they grant credit of some substance. Before the credit
decision they typically obtain information to determine the
financial situation of the debtor from credit reports or
'Baird, 12 J. L. Studies at 55, 60.
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financial journals, both of which rest on searches of filing
records.^" Therefore, at least for the scope of business
financing it can be stated, that with some modifications
voluntary general creditors basically share a disclosure
interest with probable secured creditors.
The scope of the disclosure interest is determined by the
general creditor's expectation of return payment in the
ordinary course of the debtor's business. ^^^ Whereas in the
debtor's bankruptcy the general creditor only receives per-
quota satisfaction from the estate. A well considered credit
decision therefore can only minimize the risk of a "bad"
credit, ^^* if it is based on information concerning the
probability of the debtor's bankruptcy. Such information
encompasses details of major secured transactions, primarily
the principal financer's lien, which typically are of crucial
relevance for the occurrence of bankruptcy and thus for the
assessment of the risk of a shortfall with the unsecured
credit. These details concern among others the amount of
credit and available creditlines to the debtor, the duration
^"LoPucki, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 1936; See: Theodore N. Beckman &
Ronald S. Foster, Credits and Collections: Management and
Theory 330-31 (8th ed. 1969), reflecting on the practice of
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc..
''"LoPucki, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 1931, 1938 ("Cash-flow surfer").
^^"Since the avoidance of "bad" credit minimizes inefficient
distribution of financial resources, full disclosure of
secured transactions also is suggested under general
economic aspects (LoPucki, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 1957-58).
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of the credit, the interest rate, the flow of return payments,
default regulations and the financer^s policy on calling the
loan.^^^ Since this information is not provided by the U.C.C.
recording system and therefore is hardly available for the
preparation of credit reports, the general creditor's interest
in comprehensive disclosure of details about the security
transaction is not accomplished completely by the filing
system. ^^*
But partially, as far as the mere fact of the security
transaction and the debtor's need for external capital are
shown by the files, the system complies with the disclosure
interest; and regarding the terms and repayments of the credit
the impaired disclosure interest is outweighed by the debtor's
secrecy interest. ^^^ Additionally, it has to be considered that
any impairment of the filing process and thus of the
possibility to assure priority, especially of the principal
financer's floating lien, bears the risk to diminish the
availability of credit extensions. These advances uphold the
debtor's cash-flow, may at least delay - if not avoid -
bankruptcy and ultimately increase the probability of return
^^^See: LoPucki , 80 Va.L.Rev. at 1951.
^"LoPucki, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 1951.
^^'Which to this extent is protected by U.C.C. Article 9. See
supra A
.
, B . 1 . b .
.
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payments on the unsecured credit in the ordinary course of
business for the benefit of the general creditor. ^^®
4 . The assurance for the buyer to acquire the purchased
property unencumbered
U.C.C. Article 9 protects the buyer of personal property
against the acquisition of ownership encumbered with a
security interest comprehensively. In the first instance
U.C.C. § 9-307 (1990) prevents a buyer in ordinary course
against the continuation of security interests after the
purchase. By operation of law such a buyer acquires ownership
free of any security interest; he does not need to check the
filing system in the following situations: If the purchase
occurs in the ordinary course of the seller^ s business, the
buyer acquires ownership free of any security interest
regardless of his knowledge about it.^^' The purchaser of
consumer goods subject to a perfected, but not yet filed
security interest obtains ownership free of encumbrances, if
he has no knowledge of the security interest and purchases
^^^Whereas Schwartz, 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2077-78, stresses and
finally rests on the detrimental effect of secured credit
depriving assets of the bankruptcy estate.
^"U.C.C. § 9-307 (1) (1990). Only knowledge i.e. of any
violations of the security agreement is harmful, since an
acquisition in the ordinary course of business requires
good faith on the part of the buyer and ignorance regarding
"a violation of ... a security interest of a third party,
U.C.C. § 1-201 (9) (1990); U.C.C. Official Comment § 9-307,
supra note 25, cmt. 2, at 794.
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"for value" and for private purposes, U.C.C. § 9-307 (2)
(1990). However, any buyer "takes [the collateral] free of a
security interest", as far as it secures future advances
incurring after a certain period of time after the purchase. ^*°
The buyer *s preference over the secured creditor's interest in
the continuation of his security has been reasoned on the
ground that the sale in the ordinary course of the debtor's
business is foreseeable for the earlier creditor and does not
affect the secured debt since the proceeds typically enhance
the debtor's assets or at least provide an equivalent
substitute for the collateral .^*^
If the buyer is not protected under U.C.C. § 9-307 (1990), he
can detect any security interest publicly filed by searching
the filing records. In this regard the buyer is in the same
position as the prospective secured creditor; both aim to make
sure that the subject to acquisition is not already encumbered
with a security interest. Therefore the considerations set
forth above apply correspondently .^"
^*°Which is to be determined by either the senior secured
creditor's knowledge of the sale or 45 days after the
purchase, whatever is earlier, U.C.C. § 9-307 (3) (1990).
^^^Kanda/Levmore , 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2129-30, stressing the lack
of "risk alteration"
.
^^^McDonnell , supra note 9, at 6C.07[3][b] 133-40, examines
the disclosure interests of "Prospective Buyers and
Financers" together in one chapter.
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XI. Conclusions for the public-notice-filing system under
U.C.C. Article 9
In compliance with its purposes the public-notice-filing
system under U.C.C. Article 9 protects subsequent transferees
searching the records against the risk of fraudulent
conveyances, which arises from ostensible ownership due to the
lack of a transfer of possession, by alerting the searcher of
the existence of a prior security interest. It also creates
certainty for the secured creditor, who has filed a financing
statement first, to acquire a right for prior satisfaction of
its secured debt from the collateral in a potential conflict
of security interests.
Following these rationales the filing system denies the
legitimacy of the debtor *s interest to conceal the security
transaction and his need for external capital entirely. But it
recognizes the secrecy interest regarding details of the
transaction. Correspondent to its merely 'alerting' function
it does not provide disclosure of details and thus avoids
disproportionality of the secrecy interest's infringement. In
this respect the alerted searcher is expected to inquire
further and is impaired in the interest to obtain complete
information about the secured transaction directly from the
records. Therefore, it can be concluded that the filing system
under U.C.C. Article 9 vastly accomplishes its purposes and in
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their light balances the interests involved in security
transactions.
But it has to be noted that the risk of failures in the
indexing process and in search reports caused by the filing
officer is allocated solely to the searcher. Moreover,
typically for an administrative system, it bears risks of
severe losses for the filing secured party arising from
noncompliance with formalities and it incurs significant
costs. These costs are charged for filing and for search
reports but primarily arise from litigation about the adequacy
of filing especially caused by the trustee in bankruptcy
setting aside unperfected security interests. Finally, for
private and social economic reasons U.C.C. Article 9 and the
filing system give effect to a policy generally preferring the
floating lien of the principal financer of a business to the
supplier's security for the purchase price.
Part 2: The German system of securities in personal property
In contrast the German financing practice supported by the
judiciary has developed a system of securities in personal
property giving up the initial concept of publicity
characteristic for the property law in the BGB.^^^ Similarly to
the development in England and the United States the framers
of the BGB feared the consequences of secrecy in security
transfers.^** Therefore they incorporated the pledge
indispensably requiring public notice of the transaction as
the sole statutory security device in personal property, BGB
§§ 1205-96.
But in the practice of modern business financing the pledge is
hardly of any relevance^^^ due to the primarily post-war
development of non-statutory security devices. ^*^ So far the
common non-statutory means for securities in personal property
^^^Regarding the concept of publicity see Fritz Baur,
Lehrbuch des Sachenrechts 29-31 (13th ed 1985).
^^"Serick, supra note 2, at 26; see also supra Introduction.
^^^Peter Buelow, Recht der Kreditsicherheiten an Sachen,
Rechten und Personen, cmts. 334, 335, at 97-98 (3rd ed.
1993) .
2**See supra Introduction.
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are the transfer of ownership or the assignment of claims^^^
for security purposes, primarily operating as the banker ^s
instruments, and the supplier's reservation of title. ^*® In a
more recent development the charge factoring has obtained a
firm position in the arena of security instruments for
business financing. For the purpose of appraising the value of
public-notice-filing under U.C.C. Article 9 in comparison with
the German legal system it is therefore necessary - but also
sufficient - to analyze, how these security instruments
operate and comply with the involved interests in practice.
I. The pledge as the statutory security device
Although the pledge has only a minor practical impact in the
area of business financing, it is necessary to see how it
works to understand both the economy's need for the non-
statutory security devices and their operation in the German
reality of financing. Especially with reference to the pledge
and its deficiencies to serve as the common security device in
business financing, the parties' interests determining the
purpose of the non-statutory security instruments , become
^^^Although the "Forderungsabtretung" has been translated as
"assignment of debts", i.e. Serick, supra note 2, at 52, in
the analysis the assignment of "Forderungen" literally
refers to "claims" or "accounts receivables", if the claims
are for money payment.
^^^Serick, supra note 2, at 123.
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apparent and therefore will be set forth in context with a
survey on the pledge.
Moreover, the pledge still plays some role in the area of
private consumer financing, when the debtor can give up
possession of the collateral for a limited period of time, in
practice primarily regarding jewelry, paintings and other
luxury goods. ^^' Particularly banks usually employ the pledge
to secure debts against their private clients. Pursuant to
their standard terms governing the relationship between the
bank and the client any chattel kept in the safe deposit box
at the bank is pledged to secure any debt against the client
arisen and arising from the relationship. ^^°
A. The pledge - an overview
The purpose of the pledge is to give the creditor a right to
satisfy due debts by realization of the collateral, which can
be either a chattel, BGB § 1204 (1), or a right or claim
against a third person, BGB §§ 1274-96. Accordingly, the
^"Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 334 at 97-98. In 1994
financing firms other than banks took 1.4 million pledge
interests amounting to a turnover of German marks 550
million (Florian Kolf, Leihaeuser Fuer den Winter Abschied
vom Hinterhof image: Das Geschaeft mit dem Pfand wandelt
sich, 49 no. 13 Wirtschaftswoche 72 (1995).
^"'"Standard terms [Allgemeine Geschaeftsbedingungen] -banks
no. 19 (2), hereinafter: AGB-Banken; Standard terms-savings
banks no. 21, hereinafter: AGB-Sparkassen; Buelow, supra
note 265, cmt. 3 35, at 98.
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pledge interest in a chattel is effected, when the parties
have at least informally agreed on the foresaid, ^'^ the to-be-
secured debt either has already emerged or can be specif ied,^^^
the collateral has been handed over to the creditor in
execution of the agreement^^^ and the pledgor owns the
collateral.^'" The pledge interest in rights or claims,
including accounts receivables, against third parties is
created according to the regulations for the transfer of the
particular right or claim, BGB § 1274 (1), thus regularly by
assignment ;^'^ additionally, BGB § 1280 provides a requirement
to give notice of the pledge to the third party debtor. Once
the pledge is effected the pledgee is entitled to realize the
collateral upon the debtor ^s default and certain obligational
rights and duties similar to a bailment arise between the
parties. ^'^
"^BGB §§ 1205 (1) , 1204.
^'^If it is a future or conditional debt, BGB § 1204 (2).
^'^BGB §§ 1205, 1206.
^'"Otherwise the creditor may only acquire the pledge
interest in good faith pursuant to BGB § 1207.
^''^BGB § 398. Note: Bearer instruments like bearer shares and
bearer checks are pledged like chattels by transfer of
possession, BGB § 1293.
^'^BGB §§ 1215-17. Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 367, at 105.
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The pledge interest is strictly accessory to the secured
debt.^'^^ Consequentially, when the secured debt extinguishes
the pledge interest does so, too, BGB § 1252. The pledgee is
obliged to retransfer possession of the collateral to the
pledgor, BGB § 1223 (1). The pledge interest cannot be upheld
by an exchange of debts. ^''^ Furthermore the pledge can be
transferred only by assignment of the secured debt, which then
by operation of law drags the pledge interest behind.^''*
When the debt has become due, the pledgor is entitled to
discharge the debt and redeem the pledge, BGB § 1223 (2).
Simultaneously the pledgee ^s right to realize the pledge
arises, if the debtor does not perform, § 1228 (2) sentence 1.
Generally realization is carried out by public auction
pursuant to a precisely regulated procedure. ^®° The pledgee is
entitled to the proceeds of the collateral's liquidation up to
the amount of his debt. To this extent the debt extinguishes.
^^'Palandt/Bassenge, Buergerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB Ueberbl v
§ 1204 cmt. 2, at 1290 (54th ed. 1995).
^"^Judgment of Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe, OLG 15, 393,
cited at: Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277, BGB § 1204 cmt.
7, at 1293. Exceptions apply for certain surrogates, BGB §
1210; a listing is provided in: Palandt/Bassenge, supra
note 277, BGB § 1210 cmt. 1, at 1295.
^^'BGB §§ 1250, 401, 398.
^*°BGB §§ 1233-40, 1245. The parties may agree upon other
means of realization, BGB § 1245, such as the private sale
(Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277, BGB § 1245 cmt. 1, at
1304) .
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regarding excessive proceeds the pledgor as the former owner
of the collateral becomes entitled by subrogation, BGB § 1247.
B. The requirement of publicity
The pledge indispensably is public in nature and hostile
towards secrecy. The BGB provides various means to make the
pledge public. Different from the publicity requirements -
particularly the public-notice-filing and transfer of
possessions®^ - under U.C.C. Article 9, the publicity of the
pledge under the BGB does not perfect a valid security
interest, but is a prerequisite for the pledgees validity
itself.
1. Publicity by transfer of possession
The general rule for the creation of pledge interests in
chattels requires a transfer of possession of the collateral
consisting of both the pledgee ^s acquisition of actual
possession and the complete relinquishment of the pledgor ^s
possession, BGB § 1205 (1). The transfer serves to clarify the
factual situation of control over the collateral to anybody
having an interest, ^^^ especially prospective junior creditors
^'^^U.C.C. §§ 9-302 (1) (a) and 9-305.
s^^Judgment of June 24, 1911, Reichsgericht , VI. Zivilsenat,
77 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen 202,
208 (1912); Palandt/Bassenge , supra note 277, BGB § 1205
cmt. 4, at 1293.
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and transferees of the collateral interested in the
transferor's right to dispose. Therefore the grant of joint
possession is only sufficient, if the pledgor factually
becomes excluded from any control over the collateral without
cooperation of the pledgee. ^^^
2. The transfer of constructive possession and notice to the
actual possessor
The pledge interest may be effected by transfer of
constructive possession, which requires the assignment of the
claim for restoration^^" and similarly to U.C.C. § 9-305
sentence 2 the pledgor's notice to the actual possessor, BGB
§ 1205 (2). But differently from the correspondent notice
under the U.C.C. it has been held under the BGB that purpose
of the notice requirement is not only the "manifestat[ ion of]
... the relinquishment of control"^®^ over the collateral, but
to assure the actual possessor, that the pledgor will respect
^®^BGB § 1206, so-called 'qualified joint possession".
Judgment of Jan. 24, 1983, Bundesgerichtshof , VIII.
Zivilsenat, 86 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
Zivilsachen, 300, 308 (1983). I.e. for the perfection of a
pledge interest in the content of a safe deposit box locked
with two different keys it is sufficient that the pledgor
hands over one key to the pledgee. The pledgor is hindered
to reach the collateral without help of the pledgee (See:
Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277, BGB § 1206 cmt. 2, at
1294) .
^'^"BGB § 870.
^^^See supra Part 1 II..
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the pledge in future. ^®^ Therefore it is indispensable that the
pledgor gives notice; neither the possessor's actual knowledge
about the pledge nor the pledgee's notice are suf f icient .^®^
It is noteworthy that this transfer is far less apparent to
the public and third persons than the transfer of actual
possession. But since there remains no position of possession
at all with the pledgor indicating ostensible ownership, the
public has no legitimate interest to abandon this form of
creating a pledge interest. Whereas the grant of constructive
possession to the pledgee, if designed to leave actual or
intermediate possession with the pledgor, does not disclose
the lack of the pledgor's entitlement in the collateral and
therefore is not available.^®®
3. The notice of the pledge in a claim to the third-party
debtor
Correspondent to the pledge interest in a chattel by transfer
of constructive possession the pledge in a claim generally
requires limited public notice. The pledgor has to give notice
^®*Judgment of Jan. 5, 1917, Reichsgericht , VII. Zivilsenat,
89 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen, 289,
290 (1917) (hereinafter: 89 RGZ 289); Buelow, supra note
265, cmt. 351, at 101.
^^^89 RGZ at 289-90; Palandt/Bassenge , supra note 277, BOB §
1205 cmt. 10, at 1294.
^°®Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 349, at 101. Which is in
contrast to the transfer of ownership pursuant to BOB § 930
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of the pledge to the third party debtor, BGB § 1280. But
separate notice is a superfluous formality, when the pledgee
is the debtor of the pledged claim at the same time^*' or if
any alternative means of publicity are specifically provided
for the assignment of the claim and the creation of the
pledge. ^'°
C. The pledge in the debtor ^s insolvency
In the insolvency of the pledgor the pledge entitles the
pledgee to seek so-called 'separate satisfaction' from the
collateral, which means that he may seek satisfaction from the
proceeds of the collateral's liquidation prior to general
creditors^'^. Among several valid pledge interests in the same
collateral the order of satisfaction is determined by priority
in the time of perfection; the previously created interest
^^'Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof , LM BGB § 610 Nr. 1, cited
at: Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277, § 1280 cmt. 1, at
1312.
''*°Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277, BGB § 1280 cmt. 1, at
1312. An alternate means of publicity is i.e. the delivery
of the savingsbook necessary for the transfer of the claim
for the account's balance, BGB § 952.
^'^[
"Abgesonderte Befriedigung" ] . Bankruptcy Act
(hereinafter: KO)
, §§ 48, 127; Act on Composition
Proceedings (hereinafter: VerglO) § 27 (1); Buelow, supra
note 265, cmts. 467, 474, 476, at 126-28. The pledgee has
the same right in the judicial execution against or the
insolvency of a third-person possessing the collateral.
Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter: ZPO) § 805.
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obtains priority over subsequent pledges and therefore
authorizes to prior satisfaction. ^^^
D. The pledgees incapability to comply with the needs in
trade
In fact the pledge has not been accepted as a regular security
instrument by the German financing economy. Due to its
formalities, its publicity and its requirement of transfer of
possession it has turned out to be incapable to meet the needs
of economy
.
1. The interest to keep the debtor in possession of the
collateral
It is well established that the pledgees failure in practice
can be traced back primarily to its incapability to comply
with the parties^ interest to leave or to get the debtor in
possession of the collateral and allow him to use it.^'^
Equipment and inventory are needed to run the business-
debtor^ s enterprise, sales of collateral enable return-
payments and finally, the profitability of the business is
^^^BGB § 1209. Judgment of Nov. 29, 1984, Bundesgerichtshof
,
IX. Zivilsenat, 93 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes
in Zivilsachen 71, 76 (1985); Buelow, supra note 265, cmt.
343, at 99.
2'^Serick, supra note 2, at 79; Baur, supra note 263, at 547;
see also supra Introduction.
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relevant for the future of the relationship between the
parties.^'* On the other hand possession of encumbered chattels
and consequentially their storage and maintenance annoy the
creditor, ^*^ who generally has no appropriate facilities at his
disposal. Overall the parties are interested in the
availability of a non-possessory security device. Since the
pledge at least requires the complete loss of possession on
the debtor ^s part,^^^ it cannot comply with this interest at
all.
2. The interest in secrecy about the security transaction
and the debtor ^s need for external capital
Due to the lack of empirical studies it is not entirely clear,
whether and - if so - to what extent the rejection of pledging
chattels is affected by an interest of the debtor in hiding
the security transfer and the need for external capital. The
spectrum of opinions concerning the impact of the debtor ^s
secrecy interest reaches from a denial of such interest^'^ to
the assessment that this interest is of major relevance for
^'"While consumer credits are designed to enable the
consumer-debtors to use the goods, before they can
raise the purchase money; Baur, supra note 263, at 547.
^'^Baur, supra note 263, at 547.
^'^See supra B . 1 . .
^'^Serick, supra note 2, at 79; Adams, Oekonomische Analyse
der Sicherungsrechte - Ein Beitrag zur Reform der
Mobiliarsicherheiten 170 et seq., cited at: Serick, supra
note 2, at 80 note 5.
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the refusal to employ the pledge.^'® The existence of the
foresaid secrecy interest is challenged on the ground, that
German businesses always have been severely undercapitalized
and thus there is no reason to trust legitimately in a
business being free of loans and encumbrances and owning all
chattels in possession; therefore the debtor had no serious
interest in the secrecy of the security transfer.^''
These observations, true or not, are based on the existence of
secret security instruments enabling the debtor to possess the
collateral and thereby not disclosing his undercapitalization.
If the pledge were the only available security instrument in
personal property, the trade had no reason to assume the goods
in possession of the business were encumbered to secure
external capital. Thus the foresaid considerations cannot
explain the development of the non-statutory security devices.
Furthermore, even in case the debtor lacks an interest to
conceal a shortage of capital and any encumbrances of assets,
the business-debtor apparently has a strong interest to keep
the precise ratio of capitalization as well as details about
credits and securities confidential with respect to
competitors, customers, suppliers and other creditors.
Although the pledge does not disclose details of the security
transaction except for the creditor's identification, the
^'*Baur, supra note 263, at 547-48.
^"Serick, supra note 2, at 79.
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transfer of possession indicates the debtor ^s need for
financial aid and supports conclusions concerning the
capitalization quota of the business. Therefore the pledge in
chattels is not an effective security instrument to assure the
debtor ^s secrecy interest.
Overall it can be concluded, that in practice the debtor ^s
secrecy interest affects the rejection of the pledge in
chattels and must be considered as a major factor for the
development of alternative secret security devices. The impact
increases, when exceptionally the secrecy interest is shared
by the financer, who might prefer to conceal either the
business-relationship with the debtor at all or at least the
particular security transfer.
Whereas it is unanimously held, even confirmed by the
Bundesgerichtshof ,^°° that the debtor has a serious interest in
the confidence of a security interest in a claim against a
third-party debtor since simultaneously the debtor is creditor
of the encumbered claim. Employing the pledge as security
device the debtor would be required to disclose its own urge
for credit to its debtor by notice of the pledge according to
BGB § 1280.^°^ The notice would adversely affect the debtor ^s
^°°Judgment of Sept. 23, 1981, Bundesgerichtshof , VIII.
Zivilsenat, 35 pt.l Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 275, 274
(1982) .
^°^Serick, supra note 2, at 80-81; Baur, supra note 263, at
547.
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reputation and would impose a severe hazard to the future^°^ of
the commercial relationship with its debtor; any consecutive
credit transactions would become uncertain. Thus, the pledge
neither is able to meet the debtor ^s need for secrecy, when an
account receivable is designated to serve as security.
3. The interest in using future accounts receivables for
security purposes
Serick, whose name indivisibly is connected with the
development of the German law on securities in personal
property, persuasively addresses the practical impossibility
to pledge future accounts receivables as a "main objection"
against the pledge in the financing economy. ^°^ Since the
validity of the pledge in an account receivable requires
notice to the third-party debtor, BGB § 1280, neither can
notice be given effectively nor the pledge be created before
the debt has emerged. ^"^ Therefore, parties, who are interested
in making future accounts receivables useful for security
purposes, need security devices other than the pledge.
^°^Any meaningful impact on the current credit transaction is
hardly imaginable.
^°^Serick, supra note 2, at 82.
^""Serick, supra note 2, at 83.
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4. The interest in freedom of formalities and in the
possibility to exchange the secured debt
Formalities set forth another major disadvantage of the
pledge. Besides the formalities assuring publicity and the
procedural requirements for the collateral's realization the
impossibility to exchange the secured debt is a concise
example with noteworthy practical impact. The strict
accessoriness of the pledge bars an exchange of the secured
debt and the continuation of the pledge securing a different
debt after the initially secured debt has been discharged. ^°^
To secure a different debt a new pledge interest must be
created. This necessity not only is annoying, but it also
bears the loss of the initial pledge's priority status and the
hazard of an intermediate disposal of the collateral by the
pledgor. ^°*
Whereas it is in the best interests of the parties - in the
example primarily of the financer^°^ - to be able to assimilate
the security interest to the particular needs of the parties
in the individual situation. Hence, the parties' interest to
be free of formalities regarding the creation of the security
'BGB § 1252; see supra A..
^°^Judgment of Oberlandesgericht Karlruhe, OLG 15, 393,
cited at: Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277, BGB § 1204
cmt. 7, at 1293.
^"''But this interest may correspond with the debtor's in a
lasting relationship with the financer.
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interest also has to be considered influential to the
rejection of the pledge and the employment of less formal
security instruments in practice. ^°®
II. The ordinary non-possessory and secret securities
The needs of the financing economy set forth above have caused
the employment of the constitutum possessorium for security
purposes. ^°' This institute is codally recognized in the
statutes governing the transfer of ownership in chattels, BGB
§ 930. It enables the debtor to use the collateral, while the
creditor holds the title under fiduciary restrictions.
Two kinds of non-possessory securities in chattels have
developed: The reservation of title securing purchase money
and the transfer of security ownership primarily securing
loans. Parallel to the latter the assignment of claims for
security has gained a tremendous role in practice. These
modern securities have in common, that they do not require
publicity. In improving the securities and searching for
protection against the risks resulting from the lack of
publicity the financing economy has developed a number of
amendments to the ordinary non-possessory securities. The
judiciary has been challenged to draw the lines and establish
'Jji dictum: Serick, supra note 2, at 78.
^°^Serick, supra note 2, at 27; Buelow, supra note 265, cmt.
865, at 236.
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subtle rules resolving conflicts between securities, which
particularly result from the lack of publicity. The
examination of these aspects and the hypothetical consequences
of secrecy in security transfers requires a basic
understanding of the securities^ creation and operation.
A. The seller ^s reservation of ownership
In both a macro- and a micro-economic sense, reservation of
ownership is designed to increase sales by giving an incentive
for sales on a credit basis. ^^° It serves as a security for the
seller in two ways:^^^ First, it secures the seller for the
purchase money, when he transfers the goods to the buyer
before full payment and thus waives his right to refuse
performance until counter-performance is effected, BGB § 320.
Second, it also secures the seller ^s claim for restoration
arising upon repudiation of the purchase contract.
The only statute expressly addressing the reservation of
ownership, BGB § 455, provides a rule of interpretation. ^^^
Accordingly, the seller retaining ownership is deemed to have
reserved a right to repudiate the purchase contract upon the
buyer ^s default with payment. Due to the express
^^°Palandt/Putzo, supra note 277, BGB § 455 cmt. 2, at 506.
='^^Palandt/Putzo, supra note 277, BGB § 455 cmt. 2, at 506,
cmt. 27, at 509.
^^^Palandt/Putzo, supra note 277, BGB § 455 cmt. 1, at 506.
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acknowledgment of retention of ownership in this statute the
legality of this security instrument never has been contested
seriously, although its prerequisites and technique have not
been addressed explicitly in the statutes.
1 . The features of reserved ownership
When the buyer does not pay the purchase price upon delivery
of the purchased good, the seller may in consent with the
buyer secure his purchase money by transferring absolute
ownership under the 'suspensive condition' of full payment. ^"^^
Correlatively he reserves absolute ownership under the
'restoratory condition' of full payment. ^^'' The buyer receives
actual possession of the good,^^^ while the seller retains
constructive possession. ^^^
^^^[Eigentumsuebertragung unter "aufschiebender Bedingung" ]
,
BGB §§ 929 sentence 1, 158 (1). Palandt/Bassenge, supra
note 277, BGB § 929 cmt . 27, at 1127.
^^"[Rueckbehalt von Eigentum unter "aufloesender Bedingung"],
BGB § 158 (2). Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277, BGB § 929
cmt. 27, at 1127.
^^^If constructive possession is transferred pursuant to BGB
§ 931, he becomes constructive possessor on the first level
possessing for the seller as the constructive possessor on
the second level
.
"•^^Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof , LM BGB § 1006 Nr. 11, cited
at: Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277, BGB § 929 cmt. 27, at
1127.
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Upon full payment the seller loses its ownership automatically
to the buyer ex nunc .^^'^ The buyer ^s acquisition of absolute
ownership solely depends on his conduct without any chance of
interference by the seller. Therefore the buyer has obtained
an 'inchoate title '^^® in the chattel. ^"^^ At least the inchoate
title can be subject to subsequent transfers, i.e. in
performance of resales, without assent of the seller. ^^°
Moreover the inchoate title can be encumbered, ^^^ which is of
particular interest, when its value increases in the course of
payments on the purchase price.
2. The absence of publicity
The reservation of ownership lacks any publicity. Since the
buyer obtains possession of the goods, he becomes the
^^'Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277, BGB § 929 cmt. 32, at
1127.
^"[
"Anwartschaftsrecht" ] , as translated in: Serick, supra
note 2, at 43.
^"Judgment of Oct. 24, 1979, Bundesgerichtshof , VIII.
Zivilsenat, 75 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
Zivilsachen 221, 224-25 (1980).
^''"Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277, BGB § 929 cmt. 45, at
1129. A contractual restriction of this right does not
affect the validity of the transfer in relation to the
subsequent purchaser, BGB § 137 sentence 1; it merely can
give rise to internal remedies against the buyer for
compensation, BGB § 137 sentence 2, which regularly are
worthless, when the buyer does not pay the purchase price,
^^^ Gerhard Reinicke, Annotation to Judgment of April 10,
1961, Bundesgerichtshof, VIII. Zivilsenat, 1961
Monatsschrift fuer Deutsches Recht 680, 682 (1961).
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ostensible holder of unencumbered ownership.^" Due to the lack
of any requirement of public notice the seller^ s reservation
of ownership and the security interest in the goods may remain
a secret among the parties. No subsequent purchaser of the
goods or creditors of the buyer needs to become aware of the
security interest and the buyer *s restriction regarding the
entitlement to transfer absolute ownership. But as a
consequence of the buyer ^s ostensible ownership, they may
acquire absolute ownership in good faith, BGB §§ 932-35.^^^
3 . The operation of the reserved ownership as a security
instrument
The way the reserved ownership operates as a security device
is rather complicated. Since the seller retains absolute
ownership, he has a latent restitutory claim in rem for return
of the collateral against the possessing buyer. ^^'' In defense
the buyer can assert to have a right to possess the
collateral, BGB § 986, based upon both the purchase
agreement^^^ and the inchoate title. "^ These defenses
'BGB § 1006 (1) BGB
^^^See infra IV. C. Regarding the impact of this hazard on
the seller^s interest to be assured of his security see
infra V.C.2.b.
.
""[Sachenrechtlicher Herausgabeanspruch] , BGB § 985.
"^BGB § 43 3 (1) sentence 1. Palandt/Bassenge, supra note
277, BGB § 929 cmt. 40, at 1128.
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extinguish, when the seller pursuant to BGB § 455 repudiates
the purchase agreement for the reason of the buyer ^s default
with payments or any other breach of contract."^ The purchase
agreement changes into a 'restitutory relationship
obligational in nature. '^^® It therefore no longer constitutes
a right to possess. Simultaneously, the inchoate title expires
because the condition for the acquisition of absolute
ownership cannot occur since payment is not owed any longer. ^^'
Thus the seller can seek the return of possession of the
collateral in rem pursuant to BGB § 985 under the following
preferences over general creditors. ^^°
^^^Judgment of July 1, 1970, Bundesgerichtshof , VIII.
Zivilsenat, 54 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
Zivilsachen 214, 217 (1971) (hereinafter: 54 BGHZ 214).
"^54 BGHZ at 217.
^^*[Schuldrechtliches Rueckgewaehrschuldverhaeltnis] . BGB
§§ 346 sentence 1, 455. Judgment of May 16, 1984,
Bundesgerichtshof, VIII. Zivilsenat, 37 pt. 3 Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift 2937, 2937-38 (1984). The
obligational claim for repossession emerging from this
relationship does not give the seller prior security over
other creditors. The seller merely obtains the status of a
general, unsecured creditor in the buyer ^s insolvency.
Thus, the claim is inferior to the claim for return in rem
arising from the reservation of title, BGB § 985, and
therefore will be disregarded in this examination.
^'''Judgment of Oct. 24, 1979, Bundesgerichtshof, VIII.
Zivilsenat, 75 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
Zivilsachen 221, 225-28 (1980).
"°See infra 4.a.,b..
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4. The ordinary reservation of ownership in judicial
execution and insolvency
Regarding the operation of reserved ownership in judicial
execution and insolvency it has to be distinguished:
a. The seller* s right to severance and release in the
judicial execution against the buyer by a third-party
creditor
When a different creditor of the buyer enforces a judgment
against the latter and seizes the collateral, the reserved
ownership entitles the seller to seek severance and release of
the collateral .^^^ The enforcing creditor may avoid severance
and extinguish the seller *s reserved ownership by payment of
the open purchase price to the seller, unless the buyer
opposes the payment. ^^^ Upon acceptance of payment, the seller
would have been satisfied for the purchase money. Therefore
the condition of full payment for the transfer of absolute
ownership is deemed to have occurred and the seller has lost
reserved ownership and its right to vindication of the
"^ZPO § 771. 54 BGHZ at 218-19. Since by nature the
reservation of title is nothing else but absolute
ownership, it constitutes a right, which impedes a disposal
of the collateral by the debtor in judicial execution
pursuant to ZPO § 771.
^^^BGB § 267. Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 651, at 169.
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collateral, if the seller rejects the payment although the
buyer has not opposed to it.^^^ In contrast, upon the buyer ^s
opposition the seller may reject the creditor's payment at his
discretion. Therefore, in practice the enforcing creditor
regularly also attaches the inchoate title to seize the
buyer's right to oppose the payment. ^^* Over all it can be
concluded that the reserved ownership provides complete
security for the seller in the judicial execution of a
different creditor against the buyer since he receives either
full payment or release of the collateral.
b. The reserved ownership in the buyer's insolvency
In the buyer's bankruptcy, analogously in composition
proceedings, ^^^ the administrator is entitled to elect either
to execute the purchase agreement completely or not to perform
it at all.^^^ If he decides to execute the agreement, he has to
^^^BGB § 162 (1). An exception from this rule may apply, if
the seller has a legitimate interest to refuse the
creditor's offer to pay (Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277,
BGB § 929 cmt. 52, at 1130).
^^*So-called 'Double attachment' [ "Doppelpfaendung" ] of both
the chattel, ZPO § 808, and the right, ZPO §§ 857, 829.
Judgment of May 24, 1954, Bundesgerichtshof , IV.
Zivilsenat, 7 pt. 2 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1325,
1325-26 (1954).
^^^erglO §§ 36, 50. Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 654, at
170.
^^*K0 § 17. Judgment of July 13, 1967, Bundesgerichshof , II.
Zivilsenat, 48 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
Zivilsachen 203, 205-06 (1968).
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pay the open purchase money in total ;^^'' consequentially the
condition occurs and the collateral becomes part of the
estate. Thus, in practice the administrator prefers
performance, when the balance of the purchase price is
relatively small. ^^°
Similarly to the abandonment of the collateral by the trustee
in bankruptcy under B.C. § 554 (a),^^' the administrator may
choose to deny performance particularly, when the debt exceeds
the market value of the collateral. Upon the refusal of
performance, the buyer ^s inchoate title extinguishes and the
seller is entitled to severance and retransfer of the
collateral from the estate. ^"^ In countermove the seller has to
return any received payments to the estate^*^ deducting his
expectation interest.^" Additional damages of the seller, i.e.
consequential damages arising from non-performance, are
treated like ordinary debts in bankruptcy. To this extent the
Zivilsachen 203, 205-06 (1968).
"'KO § 17, [Masseschuld] , Palandt/Heinrichs , supra note 277,
BGB § 929 crat. 57, at 1130.
^^®Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 654, at 170.
"'See supra Part 1 VII..
^*°K0 § 43, [Aussonderung] . Serick, supra note 2, at 42.
^*^BGB §§ 323 (2) , 812 (1) .
^"BGB § 326 (1), KO §§ 26 sentence 2, 17, 53, 54. Judgment
of Dec. 3, 1954, Bundesgerichtshof , V. Zivilsenat, 15
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen 333,
336-37 (1955) (hereinafter: 15 BGHZ 333).
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seller faces only per quota satisfaction.^" Therefore, the
seller is not completely secured against any losses arising
from the transaction.
c. The buyer ^s rights in the seller^ s judicial execution and
insolvency
In the judicial execution against the seller the inchoate
title gives the buyer a right for severance and retransfer of
the seized goods. ^'"' Also in the seller^s insolvency^*^ the
administrator is entitled to elect between execution and non-
performance of the purchase agreement. Upon the demand for
execution, the buyer has to pay the due purchase price
pursuant to the agreement. Consequentially he obtains absolute
ownership and becomes entitled to have the goods severed and
repossessed . ^"^
It might be profitable for the estate to prefer non-
performance. In that event the buyer is obliged to retransfer
the goods, if they are still in his possession; the
"""KO § 26 sentence 2. 15 BGHZ at 336.
"""•ZPO § 771. Judgment of July 1, 1970, Bundesgerichtshof
,
VIII. Zivilsenat, 54 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes
in Zivilsachen 214, 218 (1971); Judgment of Nov. 11, 1970,
Bundesgerichtshof, VIII. Zivilsenat, 55 Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen 20, 27 (1971).
^*^Including bankruptcy and composition proceedings.
^*^K0 § 43. Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 655, at 170.
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administrator may liquidate the goods by resale for market
value, while he has to compensate the buyer for the lost
expectation interest only per quota from the estate. ^"^ This
choice is advisable, when the resale price is higher than the
prospective payment on the buyer ^s compensation claim.
B. The bank^s security ownership
In contrast to the seller retaining his initial right in the
collateral, the bank giving credit by a loan needs to seek
security for repayment by means of a derivative acquisition of
assets for security purposes. In the area of securities in
personal property one major legal instrument is the transfer
of security ownership in chattels.
1. Customary law as the legal basis of security ownership
The transfer of security ownership has not been considered in
written law. Therefore the development praeter legem of
security ownership in variation of the codal pledge still is
sharply criticized^*® as a circumvention of the regulations on
^'•'KO § 26 sentence 2. Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 655 at
170.
^**Baur, supra note 263, at 546-48, 550; Schubert, Die
Entstehung der Vorschriften des BGB ueber Besitz und
Eigentumsuebertragung 163 (1966), showing that the
draftsmen of the BGB intentionally refused to implant the
security ownership into the code, cited at: Baur, supra
note 263, at 547 note 1.
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the pledge, especially the public notice requirement, and a
violation of the ' numerus clausus of the rights in rem.'^*^
Nevertheless, the security ownership is unanimously recognized
to be legitimate on the basis of customary law.^^°
2. The components of the security transaction
The security ownership is characterized by the principle of
abstraction. In contrast to the pledge^^^ the security
ownership itself is abstract from the secured debt, and the
security ownership's two elements, the security agreement and
the transfer of ownership are abstract from each other.
Therefore, generally the invalidation of one transaction does
not necessarily cause the ineffectiveness of the other. ^"
a. The security agreement - the transfer's causa
The security agreement between the creditor and the 'security
giver, '^^^ usually and for the purpose of this article the
349 r II["Humerus clausus der Sachenrechte" ]
.
^^° The prerequisites of customary law are fulfilled, since
precise standards have been established in society and are
applied in the judicial practice; Serick, supra note 2, at
25, 108; Baur, supra note 263, at 548.
^^^Which is accessory to the secured debt; see supra I. A..
^"Palandt/Heinrichs, supra note 277, BGB § 930 cmts. 12, 15
at 113 3.
353 r II[ "Sicherheitengeber" ]
.
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debtor^^* is not statutorily regulated as a certain category of
contract; it is an agreement sui generis pursuant to BGB §
305, the statutory manifestation of the doctrine of freedom of
contract. ^^^ Although in practice the security agreement
regularly is in writing, it does not require any specific
form.^^^ Frequently the parties combine the security agreement
with the contractual basis of the secured debt, i.e. the
contract for a loan,^^'' but legally both agreements must be
considered to be separate. ^^®
The security agreement serves as the causa for the transfer of
security ownership^^^ and obligationally connects the secured
debt with the transfer of ownership. At least implicitly it
obliges the debtor to transfer security ownership since the
parties have entered into the agreement on the basis of such
^^*The examination of the situation, where a third party
provides the collateral and transfers security ownership
would require a reflection of the internal relationship
between the security giver and the debtor, which is either
agency, BGB §§ 662-76, gift, BGB §§ 516, 518 (2), or in
lack of an agreement negotiorum gestio, BGB §§ 677-85. Such
an analysis would not relate to the operation of security
ownership itself and therefore is omitted in this thesis.
^^^Serick, supra note 2, at 28.
"•^^Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277, BGB § 930 cmt. 14, at
1133.
^^'This combination is a common practice in the area of bank
loans, Baur, supra note 263, at 567.
^^®Baur, supra note 263, at 561. Regarding the abstract
relationship see supra 2..
^^^Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277, BGB § 930 cmt. 14, at
1133.
wm
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transfer. ^*° But the security agreement's primary relevance
arises from the significant fiduciary duties, which it imposes
upon the creditor to restrict his powers emerging from his
acquisition of formal ownership in the collateral. Therefore
the agreement is considered to be 'unilateral' in nature. ^^^
Since the security agreement governs the entire internal
relationship between the parties,^" they may regulate a
variety of issues arising under the security transfer, such as
the determination of the secured debt or debts, duration and
termination issues, duties to maintain and insure the
collateral, certain extensions of the security interest and
primarily the maturity and procedure of realization of the
security interest. ^^^
^^°Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277, BGB § 930 cmt. 14, at
1133.
^^M"Einseitig verpflichtend" ] . Judgment of July 9, 1986,
Bundesgerichtshof , ZIP 1986, 1059, 1061, cited at: Serick,
supra note 2, at 46 note 9.
^"Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277, BGB § 930 cmt. 14, at
1133.
^*'Judgment of Oct. 24, 1979, Bundesgerichtshof, VIII.
Zivilsenat, 33 pt. 1 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 226
(1980); Baur, supra note 263, at 567.
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b. The transfer of ownership and the lack of public notice
The transfer of security ownership, the disposal in rem
itself, regularly follows BGB §§ 929 sentence l,""^" 930.''*^
Therefore the parties must agree upon the transfer of
ownership and create a constitutum possessorium pursuant to
BGB § 930, which serves as a surrogate for the requirement of
the public transfer of actual possession according to BGB §
929 sentence 1. Both agreements concerning the transfer of
ownership and the constructive possession can be informal . The
constitutum possessorium usually is created by the security
agreement since it at least implies that the debtor is going
to possess the collateral for the creditor as the owner. ^"
Therefore, in practice the transfer of ownership merely
requires an additional agreement about the transfer of
ownership itself. ^^'^
"^"BGB § 929 sentence 1 reads as follows: "The transfer of
ownership in a chattel requires that the owner deliver the
chattel to the transferee and that both agree that
ownership shall pass over."
^"Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277, BGB § 930 cmt. 15, at
1133.
^**BGB § 868. Judgment of May 2, 1979, Bundesgerichtshof
,
VIII. Zivilsenat, 32 pt. 3 Neue Juristische Wochenschrif
t
2308, 2309 (1979) (hereinafter: BGH, 32 pt.3 NJW 2308).
^^"^A frequent issue concerns the description of the
collateral. At least it needs to be determinable by anybody
on the sole ground of the agreement without consideration
of external circumstances (Judgment of Jan. 13, 1992,
Bundesgerichtshof, II. Zivilsenat, 45 pt. 2 Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift 1161 (1992)). I.e. the
determination of a certain inventory as a whole includes
sufficiently defined collateral (Buelow, supra note 265,
114
According to the language of BGB § 930 the requirement of a
constitutum possessorium is sufficient to replace the
indefinite public transfer of actual possession. But it is
still controversially discussed, ^^® whether in the light of the
'publicity principle in property law"^' the transfer by
constitutum possessorium needs to be accompanied by some
indefinite public act executing the transfer. ^'° Some older
judgments were based on this idea indicating the need of
circumstances which give public notice of the security
ownership in the particular collateral .^^^ But the opinions
neither have defined these circumstances and nor have imposed
serious requirements for them. Anyway, such an act would give
at least some kind of public notice about the security
transfer. It therefore would be inconsistent with the purpose
of developing security ownership as an alternative security
device to the pledge to allow secrecy in secured
transactions.^'^ Thus, the call for such a public act to create
cmt. 866, at 237) .
^"See: Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 899, at 247.
^^'["Prinzip der Publizitaet im Sachenrecht" ] . This principle
is expressed in BGB § 1006, according to which it is
rebuttably assumed that the possessor of a chattel owns it.
^^°[
"Ausfuehrungshandlung" ] , Buelow, supra note 265, cmt.
899, at 247.
^'^54 RGZ at 398-99; Judgment of June 13, 1956,
Bundesgerichtshof , IV. Zivilsenat, 21 Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen 52, 56 (1956).
^'^See supra I.D.2..
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security ownership has to be rejected.^'^ Correspondently
,
recent judgments do not rest on a public act required to
execute the transfer of security ownership. ^^^ Hence, there
does not exist any public notice requirement to create
security ownership; the parties may keep the transaction and
the creditor's security interest entirely secret.
3. The fiduciary character of the security ownership
As a consequence of the transfer of ownership the creditor
formally becomes 'unlimited owner of the right '^"^^ in the
collateral. Therefore, considering the transfer of ownership
itself, the creditor obtains "more legal power ... than he
needs for purposes of security . "^^^ The purpose of security
would only require the acquisition of a right to realize the
collateral upon maturity similar to the pledge, a 'partial
right of ownership. '^''^ Thus, according to the security
agreement or at least its purpose, the debtor only is obliged
'^^Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 899, at 247.
^^*I.e.: BGH, 32 pt. 3 NJW at 2309; Judgment of Oct. 30,
1990, Bundesgerichtshof , IX. Zivilsenat, 44 pt. 1 Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift 353 (1991).
"•'^["Inhaber des Vollrechts" ] , Serick, supra note 2, at 23.
BGB § 903 sentence 1 allows the owner to treat and dispose
of the subject to his ownership as he likes to.
^'^Serick, supra note 2, at 86.
^^'["Teilrecht"].
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to transfer such a partial right of ownership being sufficient
to secure his debt.^^®
Therefore the security agreement restricts the creditor's
excessive legal powers arising from his ownership by
imposition of fiduciary duties requiring him to exercise these
rights merely upon maturity . ^'^' Since the restriction is only
effective inter partes and does not affect the creditor's
powers in relation to any third person, ^®° the creditor is able
to validly dispose of the collateral in violation of his
fiduciary duties. ^^^ But just like any other act infringing the
debtor's right to restore his absolute ownership in the
collateral upon discharge of the secured debt, the disposal
causes an obligation to compensate the debtor for sustained
damages on the ground of 'breach of contract . '^®^
^^®Serick, supra note 2, at 86.
^"'Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 862, at 235.
^°°Serick, supra note 2, at 32.
^^^Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 862, at 235. Exceptions arise
from the policing doctrines under unconscionability , BGB
§ 138 (1), and violation of good faith, BGB § 242, i.e. in
case of a collusive transfer.
^®^[
"Positive Vertragsverletzung" ] , Buelow, supra note 265,
cmt. 862, at 2 35.
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4. The debtor *s obligational right for retransfer of
absolute ownership upon full payment
As a major difference to reserved ownership, the debtor, who
has transferred security ownership, does not retain inchoate
title in the collateral. Upon full payment he does not acquire
absolute ownership automatically unless otherwise agreed upon
by transfer of ownership under restitutory condition.
Especially in the banking practice the transfer of security
ownership typically is not made subject to the restitutory
condition of full payment. ^®^
The security agreement merely imposes at least implicitly an
obligational duty on the creditor to retransfer absolute
ownership, when the secured debt has extinguished. Typically,
the retransfer merely requires consent since the debtor still
is in possession of the collateral, BGB § 929 sentence 2. The
latter can avoid a delay of the retransfer^®" by offering
payment against the creditor's assent to the retransfer. ^^^
^"BGB § 158 (2); Judgment of Feb. 2, 1984,
Bundesgerichtshof , IX. Zivilsenat, 37 pt. 2 Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift 1184, 1186 (1984).
^^''I.e. resulting from controversies about the precise amount
due or the legitimacy of any setoffs.
^^^Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277, BGB § 930 cmt. 15, at
1134. The creditor's waiver of his rights under the
security ownership is deemed to be an assent to the
retransfer (Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof, BGH Warn Nr. 10,
cited at: Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277, BGB § 930 cmt.
15, at 1134)
.
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5. The realization of the collateral
The realization of the collateral is governed by the security
agreement. ^®^ Absent of any regulations in the agreement, the
statutes about the pledge apply correspondently as far as the
fiduciary duties in the internal relationship between the
parties are concerned.^®'' In relation to third parties
acquiring the collateral in the course of its liquidation,
there is no need for an analogy since the creditor formally
owning the collateral is entitled to transfer ownership. ^^®
a. Maturity of the security ownership
Usually maturity of the security ownership occurs, when the
secured debt is due.^®^ After a warning and the expiration of
an adequate time limit for payment^'" the creditor is entitled
^®^See supra 2. a.; Judgment of Oct. 24, 1979,
Bundesgerichtshof , VIII. Zivilsenat, 3 3 pt. 1 Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift 226, 226-27 (1980) (hereinafter:
BGH, 33 pt. 1 NJW 226).
^^'Judgment of Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main, NJW-RR
1986, 44, cited at: Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277, BGB
§ 930 cmt. 17, at 1134.
^^*See supra 3.; Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277, BGB § 930
cmt. 17, at 1134.
^®'BGB § 1228 (2) analogously. Palandt/Bassenge, supra note
277, BGB § 930 cmt . 18, at 1134.
^'°BGB § 1234 (1) analogously. Palandt/Bassenge, supra note
277, BGB § 930 cmt . 18, at 1134.
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to seek delivery of the collateral pursuant to BGB § 985 and
to liquidate it consecutively .^^^ The debtor ^s defensive right
to possess the collateral under the security agreement has
extinguished . ^^^
b. The procedures of realization
If the security agreement fails to determine, how the
collateral shall be liquidated, the creditor has the choice
between a 'private sale' by a commercial broker^'^ and a public
auction analogously to BGB §§ 1233-40.^'* The creditor is
entitled to the proceeds of the collateral's liquidation in an
amount equivalent to the open debt plus any costs incurred by
the liquidation. The creditor has to transfer exceeding
proceeds to the debtor. ^'^ Upon the debtor's consent the
^'^Judgment of March 11, 1911, Bundesgerichtshof , II.
Zivilsenat, 44 pt. 2 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1415,
1416 (1991). But he has no right to take it unilaterally
(Judgment of Oct. 30, 1990, Bundesgerichtshof, IX.
Zivilsenat, 44 pt. 1 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 353,
354-55 (1991)).
^^^Regarding the operation of the owner's latent right for
restitution under BGB § 985 and the legitimate possessor's
defense under BGB § 986 see supra A. 3..
^^^["Freihaendiger Verkauf"]/ BGB § 383.
^'*Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277, BGB § 930 crat. 19, at
1134, additionally mentioning the enforcement of a money
judgment based on the secured debt, which is necessary to
satisfy the outstanding credit completely when the
collateral's proceeds will not be sufficient.
^'^Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277, BGB § 930 cmt. 20, at
1134.
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creditor alternatively may realize the collateral either by
using the collateral and benefiting from it^'* or by retaining
it for the market value ;^'^ the debtor ^s assent to either one
at the creditor's discretion usually is provided in a
forfeiture clause in the security agreement.^'®
6. The security ownership in judicial execution and
insolvency
In the judicial execution against the debtor, the security
ownership entitles the creditor to have the attached good
severed and handed over, as long as he is not completely
satisfied for the secured debt, yet.^'' The debtor has a
correspondent right in case of the collateral's seizure in the
course of enforcement against the creditor; this right expires
upon maturity authorizing the collateral's realization. ""^
In the debtor's bankruptcy or composition proceeding, the
fiduciary restrictions of the security ownership have an
^'^[Nutzungsziehung] .
"'[Selbsteinbehalt]
.
"*BGH, 33 pt. 1 NJW at 227-28.
^''ZPO § 771. Judgment of Feb. 25, 1987, Bundesgerichtshof
,
VIII. Zivilsenat, 40 pt. 3 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
1880, 1882 (1987).
*°°Judgment of June 28, 1978, Bundesgerichtshof, VIII.
Zivilsenat, 72 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
Zivilsachen 141, 146 (hereinafter: 72 BGHZ 141).
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external effect in the conflict with the other creditors. *°^
They transform the formal ownership into a pledge-like
security interest as follows i''^^ Pursuant to KO § 43, VerglO §
26 (1) the owner has a right to have his goods severed from
the estate and delivered. But when ownership is transferred
for the limited purpose of security, it is treated like a
pledge in the insolvency proceeding. Accordingly, security
ownership entitles the secured creditor to seek separate
satisfaction of his claim from the collateral pursuant to KO
§§ 48, 127 (1),*°^ VerglO § 27.*°* Thus, generally he has only
priority in the proceeds of the collateral's liquidation
executed by the administrator. But in bankruptcy
alternatively, the creditor is entitled to claim release of
the collateral for the purpose of realization and separate
satisfaction. ""^
*°^Serick, supra note 2, at 33-34: "Quasi-real effect".
*°^Serick, supra note 2, at 34, calls it the "principle of
conversion"
.
*°^Judgment of Oct. 26, 1961, Bundesgerichtshof , VII.
Zivilsenat, 15 pt. 1 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 46, 47
(1962) .
"""Judgment of Nov. 17, 1959, Bundesgerichtshof, VIII.
Zivilsenat, 31 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
Zivilsachen 174, 176-77 (1960); Baur, supra note 263, at
563.
""^Due to the pledge-like right to realize the collateral
without prior judgment, KO § 127 (2) in combination with
BGB §§ 1235, 383 (3) analogously; Judgment of Nov. 23,
1977, Bundesgerichtshof, VIII. Zivilsenat, 31 pt. 1 Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift 632, 633 (1978). Proceeds
exceeding the open amount of his secured debt have to be
transferred to the estate (Baur, supra note 263, at 563).
Thus after the collateral's release the administrator has
122
In defense the contesting creditors may avoid the security
transfer on the basis of being executed after the debtor has
suspended payments and therefore deemed to be collusive to the
disadvantage of the general creditors ;''°^ they also may assert
the security being a bulk transfer and thus causing an
assumption of liabilities by operation of law;""^ eventually
they may claim unconscionability of the transfer. *°®
In the creditor's insolvency three situations have to be
distinguished: If the secured debt has been satisfied, it is
well established that the debtor is entitled to have the
collateral severed from the estate and released, although the
debtor does not own the collateral .""^ The debtor's
obligational right for restoration upon payment, which emerges
from the security agreement, obtains "quasi-real ef fects. "*^°
If the debt has not been satisfied completely yet, before
maturity the debtor formally has a right for severance, but
the administrator is entitled to retain possession of the
seized collateral pursuant to the purpose of the security
the right to demand its realization from the secured
creditor, KO § 127 (2).
*°^[Konkursanfechtung]
,
KO §§ 29-42.
*°^BGB § 419, Commercial Code [Handelsgesetzbuch] (HGB)
§§ 25 (1) sentence 1, 28 (1) sentence 1.
""^BGB §§ 138 (1), 826. Baur , supra note 263, at 563-66.
*°'72 BGHZ at 145-46.
*^°Serick, supra note 2, at 33-34.
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agreement; after occurrence of maturity the administrator is
entitled to realize the collateral and only is obliged to
transfer proceeds to the debtor, which exceed the secured debt
deducting the liquidation costs. "^^
7. The basic differences with reservation of ownership
The following basic differences between security ownership and
the reservation of title become relevant primarily in the
conflict of the business supplier's and the financer's
security interests and secondarily for combinations of
securities perfecting the particular creditor's security
interest :*^^ First, it has to be noted that the reservation of
title sets forth a security interest in a collateral
originally owned by the seller; in contrast, the security
ownership exists in a collateral provided by the debtor and
therefore is derivative in nature. Consequentially and second,
the seller retains absolute ownership; whereas the financer
acquires ownership, which is already fiduciary restricted for
security and liquidation purposes. Third, the buyer obtains
inchoate title in the purchased good and becomes automatically
absolute owner upon full payment; whereas the transferor of
security ownership usually receives only an obligational claim
for restoration. Finally, causa for the reservation of title
*^^Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277, BGB § 9 30 cmt. 24, at
1134; Baur, supra note 263, at 566.
*^^The combinations are analyzed infra III..
124
is the purchase contract which also creates the secured debt;
whereas the security ownership obligationally is based on the
security agreement which is 'unilateral' in nature and thus
bars the application of KO § 17 authorizing the administrator
in bankruptcy to choose whether the contract shall be
executed. "^^
III. The assignment of claims for purposes of security
Parallel to the development of security ownership, the
financing practice and the judiciary have made the fiduciary
relationship available for the assignment of claims for
security purposes. As Serick states, the security assignment*^"
"has become a major and indispensable security device in the
German credit business. "*^^ Although the security assignment is
not specifically regulated in the statutes, its legitimacy is
well established; rightly, since the draftsmen of the BGB
explicitly acknowledged its legitimacy by referring to it in
the statutes of limitations.*^^
*^^Judgment of July 9, 1986, Bundesgerichtshof , ZIP 1986,
1059, 1061, cited at: Serick, supra note 2, at 46 note 9.
Regarding the operation and effect of that choice see supra
II .A. 4 .a. ,c.
.
*^*[Sicherungsabtretung]
.
*^^Serick, supra note 2, at 90.
*"[Verjaehrungsvorschriften] , BGB § 223 (2). In contrast,
Serick, supra note 2, at 25, relies on customary law.
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1. The elements of the security transaction
Correspondent to the transfer of security ownership, the
assignment of claims including accounts for security purposes
requires both a security agreement and the disposal of the
claim, the assignment itself. Both can be informal and
combined. '•^^ The security agreement regulates the internal
relationship between the creditor and the debtor. Besides the
debtor ^s obligation to assign a claim against a third party
for security, it especially may contain rules concerning the
realization of the assigned claim. At least it implicitly
imposes fiduciary duties upon the creditor prohibiting any
disposal or collection of the assigned claim before the
debtor ^s default with performance on the secured debt.*^* In
this respect the security agreement may obtain an external
effect, when the parties stipulate a pactum de non petendo for
the benefit of the third-party debtor. '•^^ It also establishes
the creditor's obligation to reassign the claim upon
^^^Palandt/Heinrichs, supra note 277, BGB § 398 cmts. 20-22,
at 460.
"^Palandt/Heinrichs, supra note 277, BGB § 398 cmt. 22 at
460.
"^^Judgment of Oberlandesgericht Nuernberg, OLGZ 83, 481,
cited at: Palandt/Heinrichs, supra note 277, BGB § 398 cmt.
21, at 460; Dietmar Willoweit, Einwendungen des
Drittschuldners aus dem Sicherungsvertrag zwischen Zedent
und Zessionar, 27 pt. 2 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 974,
976-78 (1974).
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extinguishment of the secured debt/''° unless an automatic
retransfer by means of a conditional assignment is agreed
upon.
The creditor acquires the claim serving as security by the
debtor ^s disposal, the assignment, BGB § 398. The assignee
becomes formal creditor of this assigned debt with all rights
of a creditor. Correspondent to the security ownership, the
fiduciary duties arising from the security agreement limit his
rights only inter partes and do not invalidate any disposal
interfering with the agreement ;*^^ they merely establish the
debtor ^s compensation claims for breach of contract ."^^
Ultimately, the creditor merely is entitled to realize his
security interest by collection of the assigned account
receivable upon the debtor-assignor^ s default with performance
of the secured debt unless otherwise provided in the security
agreement. "^^
*^°The reassignment may be implied in the payment upon the
secured debt (Judgment of Nov. 21, 1985, Bundesgerichtshof
,
VII. Zivilsenat, 39 pt. 1 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift
977 (1986).
*^^Judgment of Feb. 11, 1960, Bundesgerichtshof, VII.
Zivilsenat, 3 2 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
Zivilsachen 67, 71 (1960).
*"See supra B. 3. regarding the security ownership.
*^^Palandt/Heinrichs, supra note 277, BGB § 398 cmts. 21, 22,
at 460.
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2. The necessity of the debtor *s power to assign the claim
and the strict priority rule governing conflicts of
assignments
Finally, the debtor must be authorized to assign the claim to
the creditor. Generally, this power emerges from the debtor ^s
position as creditor of the to-be-assigned claim. ''^'' If the
debtor has assigned the claim previously, he is not its
creditor any longer and therefore has lost the authority to
assign it. Thus, the subsequent assignment to the creditor is
void regardless of good faith on the part of the latter. "^^
This strict rule of priority resolves conflicts among
contesting assignments.*^^
"*Pursuant to BGB § 399 limited exceptions apply, when the
assignment is prohibited either contractually, codally or
because of the nature and purpose of the claim, i.e. the
right to certain information against a bank (Judgment of
Feb. 28, 1989, Bundesgerichtshof , XI. Zivilsenat, 42 pt. 2
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1601, 1602 (1989)).
*^^The impossibility of good-faith acquisitions of debts in
contrast to chattels and land results from the lack of
publicity manifested by possession. Therefore vested
rights exceptionally can be acquired in good faith by
assignment, when the document is delivered to the
assignee, BGB § 405 (Karl Larenz , Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts
Erster Band Allgemeiner Teil 576-77 (14th ed 1987)).
*^^Judgment of June 9, 1960, Bundesgerichtshof, VII.
Zivilsenat, 32 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
Zivilsachen 367, 370 (1960) (hereinafter: 32 BGHZ 367).
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3. The advisability of notice to the third-party debtor
Although one major reason for the preference of the security
assignment to the pledge in claims is the absence of the
requirement to inform the third-party debtor about the
security interest /^^ the creditor is advised to insist on
giving such notice in certain exceptionally risky
transactions. Due to the nature of these transactions, the
creditor is usually in the stronger bargaining position and
therefore should be able to overcome the debtor ^s secrecy
interest and withstand any demand for a waiver of the right to
give notice.
BGB §§ 407-08 provide mandatory*^® rules for the assignment to
protect the debtor of the assigned claim against the
consequences of an erroneous performance for the benefit of
his ostensible creditor being either the initial creditor or
any ostensible assignee, who is party to a subsequent and
therefore void assignment by the assignor. Pursuant to BGB §
407 (1) payment to the assignor is deemed to discharge his
debt, unless the debtor had actual*^* knowledge of the
*^^BGB § 1280. See supra I.D.l.b..
*^*Because of this purpose the debtor of the assigned claim
can waive these rights, whereas the parties of the
assignment are bound to them.
*^'Negligent ignorance is not sufficient to forfeit the
protection under this rule (Palandt/Heinrichs , supra note
277, BGB § 407 cmt . 6, at 468).
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assignment. This rule applies correspondently , when the debtor
perforins for the benefit of a subsequent, but ostensibly
entitled assignee, BGB § 408 (1)."° Although the disadvantaged
first assignee has a right to recourse against the assignor*^^
or the ostensible assignee, "^^ respectively, who received
performance, he carries the burden of either of the parties^
insolvency ."^^
This risk may increase in case of a security assignment, when
it is indicated that the assigning debtor suffers a
significant shortfall of capital. The creditor should seek
protection against ultimately not recoverable erroneous and
collusive payments or false setoffs directed to the assigning
debtor or the ostensible assignee."^" Therefore the creditor is
advised to give the third-party debtor written notice of the
assignment. Then the creditor is able to evidence the latter ^s
knowledge and can avoid the consequences of §§ 407 (1), 408."^
"^^According to the strict priority rule the subsequent
assignment is void and therefore the senior assignee has
not become creditor (Palandt/Heinrichs, supra note 277, BGB
§ 408 cmt. 1, at 469)
.
"^^Arising from breach of contract and BGB § 816, unjust
enrichment (Palandt/Heinrichs, supra note 277, BGB § 407
cmt. 3, at 468)
.
*^^Arising solely under BGB § 816, unjust enrichment.
*^^I.e. in: Judgment of Oct. 19, 1987, Bundesgerichtshof , II,
Zivilsenat, 102 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
Zivilsachen 68 (1968) (hereinafter: 102 BGHZ 68).
""As it was the case in: 102 BGHZ at 69, 77.
*"102 BGHZ at 74.
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Thus, the creditor is assured against the discharging effect
of misled payments to the assigning debtor or ostensible
assignees and can collect the assigned debt from the third-
party debtor. Hence, it can be concluded that although public
notice is not required to create security interests in debts,
practice may need and will employ restricted notice in
appropriate situations.
4. The security assignment in judicial execution and
insolvency
The creditor is entitled to oppose and claim the
discontinuation of the judicial execution in the assigned
account receivable by other creditors of the assigning
debtor. *^^ Whereas in the latter *s insolvency, the creditor,
like a pledgee, can only seek separate satisfaction from the
proceeds of the claim^s collection prior to general creditors
in the ordinary course of the insolvency proceeding. '•^^
On the other hand, the assigning debtor also has a right for
discontinuation of the judicial execution against the creditor
*^^ZPO § 771. Wolfgang Grunsky, Sicherungsuebereignung,
Sicherungsabtretung und Eigentumsvorbehalt in der
Zwangsvollstreckung und im Konkurs des Schuldners, 24
Juristische Schulung 497, 501 (1984).
"^KO § 48. Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof , ZIP 1986, 720,
722, cited at: Kuhn/Uhlenbruck, Konkursordnung, KO § 48
cmt. 24 at 819 (11th ed. 1994). Conflicts between opposing
assignments are resolved pursuant to the strict priority
rule, see supra 2..
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in the assigned claim. "^^ But this right extinguishes upon
maturity of the security interest/^' regularly the assigning
debtor ^s default with performance on the secured debt. In the
creditor's insolvency the assigning debtor is entitled to
oppose the collection of the assigned account receivable until
maturity. "^^
5. Future claims as subject to security interests
As a major improvement in comparison with the pledge, the
security assignment is not limited to present claims, but
enables the parties to employ accounts receivables arising in
future for security purposes. The parties merely assign the
prospective claim in advance; no notice requirement similar to
the notice of the pledge""^ imposes an obstacle to the creation
of the security interest. The legitimacy of an anticipated
assignment follows the argumentum a fortiori ex BGB § 185 (2)
sentence 1.*"^
*"ZPO § 771. Palandt/Heinrichs, supra note 277, BGB § 398
cmt. 23, at 460458.
"^'72 BGHZ at 146.
""^KO § 43. Palandt/Heinrichs, supra note 277, BGB § 398 cmt.
23, at 460.
""BGB § 1280. Regarding the practical impossibility to
pledge debts arising from the notice requirement see supra
I.D.3. .
""^Judgment of June 22, 1989, Bundesgerichtshof , III.
Zivilsenat, 108 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
Zivilsachen 98, 104 (1990); Buelow, supra note 265, cmts
.
954, 955, at 264-65. BGB § 185 (2) sentence 1 provides that
132
The still lasting controversy,**^ whether the creditor-assignee
acquires the claim directly upon its emergence*** or
subsequently to an intermediate acquisition by the assigning
debtor,**^ is of marginal practical relevance. Even if the
assigning debtor acquires the account receivable
intermediately and therefore in his insolvency the claim
becomes attached to the estate, the creditor can seek separate
satisfaction from the account prior to general creditors**^ and
subsequent assignees.**'
6. Bulk assignments for security purposes
Banks usually are not content with the assignment of an
individual claim as security for loans; they only accept
certain secure accounts receivables, i.e. claims for tax
refunds or purchase money arisen from a perfected transfer of
land.**® In practice banks usually insist on 'bulk assignments'
an unauthorized disposal becomes valid, when the disposing
party acquires the subject of the disposal.
**^Not decided in: Judgment of Nov. 19, 1968,
Bundesgerichtshof , VI. Zivilsenat, 22 pt. 1 Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift 276 (1969).
***[Direkterwerb] . Judgment of Aug. 11, 1955, Hanseatisches
Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, 1. Senat, 1956 Monatsschrift
fuer Deutsches Recht 227 (1956).
**^[Durchgangserwerb] . Larenz , supra note 425, at 585.
**^K0 § 48, VerglO § 27 (1).
**'32 BGHZ at 370.
***Serick, supra note 2, at 91.
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by their clients for purposes of security.*"' These assignments
cover all of their present and future claims against the
debtor emerging from a typically broadly defined relationship,
i.e. all accounts receivables arising in the debtor ^s
business."^" Bulk assignments are subject to judicial scrutiny
and certain restrictions in conflicts with other securities
because of their totality in range endangering subsequent
creditors. "^^
7. Charge factoring as a means of security
Coming from the United States factoring is a relatively new
instrument rapidly increasing its share in the German market
of business financing.*" The Bundesgerichtshof*" following
Serick*^* has categorized factoring into 'outright factoring'**^
**'["Globalzession"] . Palandt/Heinrichs, supra note 277, BGB
§ 398 cmt. 25, at 460.
*^°Kuhn/Uhlenbruck, supra note 4 37, KO § 4 3 cmt. 20, at 727.
*^^See infra IV. D. .
""Turnover in 1985: German marks 8.8 billion. In 1986:
German marks 10.6 billion. Figures from: Serick, supra note
2, at 92.
""Judgment of Sept. 19, 1977, Bundesgerichtshof , VIII.
Zivilsenat, 69 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
Zivilsachen 254, 257 (1978) (hereinafter: 69 BGHZ 254).
"^"Eigentumsvorbehalt und Sicherungsuebertragung, Bd. IV § 52
III, cited at: 69 BGHZ at 257.
455 r tl[ "Echtes Factoring" ]
.
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and 'charge factoring.'*" Outright factoring reflects a mere
sale of accounts receivables; thus the factor takes the risk
of collecting the assigned accounts receivables from the
third-party debtor. "^^ For this reason there is no limitation
on the validity of bulk assignments to an outright factor,
since other creditors are in a similar position, as if the
assignor had collected the accounts receivables itself.*^®
In distinction thereof only charge factoring is designed to
serve as a security device.*^' The debtor assigns its claim
against a third-party debtor to the creditor, the factor, only
'on account ;' ''^° the secured debt discharges, when the third-
party debtor pays to the factor. But if the third-party debtor
becomes insolvent, the factor still is entitled to enforce its
claim against the debtor. Thus, ultimately the debtor is
exposed to the risk of the third-party debtor ^s insolvency,
the creditor actually obtains a second debtor and thereby is
secured for satisfaction of its claim against the debtor. *^^
*"[ "Unechtes Factoring" ]
.
*"[Delkredererisiko] . 69 BGHZ at 257; Judgment of June 7,
1978, Bundesgerichtshof , VIII . Zivilsenat , 72 Entscheidungen
des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen 15, 20.
*=*69 BGHZ at 258.
*^*Judgment of Oct. 14, 1981, Bundesgerichtshof, VIII.
Zivilsenat, 82 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
Zivilsachen 50, 61 (1982) (hereinafter: 82 BGHZ 50).
**°["Erfuellungshalber"]
, BGB § 364 (2).
*"82 BGHZ at 61-62, 65.
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Since charge factoring is different from the security
assignment only with respect to the order of collection,
charge factoring is treated like a security assignment in
practice; the rules for security assignments are applied
analogously, including the limitations on the validity of bulk
assignments.**^ Therefore the comments on security assignments
in this thesis relate to charge factoring as well.
III. The combinations of security devices in the financing
practice - an example of the perfect security interest
In practice the simple security instruments often do not meet
the particular needs of the parties, particularly the needs of
the business financer. Therefore, neither suppliers nor banks
are content with the plain reservation of title or security
ownership, respectively. They combine security devices to
extend and expand their plain security interests. This chapter
introduces the common practices of 'extension'"*^ and
'expansion'"** in the German financing economy. It will show
that various supplements to the simple security interests in
the first instance are designed to assure continuation of the
**^In so far see supra 6. and infra IV. D.. 82 BGHZ at 56;
Rolf Serick, "Befremdliches" zur Behandlung der
Barvorschusstheorie beim Factoring-Geschaeft? , 34 pt. 1
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 794, 796-98 (1981); against
an analogy in every aspect: Palandt/Heinrichs, supra note
277, BGB § 398 cmt . 37, at 462.
*"[ "Verlaengerung" ]
.
***["Erweiterung"] .
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creditor's security interest and protection against the
hazards arising from the lack of publicity.
A. The extension of the security interest
1. The purpose and relevance of a security interest's
extension
The extension of a security interest is defined as the
continuation of the security interest in certain surrogates of
the initial collateral /^^ when the creditor has lost ownership
in the latter for some reason.*** It is designed and employed
to enable credit transactions with commercial debtors on the
basis of securities in raw materials and inventory.**^
Suppliers of these goods, who are willing to sell and do
business on a credit basis, face their customers' need to
transfer ownership in the purchased goods. In the ordinary
course of business the retailer needs to resell the inventory
goods and the manufacturer needs to process the raw materials
and to sell the finished products. The resale requires a
transfer of ownership to the ultimate purchaser and the
processing will by operation of law cause the processor's
**^I.e. any proceeds from its resale.
*"I.e. because the debtor processes or sells it.
Buelow, supra note 265, cmts. 997, 1219, at 279, 358.
"^'Serick, supra note 2, at 47-59; Buelow, supra note 265,
cmts. 997-1034, at 278-91.
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acquisition of ownership, BGB § 950. However, the supplier
would lose reserved ownership in the collateral and merely
obtain compensation claims for breach of contract and tort.
But these claims lack any security function."^® An extension of
ownership compensates this loss by continuing the security
interest in the surrogate of the collateral, basically the
finished products of processed raw materials and the proceeds
of the resale, the claim for the purchase price. "^^
The extension of ownership sufficiently secures the supplier,
selling inventory goods and raw materials on a credit basis
and allows the debtor to process and sell them. But the
extension of the security interest is not limited to the
supplier's reservation of title; banks can and do extend
security ownership in the debtors' inventories and raw
materials, too.'*''° In contrast to the financing of supply in
raw materials and inventory of businesses, the extension of
security interests is of no or only marginal relevance in the
area of consumer financing, because the consumer is deemed to
be the ultimate user and owner of the collateral. For the same
*See infra 2.
a
**Vudgment of March 3, 1956, Bundesgerichtshof , IV.
Zivilsenat, 20 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
Zivilsachen 159, 163-64 (1956) (hereinafter: 20 BGHZ 159).
"^^Although the bank's security interest in the initial
collateral is subordinated to the supplier's reserved
ownership, see infra IV. B.. Serick, supra note 2, at 50-52
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reason security interests in business equipment usually are
not extended. """^
2. The components of an extension of a security interest
Technically, the extension of a security interest may consist
of a 'processing clause '"^^ authorizing the debtor to process
the collateral and assuring that the creditor's security
interest continues in the finished product, a selling clause
empowering the debtor to sell the collateral in the ordinary
course of business combined with an advance security
assignment of the claim for payment of the resale price and
finally a power to collect that claim.
a. The processing clause
The following model of a processing clause provides:*''^
'8. Processing Clause. (1) The Bank authori[z]es the
borrower until further notice in the ordinary course of
business to process or procure the processing of the
"'^SericJc, supra note 2, at 47-59, and Buelow , supra note
263, at 278-91, correspondently limit their analyses to the
extension of security interests in inventory and raw
materials.
472 r II[ "Verarbeitungsklausel" ]
.
^^^No.8 of the 'Area Security Contract for Warehouses with
Changing Contents and Capital Goods' of the Deutsche Bank
AG, unpublished no. 11-011 1178, as translated in: Serick,
supra note 2, at 48-49.
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goods given as security. The processor therein acts as
the gratuitous agent of the Bank as producer, so that the
Bank retains or acquires the ownership, sole, joint or
inchoate, in the products at all times and at each stage
of the process (§ 950 BGB)
.
(2) If, notwithstanding the above, the Bank should at any
stage of the process lose ownership, sole, joint or
inchoate, and the borrower obtain such rights, such
rights are to vest in the [B]ank immediately the borrower
acquires them. In such a case also the borrower holds the
goods in question for the Bank. Should the rights
acquired by the security-giver be merely rights to call
for ownership in the goods, sole, joint or inchoate, he
hereby assigns such rights to the Bank.'
If the collateral consists of raw materials or primary
products, the debtor needs to be authorized to process the
collateral. The processing causes both the processor's
acquisition of ownership in the finished product"'" and,
pursuant to BGB § 950 (2), the extinguishment of the rights in
the processed materials including the reserved or security
"'"BGB § 950 (1), unless the value of processing is
significantly lower than the value of materials, which has
been assumed when the value of processing made 40 % of the
product's total value; Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof , WM
1972, 188, cited at: Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 1027, at
289. If the value of processing remains below this rate,
the owners of the processed materials become co-owners per
quota, BGB §§ 947-48.
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ownership of the creditor and an inchoate title of the debtor.
Thus, the debtor would infringe the creditor's ownership by
processing the collateral and would risk liability for breach
of contract*'^ and tort"''^ without the authorization provided by
the processing clause as set forth above.
The power to process needs to be accompanied by the
determination, that the debtor processes the goods on behalf
and "as the . . . agent"*^'' of the creditor. The parties thereby
agree upon the creditor being the processor and thus directly
becoming owner of the finished product pursuant to BGB § 950
(1).*''® The creditor avoids a transit acquisition of the
debtor, which would bear the risk of an intermediate seizure
of the finished product by other creditors. "^^ The creditor's
rights in the finished product, the surrogate of the raw
materials and processed goods, correspond to those, which he
*''^[ Positive Vertragsverletzung]
.
*^*BGB § 82 3 (1).
*''''Supra No. 8 (1) of the sample clause.
*'*20 BGHZ at 163-64. A minority of scholars are of the
opinion that the processor has to be determined according
to the factual situation in life; the debtor must be
regarded as the processor and original owner of the
finished product since the debtor carries the economical
risk of processing and selling it; the processing clause
only creates a derivative acquisition of security ownership
by an anticipated transfer (Palandt/Bassenge, supra note
277, BGB § 950 cmt . 11, at 1144). This opinion ultimately
imposes the risk of an intermediate insolvency of the
debtor and attachment of the finished product upon the
secured creditor.
^''Buelow, supra note 265, cmts. 885, 1025, at 242, 288.
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had in the initial collateral. Therefore his ownership is
restricted by the fiduciary duties under the security
transaction.
In this respect it is noteworthy, that the supplier's
reservation of ownership in the original collateral mutates to
security ownership in the surrogate . *®° Retention of ownership
in the surrogate is impossible; the supplier's ownership is
initially restricted by the purposes of security, when the
surrogate comes into existence. But in variation of the simple
security ownership and corresponding to the retention of
title, this substitutive type of security ownership is subject
to the restitutory condition of full payment, so that the
debtor acquires an inchoate title in the finished product.
This modification of general security ownership in the
surrogate results from an anticipated transfer of inchoate
title to the debtor. *^^ This transfer at least can be inferred
from the extension of the initial reservation of ownership and
the extension's purpose being only to continue the original
**°Serick, supra note 2, at 66, 133.
""BGB §§ 929 sentence 2, 158 (1). Ruediger Nierwetberg, Die
Rechtsposition von Lieferant und Produzent nach
Verarbeitung im verlaengerten Eigentumsvorbehalt , 36 pt. 3
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2235, 2236 (1983). A
continuation of the debtor's original inchoate title in the
surrogate, as suggested by IVerner Flume, Der verlaengerte
und erweiterte Eigentumsvorbehalt, 3 Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift 841, 844 (1950), must be rejected, since the
inchoate title has extinguished pursuant to BGB § 950 (2)
(Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 1028, at 289).
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security interest in the surrogate but not to increase or
decrease the parties^ rights.
b. The authorization to sell the collateral
The selling clause empowers the debtor to sell the collateral
regardless of whether it is the original or the finished
product, and to transfer ownership in its own name in the
ordinary course of business, BGB § 185 (1). Thus, the debtor
need not disclose the security transfer to its customers.
Whereas without the assent of the creditor formally owning the
collateral, the debtor could not transfer ownership validly
and thus would face liability to its customers for breach of
contract; the debtor finally would be hindered to use the
collateral for the operation of its business, which would be
contrary to the purpose of the extension of the security
interest.*®^ Therefore, the selling clause is an essential of
every extension of a security interest*" and at least is
implied in any purchase transaction under reservation of
title, when the goods apparently have been purchased for the
purpose of resale.*®"
^See supra 1 . .
*Buelow, supra note 265, cmts. 1008-08, at 282-83.
'Palandt/Putzo, supra note 277, BGB § 455 cmt. 13, at 507.
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The power^s limitation to sell the collateral only in the
ordinary course of business is designed to protect the
creditor against detrimental transfers, primarily fraudulent
and dumping sales. "^^ Frequently subsequent buyers of the
collateral prohibit the assignment of the purchase money. A
sale under this condition would be beyond the ordinary course
of business since the anticipated assignment of the purchase
money to the creditor"®*' would be void and ineffective under
the prohibition, BGB § 399, and the creditor would be stripped
off the security interest without any compensation.*®^ But
within the boundaries of the ordinary course of business the
debtor is free in his calculations; to this extent the
creditor is barred from any interference with the debtor ^s
business.*®®
c. The accessory assignment of the purchase money and the
power to collect
In the course of the sale of the initial or substitutive
collateral the creditor loses ownership. But on the other hand
*®^Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof , WM 1969, 1452, cited at:
Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 1010, at 283 note 6.
"^See infra c .
.
*®''Judgment of Nov. 28, 1968, Bundesgerichtshof, VII.
Zivilsenat, 51 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
Zivilsachen 113, 116-19 (1969); Judgment of Dec. 3, 1987,
Bundesgerichtshof, ZIP 1988, 175, 180, cited at: Serick,
supra note 2, at 56 note 11.
''®®Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 1010, at 283.
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the sale establishes the claim for the purchase money. This
surrogate replaces the goods sold as the collateral of the
security interest. Thus, the parties agree upon the assignment
of the purchase money for security purposes, the so-called
'accessory assignment.'*®' Typically they anticipate the
assignment in the initial security transaction to assure, that
the creditor acquires the claim directly upon its emergence
without prior transit acquisition by the debtor.*'" The parties
may limit the assignment to the amount of the secured debt*'^
plus an adequate risk markup.
Usually the creditor authorizes the debtor revocably to
collect the purchase money in its own name on behalf of the
creditor, BGB § 185 (1).*'^ Correlatively to this power, the
security agreement or the purchase contract, respectively,
obliges the debtor to collect the purchase money and pay it to
the creditor in the amount of the secured debt.*'^ For example,
*®'[ "Anschlusszession" ] /* see the sample clause infra.
*'°See: Judgment of May 23, 1958, Bundesgerichtshof , VIII.
Zivilsenat, 27 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes 306
(1958); supra II. C. 5..
*'^Judgment of Oct. 23, 1963, Bundesgerichtshof, VIII.
Zivilsenat, 17 pt. 1 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 149,
149-50 (1964).
*'^Serick, supra note 2, at 56-57; Buelow, supra note 265,
cmt. 1004, at 281.
"'^Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 1005, at 281.
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the accessory assignment and collection clause of the Deutsche
Bank AG"'* states:
'10. Accessory Assignment. (1) The borrower hereby
assigns, as security for the purposes of this contract,
all present and future claims arising out of the sale of
secured goods. Such claims, if not already transferred to
the Bank, are to vest on the conclusion of this contract,
at latest, as soon as they arise...
(2) The borrower is until further notice authori[z]ed by
the Bank to collect the debts so assigned to the Bank in
the ordinary course of business...'
B. The expansion of the security interest
A security interest is expanded, when it secures additional
debts on different bases than the primary credit."'^
Alternatively, the parties could create several security
interests for each additional debt arising out of their
relationship- Apart from the inconvenience of this procedure,
the creditor would face the risk of the security interest
*'*No.lO of the 'Area Security Contract for Warehouses with
Changing Contents and Capital Goods' of the Deutsche Bank
AG, unpublished no. 11-011 1178, as translated in: Serick,
supra note 2, at 49.
"'^Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 998, at 279; Serick, supra
note 2, at 48, 58-59.
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lapsing upon payment on the particular secured debt. The
debtor would be entitled to the collateral, which therefore
could be subject to attachment and seizure by other creditors.
The secured creditor would finally lose the collateral for
security purposes.*'^
The expansion of the initial security interest can prevent
this loss.**^ The collateral initially secures and continues to
secure other debts having emerged since the security interest
has been created, even after the initial debt has
extinguished."'® Therefore the creditor, who expects further
claims against the debtor arising from a particular
relationship, i.e. the supplier for his service charges and
the bank for subsequent loans or overdrafts, is advised to
stipulate an expansion of the security interest covering also
any additional debts, which emerge for other reasons than the
debt initially secured. Accordingly, the expansion clause
embodied in security agreements by the Deutsche Bank AG*"
reads as follows:
"'^This objection is made against the statutory pledge; see
supra I . D . 4 .
.
"'^Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 1035, at 292.
*'®Serick, supra note 2, at 58-59.
"''No.l of the 'Area Security Contract for Warehouses with
Changing Contents and Capital Goods' of the Deutsche Bank
AG, unpublished no. 11-011 1178, as translated in: Serick,
supra note 2, at 49.
147
'1. (1) The transfer is made in order to secure all
existing and future claims against the borrower, even if
subject to condition or term, which may be vested in any
branch of the Deutsche Bank.'
It has to be noted, that the foresaid clauses are only models,
which in practice are employed in amended or altered versions.
The Deutsche Bank AG as many other financing businesses and
suppliers combine both the extension and expansion clauses to
create the perfect security interest for their particular
needs. The expansion and extension of security ownership or
reservation of title enable the creditor to assure a
continuing security interest in the debtor ^s present and
future personal property securing current and advanced debts.
Therefore, especially in the setting of business financing
creditors combine and incorporate these covenants in the
security agreements. ^°° Primarily the so perfected security
ownership of the bank resembles significantly the floating
lien as employed by business financers in the United States.
Routinely the extended and expanded security ownership of
banks covers virtually all of the debtor ^s personal property
assets. ^°^ Similarly to the floating lien, the extension of
^°°See i.e. the 'Area Security Contract for Warehouses with
Changing Contents and Capital Goods' of the Deutsche Bank
AG.
^°^But if the liquidation value of the collateral exceeds the
secured debt disproportionally , the secured transaction may
be voidable for unconscionability [ "Uebersicherung"
]
(Judgment of June 22, 1989, Bundesgerichtshof , III.
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security ownership assures continuation of the security
interest in after-acquired property of the debtor, i.e. in
inventory or accounts. The expansion clause accomplishes that
the security ownership also secures future debts, particularly
advances and overdrafts, corresponding to the cross-
collateralization notoriously implemented in the lien
agreement under the U.C.C..
IV. The conflict of security interests
The conflict of security interests is formatively influenced
by the lack of publicity in the area of security interests. In
the effort to resolve the conflicts, the courts recognize a
set of rules which basically give effect to the security
interest created first. But these rules also contain two
exceptions, the subsequent acquisition of security interests
in chattels in good faith and the subsidiarity of certain
advance transfers, primarily bulk assignments. The third
relevant restriction in practice, the subordination of a
transfer of security ownership in advance to reservation of
title, ultimately results from the underlying principles of
the f irst-to-create rule of priority and therefore does not in
theory set forth an exception from this axiom. The following
examination will focus on conflicts of securities in the area
of business financing, but will also provide an excursion on
Zivilsenat, 108 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
Zivilsachen 98, 107-09 (1990)).
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conflicts of security interests in motor-vehicles, the
dominant consumer product serving as collateral in the modern
German practice of consumer financing. ^°^
A. Priority of the security interest created first -
the primary axiom
In a conflict of opposing security interests in the same
collateral, the primary axiom awards priority to the security
interest that has been created first. This rule reflects
nothing else but the consequence of the legal situation in rem
with respect to the collateral; nemo dat
,
quod non habet:^°^ "A
person cannot in general transfer a better title than he
himself possess. "^°* After the first security transaction the
debtor is no longer entitled to transfer ownership in the
chattel or to assign the claim for security purposes again.
Either he has lost this right because of the prior transfer or
^°^See infra C.4.; Serick, supra note 2, at 109, and
Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277, BGB § 932 cmt. 13, at
1136, both limiting their analysis on securities in the
area of consumer financing to motor-vehicles serving as
collateral
.
^°^Short form of: Nemo plus juris ad alium transferre potest,
quam ipse habet . Detlef Liebs, Lateinische Rechtsregeln
und Rechtssprichwoerter 10, no. 40, at 129, and no. 63, at
132 (5th ed. 1991)
.
^°*R. M. Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security 19
(1982). The tradition of this primary axiom of priority
goes back to the Roman digesta 50, 17, 54 {Ulpian) (Liebs,
supra note 503, no. 65, at 132). This principle also
governs the concept of priority in the British system of
securities in personal property (Goode, id at 19).
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assignment or he never has obtained such a right because the
seller retained ownership.
Neither does the power to transfer ownership arising from the
extension of the simple security interest cover a subsequent
secured transaction, since the transfer for security purposes
goes beyond the ordinary course of business. ^°^ Due to the lack
of the debtor ^s entitlement, the subsequent transfer or
assignment therefore 'misses' the collaterals"^ and has no
legal effect.^°^
B. The subordination of the transfer of security ownership
in advance
In practice banks often stipulate transfers of ownership in a
business^ inventory or part thereof for security purposes, so-
called 'area security contracts. '^°® Since the inventory
changes, the security transaction encompasses not only present
assets but also goods and raw materials becoming part of the
inventory in future. With respect to their anticipatory
^°^Judgment of March 30, 1988, Bundesgerichtshof , VIII.
Zivilsenat, 104 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
Zivilsachen 129, 132-33 (1989); see supra III. A. 2. b..
506 r II["Geht ins Leere"].
^°''32 BGHZ at 370, regarding security assignments; Buelow,
supra note 265, cmts. 892, 1129, at 244, 329-30.
508 r II[ "Raumsicherungsvertraege" ] ; see supra III.B.
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element, such transactions doubtlessly are valid. ^°' But in the
event of a conflict with the supplier's reservation of title
in parts of the debtor's inventory, the advanced security
transfer to the bank is subordinated. ^^° As long as the debtor
has not acquired full ownership in the collateral from the
supplier because the price has not been paid in full, the
debtor has not acquired absolute ownership and therefore is
not entitled to execute the security transfer, yet. Thus, the
bank has not obtained security ownership. ^^^ The bank merely
has acquired the debtor's inchoate title in the collateral for
security purposes, ^^^ which is inferior to the full ownership
of the supplier. ^^^ Therefore, although the advanced transfer
of security ownership to the bank was entered into previously,
it is defeated by the contesting supplier's reservation of
title. To this extent the primary axiom that the security
^°'Similarly to the United States, in Germany disputes
frequently arise concerning whether the collateral is
sufficiently described. See i.e. Judgment of Jan. 13, 1992,
Bundesgerichtshof , II. Zivilsenat, 45 pt. 2 Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift 1161, 1161-62 (1992).
"°The subordination is not limited to 'area security
contracts', but applies to any advanced transfer of
security ownership contested by reservation of title.
^^^An acquisition in good faith is excluded, since the bank
does not obtain actual possession; in this respect see
infra III. 2.; regarding the typical lack of good faith
see infra III .3 . .
^^^Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277, BGB § 930 cmt. 2, at
1132, § 929 cmt 45, at 1129.
^^^Regarding the possibility to raise the inchoate title to
full security ownership by satisfying the supplier for the
purchase money and thus reacting to the subordination in
the conflict of securities see infra V.D.I.
.
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interest created first prevails in the conflict of securities,
is restricted. This general preference of the supplier's
reservation of title to the bank's anticipated security
ownership corresponds to the priority of the supplier's title
retention over the floating lien under the pre-code common law
in the United States. ^'^'*
C. The priority of subsequent acquisitions of security
ownership in good faith and the limitations on this
exception to the general priority rule
Regarding the conflicts of security interests in chattels the
primary axiom of priority is breached by the validity of
subsequent acquisitions in good faith pursuant to BGB §§ 932-
35, when the debtor has lost or never has obtained the right
to transfer security ownership in the collateral. But the
availability of this exception is restricted drastically by
various limitations.
1. The validity of subsequent bona fide acquisitions in
general
The validity of subsequent acquisitions in good faith is based
on the publicity of possession, which grants ostensible
'See supra Part 1 VIII.
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ownership to the possessor."^ Therefore, because of lack of
publicity by possession, claims generally cannot be acquired
from the assignor in good faith after a previous assignment."*
According to BGB §§ 932-34 the defect of a subsequent transfer
of security ownership caused by the lack of the debtor *s right
to transfer ownership will be cured, when the debtor transfers
possession of the chattel to the transferee and the latter
acts in good faith. "^
2. The limitation on bona fide acquisition of security
ownership without transfer of actual possession
Typically the subsequent transfer of security ownership also
is designed to create a non-possessory security interest.
Thus, since the debtor remains the actual possessor of the
collateral, the subsequent acquisition of security ownership
in good faith is governed by BGB § 933.^^® Accordingly, the
"^BGB § 1006. Judgment of June 11, 1953, Bundesgerichtshof
,
IV. Zivilsenat, 10 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes
in Zivilsachen 81, 86 (1953); Soergel/Muehl , Buergerliches
Gesetzbuch Band 5 Sachenrecht BGB § 932 cmt. 6, at 326
(11th ed. 1978) .
"^See supra II. C. 2.. Larenz , supra note 425, at 576.
"'BGB § 935 imposes a negative precondition: The chattel
must not been stolen or otherwise deprived from the real
owner or the legitimate actual possessor, respectively.
Since the debtor as the legitimate actual possessor
deliberately gives up possession in the course of the
subsequent transfer, BGB § 935 never gives rise to an issue
in the conflict of security interests.
^^^Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 937, at 256.
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bona fide acquisition is not valid until the debtor has handed
over the collateral. In practice this regularly does not
occur, before the debtor is in default with performance to the
subsequent creditor and the security agreement authorizes the
realization of the collateral. When the subsequent creditor
then takes actual possession in accordance with the security
transaction and still acts bona fide - particularly regarding
the lack of any foregoing security interests in the collateral
-, the subsequently created security ownership becomes valid^^*
and ousts the senior security interest.
These strict limitations for subsequent acquisitions of
security ownership in good faith cannot be evaded by a
temporary transfer of actual possession; the transfer must be
designed to last permanently ."° Although this issue is subject
to some litigation, ^^^ the foresaid restriction of the transfer
of actual possession usually prevents subsequent Jbona fide
acquisitions of security ownership. Thus in practice the
enforcement of the senior security interest in the collateral
^^'BGB § 93 3. Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof , WM 1956, 527,
cited at: Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 937, at 256 note 178
""Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof, WM 1970, 251, cited at:
Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 937, at 256 note 179; Judgment
of Nov. 14, 1969, Oberlandesgericht Muenchen, 6. Senat, 23
pt.2 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 667 (1970).
"^Because it has to be decided by scrutinizing each case on
its individual facts.
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is only rarely interrupted by other creditors claiming to have
acquired security ownership subsequently in good faith. "^
3. The limitation on good faith regarding goods typically
subject to reserved ownership
The second major limitation on subsequent acquisitions for
security purposes concerns the element of good faith. Good
faith is excluded, when the transferee's lack of knowledge is
due to gross negligence on his part, BGB § 932 (2).
Accordingly, the transferee has a duty to inquire whether the
transferor is the owner of the prospective collateral, when
the reasonably prudent transferee considering his individual
knowledge and experience seriously is induced to suspect a
lack of the transferor's ownership."^ Especially in the area
of business financing, serious doubts concerning the
transferor's ownership in the collateral are suggested to the
bank or any other professional financer, when the collateral
typically is subject to reserved ownership like equipment,
inventory and raw materials and the subsequent transfer is
executed within the regular financing period. Therefore the
bank or financer, who intends to accept security ownership in
chattels as security for loans to a business, has to
investigate, whether the prospective collateral is subject to
"^Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 937, at 256.
"^Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof , WM 1978, 1208, cited at:
Palandt/Bassenge, supra note, BGB § 932 cmt. 10, at 1136.
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the supplier's reservation of ownership. If the bank fails to
undertake appropriate^^" efforts to inquire the transferor's
entitlement and closes the transfer, it forfeits the
protection under BGB §§ 932-34 and cannot assert to have acted
in good faith. "^
Neither can the bank invoke the merchant's ostensible power to
transfer ownership in the ordinary course of his business
pursuant to HGB § 366."^ Any transfer of ownership for
security exceeds the ordinary course of business and thus
apparently is not covered by any extension of a security
interest."'^
""I.e. obtaining a confirmation of ownership from the
transferor is not sufficient (Judgments of
Bundesgerichtshof , LM BGB § 932 Nr. 29 and WM 1978, 1028,
both cited at: Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277, BGB § 932
cmt. 10, at 1136)
.
"^Judgment of June 19, 1958, Bundesgerichtshof, II.
Zivilsenat, 11 pt. 2 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1485,
1486 (1958) (hereinafter: BGH, 11 pt. 2 NJW 1485); Judgment
of Jan. 8, 1960, Oberlandesgericht Celle, 11. Senat, 13 pt.
1 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 967 (1960).
"*Which is to distinct from good faith in the debtor's
ownership itself. A power to transfer ownership i.e. could
have been provided by a selling clause in connection with
the execution of a security interest.
"^Judgments of Bundesgerichtshof, WM 1968, 540; WM 1973, 38;
WM 1975, 362; all cited at: Baumbach/Duden/Hopt
,
Handelsgesetzbuch HGB § 366 cmt. 2 C, at 909 (28th ed.
1989) .
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4. Excursion: The publicity of the certificate of title
limiting subsequent acquisitions of motor-vehicles in good
faith
In the area of consumer financing, motor-vehicles represent
the type of chattel commonly preferred as collateral by
financers. Apart from the fact that motor-vehicles often
represent a substantial part of the debtor *s total assets,"*
a main reason for this preference appears to be provided by
the particular certainty regarding the priority in a conflict
of security interests in motor-vehicles. This clarity in
practice ultimately is caused by the public function of the
motor-vehicle ^s certificate of title."' The certificate of
title only has to show the 'keeper of the motor-vehicle, '"°
who normally, but not necessarily is the owner. "^
Nevertheless, an unbroken line of authorities has established
the rule that the certificate of title has a 'negative bona
fide effect' for the acquisition of ownership. ^^^ According to
"®In this respect the German scene does not differ from
households in the United States. Regarding the substantial
value of motor-vehicles to private households in the U.S.
see: Albany Discount Corporation v. Mohawk National Bank of
Schenectady, 269 N.E.2d 809, 811 (N.Y. 1971).
"'[Kraftfahrzeugbrief ]
.
"°[ "Kraftfahrzeughalter" ]
.
"^[Strassenverkehrs-Zulassungs-Ordnung] , Sept. 28, 1988,
BGBl. I, p. 1793] § 25 (1) sentence 1.
^^^[
"Negative Gutglaubenswirkung" ] . Judgment of March 11,
1991, Bundesgerichtshof , II. Zivilsenat, 44 pt. 2 Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift 1415, 1416 (1991) (hereinafter:
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the customary standards not the possession of the motor-
vehicle solely, but the possession of the vehicle together
with the possession of the certificate of title identifies the
owner. ^^^ Thus the transferee lacks good faith, when he does
not receive possession of the certificate of title from the
transferor.""
As a practical consequence the diligent secured party usually
possesses the certificate of title and therefore is protected
against a subsequent acquisition of ownership including
security ownership in the motor-vehicle. On the other hand the
diligent transferee refrains from the transaction, when the
transferor cannot provide the certificate of title. Hence, the
possession of the certificate of title establishes publicity
of the entitlement in the particular motor-vehicle which the
certificate is issued for; it avoids conflicts of security
interests between diligent creditors; and finally, in case of
BGH, 44 pt. 2 NJW 1415).
"^Soergel/Muehl , supra note 515, BGB § 932 cmt. 18, at 330.
""BGH, 44 pt. 2 NJW at 1416. A number of courts have held,
that an exception thereof applies, when the transfer
concerns a new vehicle from an authorized dealer of the
manufacturer (Oberlandesgericht Duesseldorf, NJW-RR 1992,
381; Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe, NJW-RR 1989, 1461; both
cited at: Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277, BGB § 932 cmt.
13, at 1137). Whereas the Oberlandesgericht Hamm, Judgment
of Jan. 13, 1964, 5. Senat, 17 pt. 2 Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift 2257 (1964), correctly has found, that in
this case only the good faith in the merchant's power to
dispose the goods in the ordinary course of his business is
protected pursuant to HGB § 366, in contrast to good faith
in the debtor's ownership.
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a conflict it prefers the diligent creditor possessing the
certificate of title.
D. The inferiority of the bulk assignment to the subsequent
extended reservation of title
To the disadvantage of banks, the courts have perforated the
principle of priority with respect to bulk assignments to the
financer. By now it is well established that a bulk assignment
for security purposes is unconscionable and therefore void, if
and in so far as it refers to claims, which customarily are
subject to anticipated assignments to a supplier in the course
of extension of his reserved ownership. ^^^ The courts have
considered that suppliers typically reserve ownership and
require its extension for security of the purchase money;
therefore the debtor, who needs to obtain goods and raw
materials to run his business, has no choice but to execute
the subsequent anticipatory assignment to the supplier knowing
that he is not entitled to because of his previous bulk
assignment to the bank. Thus the bank foreseeably compels the
debtor to breach his contract with the supplier, when it
"^BGB §§ 134, 138 (1). Judgment of April, 18, 1991,
Bundesgerichtshof , IX. Zivilsenat, 44 pt. 3, Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift 2144, 2147 (1991); Judgment of
March 7, 1974, Bundesgerichtshof, VII. Zivilsenat, 27 pt. 2
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 942-43 (1974). For other
purposes and the assignments of other debts the bank may
save the validity of the bulk assignment by expressly
excluding debts from the assignment, which are usually
subject to the supplier's expansion of reserved ownership,
[Dingliche Teilverzichtsklausel ]
.
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demands a bulk assignment to secure the credit for the
business. ^^^
This 'breach-of-contract '-doctrine^^'' has been challenged by
scholarly literature advocating a sharing of the assigned
purchase money and its proceeds among the assignees per quota
calculated on the amounts of the secured debts. ^^® This
' sharing '-theory^^^ lacks any statutory basis and therefore
must be rejected. ^*° The better reasons support the strict
preference of the supplier's extended reservation of
ownership. The supplier's security interest is designed to
secure the present debt of a single transaction, the purchase
of certain goods; whereas the bulk assignment to the bank is
made prophylactically to secure all debts, present and future,
arising from a continuous or recurrent relationship. Since as
a matter of fact the bulk assignment to the bank is made at
the beginning of the relationship with the bank and thus often
at the starting point of the debtor's business operations, the
^^^Judgment of Oct. 13, 1987, Bundesgerichtshof , VI.
Zivilsenat, 41 pt. 1 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 263,
264-65 (1988).
"^["Vertragsbruchlehre" ] , Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 1137,
at 333.
"^Peter Finger, Verlaengerter Eigentumsvorbehalt und
Globalzession, 25 pt. 2 Juristenzeitung 642, 644 (1970);
Buelow, supra note 265, cmts. 1146-50, at 336-38.
^^'[
"Teilungslehre" ] . Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 1146, at
336.
^*°Esser, 135 ZHR 320, 330 (1971), cited at: Buelow, supra
note 265, cmt. 1150, at 337 note 35.
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bank^s security interest would almost always gain priority
over subsequent advance assignments to suppliers in operation
of the strict f irst-to-create axiom of priority; the supplier
would be barred from the possibility to acquire sufficient
security for the purchase money; thus, the supplier's extended
reservation of title would be 'devalued; '^"^ undue hardships
would be imposed on the supplier, primarily when day-to-day
transactions with the debtor are involved, which are executed
on the basis of standard terms without actually stipulating
any securities. All of which is to say that German law would
become the same as the law under the U.C.C. on this subject.
V. The partial compliance of the German system of securities
in personal property with the interests involved in business
financing and the disadvantages of banks and general
creditors
An evaluation of the German system of securities in personal
property and its basic avoidance of publicity of security
transfers requires clarification about its ability to comply
with the interests involved in security transactions in the
area of business financing. The following attempt to make a
conclusive statement on this issue considers the interests of
the debtor, his customers, his supplier, his bank and his
general creditors.
^"^["Entwertet" ] . Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 1133, at 331-
32.
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A. The complete compliance with the debtor *s interest to use
the collateral and conceal the security transaction
In modern business financing the debtor *s interest to use the
collateral for business purposes can be fully complied with by
the creation of a constitutum possessorium and the employment
of processing and selling clauses connected with the extension
of the security interest. Accordingly, the debtor may obtain
or retain actual possession of the collateral and be
authorized to process and sell it.
Additionally, as set forth above the development of reserved
ownership and security ownership as well as the security
assignment enable the parties to keep the security transaction
entirely secret. In contrast to the statutory pledge the
modern security devices lack a requirement of public notice.
Exceptionally in limited, extremely risky transactions the
creditor might prefer to disclose a security assignment to
assure against the discharging effect of performance by the
third-party debtor to the debtor or a subsequent ostensible
assignee. ^*^ In cases like these, the debtor ^s interest in
secrecy is inferior to the creditor's interest to limit the
risks resulting from the debtor's insolvency.
'See supra I I I.e. 3.
163
B. The full protection of the debtor *s customers
The debtor ^s customers purchasing the collateral are protected
completely against failures to acquire the full ownership in
the purchased good without any encumbrances in three ways:
First, the selling clause, which is at least implied in the
commonly extended security transaction regarding inventory
goods and raw materials, empowers the debtor to transfer
ownership in the ordinary course of his business. Thus,
normally the debtor^s customer, who purchases the collateral,
acquires full and absolute ownership due to the extension of
the security interest.
Second, if the debtor lacks authority to transfer ownership in
the collateral,^" the debtor ^s customer is protected in its
good faith in the debtor ^s ownership and primarily the
debtor ^s ostensible power to transfer ownership in the
ordinary course under HGB § 366. The resale to the customer
usually belongs to the ordinary course of the debtor ^s
business. The protection under HGB § 366 takes into account
that good faith in the merchant's ownership may be precluded
because of the transferee being seriously induced to suspect.
'"'I.e. because the security interest exceptionally has not
been extended and extension cannot be inferred from the
purpose of the security transaction.
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that the good is subject to financing and a security interest,
especially reservation of title. ^**
Third, however, when the security interest consists of
reservation of title or conditional security ownership, in
minimum the subsequent purchaser acquires inchoate title in
the good. Any intended transfer of ownership includes the
inchoate title^*^ as a 'minus identical in character , '^"^ which
the debtor is entitled to transfer.^*" In apparently critical
situations the subsequent purchaser knowing about the security
interest may protect itself and decide to make a repayment on
the secured debt for the purchased good directly to the
secured creditor, BGB § 267 (1), to meet the condition for -
ultimately the purchaser's - acquisition of full ownership.^*®
Although the debtor may oppose to the direct payment, the
creditor is not bound to the opposition, BGB § 267 (2). The
creditor still can - and for his own benefit usually will -
accept the payment at his discretion.^*' The purchaser then can
^**Judgment of Feb. 5, 1975, Bundesgerichtshof , VIII.
Zivilsenat, 28 pt. 2 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 735,
736 (1975).
^*^Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277, BGB § 930 cmt. 2,
at 1132, referring to the 'area security contract'.
^'**[
"Wesensgleiches Minus"].
^'"'Any contractual prohibition is void in relation to the
debtor's customer, BGB § 137 (1); see supra II. A. 1..
^**See supra II. A. 4. a..
^*'Palandt/Heinrichs, supra note 277, BGB § 267 cmt. 5, at
313.
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set off his claim against the debtor for recourse"" against
his debt for payment of the resale price to the latter.
C. The comprehensive satisfaction of the supplier's interest
in a firm security for the purchase price
Obviously the supplier reserves ownership for the purpose of
securing the claim for the purchase money. But apart from this
dominant security interest it must be considered, that the
reservation of title generally is designed to increase
sales ;"^ it sets forth a security device, which due to its
non-possessory and secret nature attracts the debtor to
purchase goods on a credit basis. These general and hardly
measurable benefits for the supplier must be taken into
account and may justify the supplier's exposure to the
remaining limited degree of uncertainty and risk in the
operation of reserved ownership.
"°Arisen from the discharge of the secured debt and based on
either commission (BGB §§ 662, 670), BGB §§ 677, 683,
670 or unjust enrichment (BGB § 812), depending on the
internal relationship to the debtor (Palandt/Heinrichs,
supra note 277, BGB § 267 cmt. 7, at 313; Palandt/Thomas,
id, BGB § 812 cmt. 62, at 904).
"^See supra II. A..
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1. The certainty of acquiring a perfect security interest by
reservation of ownership
A primary goal of the reserved ownership is the certainty for
the supplier to obtain a perfect security interest. Referring
to the security transaction the supplier is the original owner
of the collateral and retains ownership. Therefore the
supplier does not face the risk of prior security transfers in
the collateral or any other lack of the debtor ^s right to
transfer the security interest, which immanently goes along
with a derivative acquisition of security ownership. Even an
advanced transfer of security ownership from the debtor to the
bank cannot harm the supplier; it would be ineffective, since
the debtor does not acquire full ownership, which it could
transfer to the bank."^
2 . The minor risk of losing the security interest
On the other hand, the possibility of a subsequent acquisition
of ownership in good faith pursuant to BGB §§ 932-35 exposes
the supplier to a minimal risk of losing his security interest
in the course of subsequent transfers of the collateral by the
debtor. This risk is limited to a few exceptional situations.
Against losses in standard situations the supplier either is
protected by law or can protect itself by extension of the
'"Regarding the possibility for the bank to acquire inchoate
title and be secured thereby see infra D.I..
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reserved ownership. Overall the German law on securities in
personal property comprehensively accomplishes the supplier's
particular interest to be assured of an effective security for
the purchase money.
a. The extension of reserved ownership providing
substitution for the ownership in the initial collateral
The supplier may allow the debtor to transfer ownership in the
collateral, either the initial inventory or the substitutive
finished product, and in consideration make the debtor assign
the claim for payment of the resale price in advance.^" By
this extension of the reserved ownership the supplier assures
the continuation of his security interest in case of
prospective transfers of the collateral in the ordinary course
of the debtor's business. The courts have upheld the
supplier's protection by the anticipated assignment in the
conflict with a previous bulk assignment by the debtor to the
bank including the claim for the resale price. They have
constantly given effect to the subsequent assignment to the
supplier^^" and thus enforced the supplier's protection against
the loss of the security interest to the bank financing the
debtor
.
^"For details see supra III. A..
^^*See supra IV. C.
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b. The restrictions on subsequent acquisitions in good faith
Subsequent transfers of equipment or of security ownership in
inventory or raw materials are normally not covered by
extension of reserved ownership and therefore generally have
to be feared by the supplier. The debtor typically does not
purchase equipment for the purpose of reselling it, so that
reserved ownership in equipment usually is not extended."^ The
subsequent transfer of security ownership by the debtor is not
within the ordinary course of business and therefore not
governed by the rules of extension. ^^^ To this extent the
supplier may completely lose the security interest by a
subsequent acquisition in good faith. But the courts have
limited the possibility of such a loss drastically.
The first serious limitation on acquisitions in good faith
arises from the statutory requirement of a transfer of actual
possession, BGB §§ 932-34. Thus, any subsequent transfer of
security ownership will not be valid, until the debtor hands
over the collateral to the subsequent transferee. With respect
to a subsequent transfer of security ownership the delivery
'See supra III.A.l
556see supra III.A.l.. I.e. the extension in no. 10 of the
standard terms of the Deutsche Bank AG expressly authorizes
only the "sale of [the] secured goods" (supra III.A.2.C.).
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normally will not happen before the suspension of payments by
the debtor."'
Goods such as business equipment are typically subject to
reservation of title. With respect to such assets, the courts
have constantly held that the transferee must seriously
consider a lack of entitlement to transfer ownership on the
part of the debtor. Therefore the transferee has a duty to
undertake adequate inquiries regarding the debtor ^s
entitlement and reserved ownership in the goods. ^^® In practice
there arise issues regarding, whether goods are typically
subject to reservation of title or the debtor presumably is at
least empowered to transfer ownership in the ordinary course
of business, HGB § 366. However and although these issues may
turn out to the detriment of the supplier, the general
acknowledgment of the subsequent transferee's duty to inquire
contributes to the protection of the supplier against
subsequent transferees being unaware of its interest and
acquiring ownership. Especially banks which are about to take
security ownership, can neither rely on the absence of
reservation of title nor HGB § 3 66 and the presumption of the
debtor's authority to execute the security transfer because
the transfer for security purposes is not in the ordinary
course of the debtor's business. Overall it can be concluded,
"'See supra IV. C. 2..
"®See supra IV. B. 3..
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that both restrictions impose serious obstacles to subsequent
acquisitions of absolute and security ownership in good faith
which would oust the supplier's security interest because the
extension clauses do not apply.
If reserved ownership is extended, the supplier only loses
security unforeseeably when the debtor delivers the collateral
to the transferee. With respect to a competing creditors
taking possession of the collateral for security purposes,
this situation will rarely occur in practice, before the
debtor's suspension of payments. Additionally, a loss of
security requires that either the collateral typically must
not be subject to reservation of title at the time of the
subsequent transfer or adequate inquiries regarding the
debtor's rights in the collateral must not have indicated the
existing security interest and the restriction regarding the
debtor's entitlement in the goods.
Therefore, the risk for the supplier to lose the security
interest is limited to extraordinary situations and is of
minor practical relevance. Any harm, which nevertheless might
occur to the supplier, can be regarded as justified by the
general gain in sales in assenting to sell on a credit basis
and to employ the non-possessory and secret security device of
reserved ownership. ^^' Accordingly, it seems appropriate to
'See supra II. A. 1..
171
impose the burden on the supplier to monitor both the debtor ^s
possession of the collateral and his financial situation, when
the supplier wants to eliminate even marginal risks to the
retained title. The supplier must be alert to the need to
repossess in time, before a different creditor takes
possession at the debtor ^s suspension of payments.
D. The disadvantages of the bank in the conflict of
securities and the imposition of due diligence on the bank
as a compensation for the lack of publicity of security
transfers
The courts systematically have shifted the risks arising from
the lack of publicity in security interests to the bank. The
bank^s subordination to the supplier's security interest gives
some certainty in the area of business financing. Often
hardships for the banks are avoided because they have secured
loans additionally i.e. by land charges. The present system of
securities in personal property partially also serves for the
benefit of the banks since they neither have to take
possession of the collateral as under the statutory pledge nor
have to take the costs and risks connected with the need to
comply with formalities of filing public notice of the
security transaction.
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1. The general subordination of the bank^s security interest
to the supplier's reservation of title
The bank's general subordination to the supplier's security
interest emerges from the nature of the supplier's reservation
of ownership. Since the supplier initially owns and merely
retains ownership in the collateral, when he enters into the
security transaction, the bank cannot derivatively acquire
security ownership from the debtor as the 'entitled person, '^*°
until the supplier has received payment of the purchase money
and the condition for transfer of absolute ownership has been
met."^ Thus, any transfer of security ownership in goods being
subject to reserved ownership usually can only effect the
acquisition of inchoate title in the collateral .^^^ An
acquisition of full ownership for security purposes in good
faith is precluded, since both the bank typically does not
obtain actual possession of the collateral and a diligent
inquiry would have alerted the bank to the reservation of
ownership and the debtor's lack of right to transfer security
ownership. Therefore, in the conflict with the supplier's
reservation of title the bank's security interest regularly is
ineffective.
560[- Mgej-echtigter" ]
.
^^^Regarding the subordination of advanced transfers of
security ownership in particular see supra IV. B..
^"See supra B.
.
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But as a 'minus' to security ownership, the bank has acquired
the supplier's inchoate title for security purposes. The bank
may raise the inchoate title to full security ownership. ^^^ It
may pay the purchase money owed by the debtor to the supplier,
BGB § 267. Thereby the bank discharges the debtor's secured
debt, so that the condition for the debtor's acquisition of
full ownership under the sales contract occurs. Due to the
anticipated security transfer to the bank, finally the bank
obtains security ownership in the collateral.^**
Consequentially, the bank can seek satisfaction from the
collateral. But this procedure is only appropriate, when the
balance of the purchase money is smaller than the expected
proceeds from the liquidation of the collateral. Nevertheless,
the disadvantage of the bank's security ownership may diminish
severely in the individual case.
Another facet of the general subordination of the bank's
security interest results from the axiomatic invalidity of
advanced assignments of expected claims for payment of the
resale price contained in the bulk assignment to the bank.^*^
Accordingly the bank's security interest is defeated in the
conflict with the supplier's extension of reserved ownership
^*^See supra IV. B. for the advanced transfer of security
ownership in particular.
^^''See BGB 185 providing that a disposition lacking the
transferor's power becomes effective upon his acquisition
of the disposed right.
^^^See supra IV. C. .
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regardless of priority in the creation of the security
interests.
2. The burden of due diligence as a balance for the lack of
publicity
As a factual consequence of the bank^s strict subordination to
the supplier's security interest the bank bears the burden to
balance the lack of publicity in the system of securities in
personal property. In its own interest to acquire an adequate
security interest it has to investigate the rights in a
prospective collateral typically subject to reserved
ownership. It must diligently check the debtor's records
regarding the existence of reserved ownership and, if it has
detected any, the amount of payments made on the purchase
price. ^^^ The latter is necessary to find out the balance due
and to determine the value of the debtor's inchoate title in
the prospective collateral, so that the bank is able to
decide, whether an acquisition of the inchoate title enabling
the foresaid procedure will provide adequate security.
Moreover, especially when payments are not sufficient to
achieve the break-even for the acquisition of the prospective
collateral for security purposes, the bank may seek a 'release
'BGH, 11 pt.2 NJW at 1486
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statement'"'' from the supplier, who might have an interest in
the debtor receiving the credit."® This release statement
basically resembles the subordination agreement employed by
purchase money lenders in the United States. In practice being
the sole means to assure the bank for the acquisition of the
security interest, the release statement creates limited
publicity of the prior security interest."' However, since
this limited publicity is a mere reflex of the bank^s
diligence, it can be concluded that the lack of a public
notice requirement for the creation of reserved ownership is
to the debit of the banks, which have to undertake diligent
efforts to assure the perfection of the security interest.
3. The risk of losing the security interest
Apart from the subordination in the conflict with the
supplier's reservation of title, the bank is at risk of losing
its security interest to subsequent transferees of the
collateral. Significantly more than the supplier, the bank is
exposed to the risk of subsequent acquisition of security
ownership in good faith by different creditors. Unlike the
duty to investigate the rights in goods which are typically
567 r II[ "Freigabeerklaerung" ]
.
"^Judgment of Oberlandesgericht Nuernberg, WM 1962, 95, 96,
cited at: Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 93 3, at 255 note 171.
"'Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof , WM 1963, 1186, cited at:
Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 933, at 255 note 171.
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subject to reserved ownership, generally there does not exist
any such obligation with respect to prior security ownership
in the prospective collateral .^"^^ This principle has only been
displaced, when the transferee actually knew either about the
particular senior credit^'^^ or that the debtor was deeply in
debt.^^^ Therefore the subsequent transferee more likely acts
in good faith regarding the prior security interest of the
bank than the supplier's reservation of title. ^^^
Furthermore, in contrast to the supplier, who retains original
ownership and therefore is immune to subordination according
to the primary axiom of priority, ^'"' the bank is subject to
this principle in the conflict with other creditors claiming
to have acquired security ownership in the collateral.
Therefore, the bank unlike the supplier is exposed to the
inducement for subsequent creditors to gain priority
""Judgment of June 22, 1966, Bundesgerichtshof , VIII.
Zivilsenat, 19 pt. 2 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1959,
1960 (1966); Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 934, at 255.
"^Judgment of Bundesgerichtshof, LM BGB § 932 Nr. 26, cited
at: Palandt/Bassenge, supra note 277, BGB § 932 cmt. 11, at
1136.
"^Judgment of Nov. 14, 1977, Oberlandesgericht Celle, 9.
Senat, 33 Juristenzeitung 400, 401 (1978).
"^Buelow, supra note 265, cmt. 9 34, at 255.
"*See also supra C.I..
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fraudulently, i.e. by backdating the documents of their
security transactions.^'^
4. The transformation of security ownership in the debtor ^s
insolvency
A minor disadvantage for the bank results from the principle
of transformation^''^ which does not apply to reserved
ownership. In the debtor ^s insolvency the bank cannot demand
to have the collateral severed and transferred. ^''' Like a
pledgee it is basically limited to the right to prior
satisfaction from the proceeds of the collateral's liquidation
by the administrator within the pending insolvency proceeding.
5. The limited value of the bank's right to demand
additional and effective securities at any time provided in
the AGB-Banken no. 19 (1) and AGB-Sparkassen no. 21 (4)
The banks try to avoid potential conflicts of securities to
limit losses resulting from the subordination to the
supplier's reservation of ownership and the risk of losing the
security interest to subsequent creditors by incorporating
"^As it was the case in: Judgment of Jan. 24, 1983,
Bundesgerichtshof , VIII. Zivilsenat, 86 Entscheidungen des
Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen 300 (1983).
^"^See supra II.B.6..
^^'Like an unrestricted owner can, who is not bound by the
fiduciary duties of a security agreement.
178
clauses in their standard terms, which give them the right to
demand further and effective securities from the debtor, AGB-
Banken no. 19 (1) and AGB-Sparkassen no. 21 (4). Such a clause
is valid^'® and can protect the bank, when it recognizes the
ineffectiveness of its present security interest in time and
the debtor is able to provide a different collateral
sufficient to secure the credit. But in the practically
relevant case, when the additional security transfer under
this clause is closed during the debtor ^s crisis, it is too
late: the transfer is avoidable pursuant to KO § 30 no. 2.^^'
E. The lack of publicity affecting the subsequent general
creditors
Furthermore, the lack of publicity works to the detriment of
the general creditors of the debtor, who omitted to secure
their claims. The security interest of either the supplier or
the bank removes the collateral from the pool of the debtor ^s
assets serving to satisfy the general creditors. The BGB^s
initial concept of publicity in the area of security
transfers^®° was intended to protect subsequent general
creditors against erroneous appraisals of the debtor ^s assets
^'^Judgment of Nov. 15, 1960, Bundesgerichtshof , V.
Zivilsenat, 33 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
Zivilsachen 390, 394-94 (1961) (hereinafter: 33 BGHZ 390)
^^'33 BGHZ at 394-95.
^°°See supra Part 2.
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caused by ignorance of any part thereof being subject to a
security interest. ^*^ This principle of publicity in securities
has been contravened and in practice almost completely ousted
by the recognition of the non-possessory and secret security
transfers. Since their creation only requires internal - and
informal - agreements between the secured party and the
debtor, the subsequent general creditor need not notice the
security transfer and the loss of the debtor ^s assets being
available for his satisfaction. Therefore the general creditor
may provide the debtor with credit based on an erroneous
assessment of the debtor *s capacity to satisfy this debt for
return payment.
Although available, credit reports are of comparatively little
help since they generally reveal only the debtor ^s performance
in the past, pending insolvency or other major judicial
proceedings and the status of certain limited assets publicly
disclosed. These reports rest on court and bankruptcy records
and an appraisal of some of the debtor ^s assets as far as they
are recorded at public office, i.e. in the commercial and the
land and title registers, or otherwise published, i.e. in
balance sheets of certain business entities. They cannot and
do not consider the current status of encumbrances of personal
property due to security transactions.
^Pignora tacita; Baur, supra note 263, at 549-50.
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In an effort to avoid harsh results for the general creditors
courts have invalidated security interests in extreme cases,
when the secured party has acquired excessive and opaque
security interests "consciously putting up with the not remote
danger that unaware creditors subsequently sustain damages". ^^^
Nevertheless, since the exception recognized by the courts
only applies in rare situations, the subsequent general
creditors also have to be considered as the bereaved of the
lack of publicity in the modern German system of securities in
personal property. ^^^
VI. Conclusions for the operation of the German legal system
of securities in personal property in business financing
In the area of business financing the German legal system is
characterized by the lack of publicity. In deviation from the
pledge as the sole statutory means for a security interest in
personal property the practice has developed a system of
security instruments based on constructive possession allowing
the debtor to use the collateral. Neither the judiciary or the
"^So-called: "Glaeubigergefaehrdung" . Judgment of April 9,
1932, Reichsgericht, IX. Zivilsenat, 136 Entscheidungen des
Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen 247, 254 (1932). Baur , supra
note 263, at 550, describes this development tersely:
'Pledge according to the BGB: Realization of publicity.
Atypical security interests: Disregard of publicity.
Invalidity of the atypical security interest: In crass
violations of publicity.'
^^^Baur, supra note 263, at 549-50, bases his considerations
implicitly on the same opinion.
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legislature have created a public-notice requirement
substituting the transfer of possession. Thus, the German law
on securities in personal property completely realizes the
debtor ^s interest in both the ability to use the collateral
and the secrecy of the security transaction. Consequently, the
secrecy causes the debtor ^s ostensible ownership and
uncertainty among creditors regarding the priority among
conflicting security interests.^*"
In a far reaching response to the uncertainty the courts have
established a mesh of rules subordinating various security
interests to others generally to the disadvantage of banks;
besides the complete protection of the collateral's final
resale buyers only the suppliers of a business can be sure to
acquire a perfect security for the purchase money, if they
extend their reservation of title. The courts thereby have
responded to the what they see as unfair advantages of the
banks. These advantages spring from being first secured
creditor and having the power to stipulate or dictate security
agreements with the debtor. The priority rules do not help the
banks. The bank must investigate the rights in the prospective
collateral, and must regularly rely on the debtor's statements
regarding the closing dates of even informal security
transactions. The bank faces the risk of subsequent
""Since the German law does not require perfection to gain
priority in a conflict, the issue of priority and the
uncertainty concerns the security interests' validity.
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transferees acquiring the collateral in good faith due to
ostensible ownership or being tempted to deprive the financer
of his security interest fraudulently.
Overall it can be concluded, that the German legal system
comprehensively gives effect to the debtor ^s secrecy interest
and the supplier's interest to be assured of a perfect
security for the purchase money. The banks either are
subordinated to other creditors, especially suppliers, and
therefore have not acquired a valid security interest or at
least have to bear the burden of diligent inquiry and
uncertainty regarding a potential conflict of security
interests.
Final comparison and conclusions
I. The advantage of certainty and the risks and costs under
the public-notice-filing system of U.C.C. Article 9
In contrast to the German laws on securities in personal
property the public-notice-filing system under U.C.C. Article
9 in combination with the first-to-file priority rule
establishes certainty and predictability among competing
secured creditors. But this advantage for the secured
creditors has its price. Secured creditors face the risk of
failing to comply with the formal requirements of proper
filing and thus of sustaining severe losses due to mere per-
quota satisfaction in the debtor *s bankruptcy like any general
creditor. The impact of improper filing under the system gives
rise to a significant volume of litigation solely concerning
the issue of compliance with the filing requirements. Most of
the litigation emerges from trustees in bankruptcy
challenging the adequacy of the particular filing under the
"strong-arm" power. Additionally, there incur some costs
linked to the filing procedure itself, the filing fees and
expenses for the preparation of the financing statement and
its filing. In addition, the searcher of the records bears the
risk of trivial errors in the financing statement by the
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senior creditor and of mistakes in the indexing process and
search reports caused by the officer in the filing office,
which may mislead the searcher. The searcher consequentially
may grant credit to the debtor without discovery of a prior
security interest. The searcher also has to pay some moderate
fee for the search report.
Such costs linked to the bureaucracy of the filing system
encompassing losses due to noncompliance with formalities,
mistakes by officers, litigation costs as well as filing and
searching fees and expenses do not incur under the informal
German legal system of securities in personal property. But
creditors basically depend on the debtor ^s representations
regarding prior securities without the possibility of simple
and accurate verification through a public recording system.
In part the priority rules reduce the exposures which
creditors would otherwise face from the secret and informal
system. In light of these priority rules, creditors are
normally disappointed only in the event of misrepresentation,
when the creditor itself has not employed due diligence in its
inquiry, or when a subsequent creditor or purchaser of the
collateral qualifies as good faith transferee.
II. Economic benefits under the public-notice-filing system
From an overall economic perspective, the first-to-file
priority rule and its core element, the public-notice filing
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system, seem to be more efficient than the informal German
system of securities in personal property. The assurance of
priority to the first creditor, who "stakes his claim" by
filing a financing statement, has been held to encourage
financers to provide businesses with initial credit and
thereby to increase economic activity. Moreover, financers
have an incentive to monitor and counsel debtors in financial
matters by providing external capital, which improves
effective financial management of businesses. Since the
financer "signals" his information about the debtor ^s
creditworthiness through the public-notice-filing system to
the credit market, subsequent creditors generally are supposed
to be able to make a sophisticated credit decision and thereby
to minimize inefficient distribution of financial resources by
"overlending"^®^ to debtors facing insolvency. In contrast, the
uncertainty about priority under the informal German system
presumably at least causes hesitation towards credit decisions
paralyzing economic initiatives.
III. The preferable balance of interests under the
public-notice-filing system in general
This comparison also has revealed that the public-notice-
filing system under U.C.C. Article 9 generally gives effect to
a compromise of the involved interests superior to the German
'Kanda/Levmore , 80 Va.L.Rev. at 2142
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legal system lacking any defined policy in this regard at all.
Basically the public-notice-filing system serves and creates
certainty among creditors and transferees regarding the
existence of a perfected security interest in the collateral
and thereby overcomes the risks of the debtor ^s ostensible
ownership including fraudulent conveyances. In combination
with the first-to-file priority rule the certainty extends to
the priority over conflicting security interests in the same
collateral particularly in the debtor^s insolvency.
In so far as this certainty is impaired by the consequences of
noncompliance with the filing system^ s formalities rendering
the creditor unsecured in the debtor ^s bankruptcy, this
inherent risk of an administrative system is satisfactorily
allocated to the filing secured party according to the
principle of causal responsibility. The other significant
impairment of certainty concerns the searcher ^s burden to bear
the risk of misleading mistakes by the filing officer. The
only - but not compelling - explanation for this allocation of
risks rests on the secured party ^s legitimate reliance on the
correct procedure in the filing office and the searcher ^s
basic responsibility for the result of his investigations and
his nearness to the debtor ^s representations in his credit
transaction.
By establishing the general certainty in trade the filing
system surmounts the debtor *s interest to conceal the entire
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security transaction and its need for financial aid. But on
the other hand under U.C.C. Article 9 the filing creditor is
not forced to disclose any trade secrets contained in the
terms of the transaction; since to this extent the secrecy
interest is protected, the system generally avoids
disproportionate infringements of interests.
In contrast, the German legal system gives only limited effect
to the traders certainty interest. It factually prefers the
debtor ^s secrecy interest comprehensively. Since the debtor ^s
interest to hide the security transaction itself and its
shortfall of capital ultimately aims to mislead the trade,
this interest is not as compelling as the traders certainty
interest, which initially was assured under the BGB and thus
can be called legitimate. Therefore the imbalance of interests
under the German legal system is disproportionate. Publicity
of security interests and the public-notice-filing system
under U.C.C. Article 9 in particular accomplish a compromise
of interests clearly preferable to the operation of the German
legal system on securities in personal property.
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IV. Policies of efficiency and fairness underlying the
different resolutions of the conflict between principal
financer and supplier and the impact on interstate commerce
between the United States and Germany
But in the important conflict between principal financers and
suppliers of a business the German courts have developed a
system of priority under aspects of fairness, which is
favorable to the practice according to the principles of the
U.C.C. . Under German law the floating lien of the principal
bank of a business is overall subordinated to the supplier's
reservation of title, which is notoriously extended to the
proceeds arising from the resale of the goods. In establishing
this principle, the courts have considered that under the
primary axiom of first-to-create priority the banks would
always prevail over subsequent creditors seeking security
since the banks are routinely the first creditors of the
business. Moreover, the banks generally tend to be oversecured
by collateral significantly exceeding the amount of credit in
value; in addition to securities in personal property they
typically are also secured by land charges. Thus, for security
purposes the banks are - at least substantially - secured
without a prior security in the goods transferred by the
supplier and in the proceeds thereof. In contrast, the
supplier has nothing else but the delivered goods possibly
serving as security for the purchase money. Thus, for
security purposes the supplier virtually depends on the
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priority of the retained ownership in the delivered goods in
contrast to the bank.
Furthermore, the banks ultimately also benefit from the supply
of goods since it is necessary to run the debtor ^s business
and thereby to enable return payments plus interest, the
banks ^ profit, from the debtor ^s cash-flow. It appears unfair
to let the banks share from these benefits of the supply
transactions and not only leave the risk of default with
payment of the purchase price solely with the supplier, but
also take the goods and proceeds for own security purposes.
Because of the interest which the principal financer receives
from the business^ cash-flow for its loan and its investment
of external capital in the business, the principal financer
basically has a stake in the business much like a joint
venturer. Therefore it seems unfair to prefer the bank over
suppliers in the event of the business^ failure. This would
deliberate the bank substantially from the consequences of
such failure at the expense of the far less engaged supplier.
In addition, a binding effect of the bank^s security agreement
with the debtor on the supplier depriving the latter of the
ability to secure the purchase money would contravene with the
fairness principle in contract law prohibiting contracts,
which harm third parties. ^^^ Unfairness under this aspect
^'^Judgment of Nov. 12, 1980, Bundesgerichtshof , VIII.
Zivilsenat, 78 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
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especially results from the bank^s knowledge that the business
debtor will and must engage in supply transactions to run the
business .^®'' Since eventually the bank acquires a security in
the inventory prior to the security of subsequent creditors
upon payment of the purchase money to the supplier, and
therefore inventory financing is not entirely useless for the
bank, it seems adequate to overall subordinate the bank^s lien
to the supplier's reservation of title under the criterion of
fairness.
In contrast, the principles under the U.C.C. preferring the
principal lienor over the supplier do not give effect to these
considerations of fairness. They fundamentally rest on private
and social efficiency. The demotion of the retention of title
to the reservation of a security interest, the notification
requirement for the priority of a purchase money security
interest in inventory, the exclusion of accounts proceeds from
the scope of priority of such interest, the acknowledgement of
negative pledge clauses and the attachment of the floating
lien to the delivered goods free of the supplier's right to
reclamation all work to prevent the supplier from obtaining
any security for the purchase money prior to the floating
lien. This policy of general subordination of the supplier
Zivilsachen 369, 374-75 (1981).
^^'Courts basically police the banks' security agreements on
grounds of unconscionability pursuant to BGB § 138 (1)
because of knowingly endangering third party creditor's
interests; see supra Part 2 IV. D.
.
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cannot be considered fair for the reason that the supplier is
free to bargain for assurances or subordination statements
from the floating lienor since the supplier typically lacks
sufficient bargaining power to do so.
The United States^ policy rather has been justified on grounds
of economic efficiency. The assurance of priority to the
principal lender can be considered to give an incentive to the
credit market to be the first financer of a business and
thereby increase economic activity. It also may reduce the
risk premium reflected in the interest rate and compensate the
principal financer for monitoring and counselling the debtor
for the benefit of the credit market receiving the lienor^
s
information about the debtor ^s creditworthiness through the
filing system. Upon this information subsequent creditors can
make sophisticated credit decisions and individually and
socially avoid wasteful distribution of financial resources.
The U.C.C.^s resolution of the conflict between floating
lienor and supplier appears as a novelty to the vast majority
of German lawyers. In German legal culture the "economic
analysis of law" has commonly been rejected at least in so far
as it declares overall social efficiency to the maxim of law
in private, including commercial, transactions. They are
entered into for the benefit of the parties, but not of an
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entire market or society.^®® The assurance of fairness and
equity rather than efficiency generally are regarded as the
prior tasks of law.^®'
The ignorance of German lawyers and businessmen about the
impact of efficiency criteria on the concept of security
interests in personal property under the U.C.C. and on the
overall inferiority of the supplier's security for the
purchase money in particular turned out to be disastrous in
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp., Ltd. v. HFH USA
Corporation.^^° In this case a German supplier sold and shipped
machinery under reservation of ownership to his customer in
the United States. ^^^ A financing statement had not been filed
until the supplier became aware of the buyer's financial
difficulties. At the time of the filing the grace period for
filing after delivery had already expired, ^^^ so that the
^°*Guenter H. Roth, Handels- und Gesellschaftsrecht - Das
Recht des kaufmaennischen Unternehmens (4th ed. 1994), pp.
9-12; Jens Hausmann, Die Bedeutung der Rechtsfolgeanordnung
"gelten als" in § 25 Abs. 1 Satz 2 HGB - Ein Beitrag zum
Verhaeltnis von Fiktion, Vermutung und Rechtsschein, 31
Juristische Schriftenreihe 80-81 (1992), with respect to
the inefficient allocation of performance in HGB § 25 (1)
sentence 2.
^^'Other objections concern the facts that markets do not
operate optimally and that participants in the market
frequently not only act for other purposes than economic
gain (Roth, supra note 588, at 11-12).
^'°805 F.Supp. 133 (W.D. N.Y. 1992).
"^805 F.Supp. at 139-45.
^'^U.C.C. § 9-312 (4) (1990). The court acknowledged, that
the debtor had obtained possession upon arrival and storage
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purchase money security interest could not defeat the priority
of the floating lien of the debtor ^s principal financer.
The New York court has refused to enforce a choice-of-law
clause in the sales contract providing that German law and
thereby the German principles for the reservation of title
shall govern the sale. It has recognized the preference of the
supplier's reservation of title to the floating lien under
German law vis-a-vis the priority of the floating lien under
the U.C.C.. The floating lienor would have been subordinated
to the supplier, if German law were applicable. ^^^ Thus, the
floating lien would lose its priority status which it enjoyed
under United States' law. Since the lienor was not party to
the sales contract, this result would have violated public
policy.^'" The court has stated that the enforcement of the
reservation of title according to the German laws would have
offended the "fundamental purpose of ... U.C.C.'s Article 9:
'to create commercial certainty and predictability by allowing
third party creditors to rely on the specific perfection and
priority rules that govern collateral within the scope of
Article 9. '"595 Remarkably, Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
of the machinery in the free trade zone in Buffalo, New
York, (805 F.Supp. at 144).
^"805 F.Supp. at 140.
^'"805 F.Supp. at 140.
^^^805 F.Supp. at 141, citing: Carbon v. Tandy Computer
Leasing, 803 F.2d 391, 394 (8th Cir. 1986).
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Corp., Ltd. highlights the principal differences between the
German and the United States^ legal systems on securities in
personal property.
>
'
